People v. Williams
| Decision Date | 16 October 2017 |
| Docket Number | H042903 |
| Parties | THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. BARTON RHETT WILLIAMS, Defendant and Appellant. |
| Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
(Santa Clara County Super. Ct. No. C1230617)
Defendant Barton Rhett Williams appeals following his conviction by a jury of first degree murder. On appeal, he raises claims of instructional error, prosecutorial misconduct, ineffective assistance of counsel, and cumulative error. He also contends the trial court erred in determining that two out-of-state convictions were strikes for purposes of the Three Strikes Law. We shall affirm.
The Santa Clara County District Attorney charged defendant with murder (Pen. Code, § 187)1 and alleged that he had personally inflicted great bodily injury within the meaning of sections 667 and 1192.7. The first amended information also alleged that defendant had sustained two prior strike convictions (§§ 667, subd. (b)-(i), 1170.12)—a first degree burglary conviction in violation of Oregon Revised Statute section 164.225and robbery in violation of Oregon Revised Statute section 164.405.2 It further alleged that the Oregon robbery conviction constituted a serious felony conviction (§ 667, subd. (a)) and that defendant had served a prison prior term in California (§ 667.5, subd. (b)).
The case proceeded to a jury trial in late 2014. The following evidence was adduced at trial.
Late on the night of April 16, 2012, Witwas Lee Shugan walked to his parked car after leaving work at the Thai restaurant he owns in downtown San Jose. As he entered the parking lot at 35 South Second Street, defendant approached him and asked him to call 911. Shugan saw flames and realized a woman was on fire. Shugan notified the parking attendant, Terrence Cruz, who called 911. That call came in at 11:43 p.m. Cruz threw water on the flames to put them out.
The victim was sixty-four-year-old Patricia Storey, defendant's wife. Storey was alive when paramedics arrived, despite extensive and horrific injuries. She had sustained burns to 78 percent of her body, many of them third and fourth degree. Storey's treating physician at Santa Clara Valley Medical Center testified that Storey's burns were some of the worst the doctor had ever seen and were not survivable. Story died from her injuries at 2:00 p.m. on April 17th. The assistant medical examiner who conducted Storey's autopsy identified her cause of death as thermal and inhalation injuries due to engulfment in fire.
San Jose police officers Mike Waara and Adam Nyein were among the first responders. Each independently interviewed defendant at the scene and recordings of those interviews were played for the jury.
Defendant told Officer Waara he and his wife bought two pints of vodka at 7:30 or8:00 p.m. that night and came to the parking lot. At some point, he lit a cigarette for her and then walked to the Safeway to buy a soda. When he returned 15 to 20 minutes later, she was on fire. Defendant said she must have passed out with the cigarette. Defendant told Officer Nyein a similar story.
The incident was captured on the parking lot's surveillance video, which was played at trial. According to witness testimony describing the video, it showed defendant and Storey sitting towards the back of the parking lot. Storey was in a chair with her back to the camera; defendant was sitting on some steps in front of her. The video showed several small flashes of light originate in defendant's lap and move onto Storey's lap. Then smoke became visible, followed by large flames engulfing Storey. Nearly three minutes after the flames became visible on Storey, the video showed defendant using a blanket to smother the fire.
Officers arrested defendant on April 18th after viewing the surveillance video.
Arson investigator Sandra Wells determined that the fire originated in Storey's lap and that it was a quick burning fire, which is not consistent with a dropped cigarette.
Karen Froming, M.D., a clinical neuropsychologist, testified for the defense as an expert in neuropsychology and the effects of substance abuse and alcohol on the brain. Dr. Froming testified that she met with defendant five times, with each session lasting several hours, to interview him and conduct testing. She opined that defendant suffers from various neuropsychological deficits, including slow processing speed, poor strategic planning, and attentional problems. She further testified that he suffers from severe alcohol dependence and had been a chronic abuser of alcohol for 20 years. Dr. Froming opined that a person with deficits like defendant's—delayed processing speed and strategic planning problems—might approach something like a person on fire in a "haphazard" and illogical way despite having good intentions.
In closing, the prosecution argued two theories of first degree murder—premeditated murder and felony murder. As to felony murder, the trial court instructedthe jury:
On December 22, 2014, after deliberating for approximately 30 minutes, the jury returned a verdict of guilty of first degree murder.
On July 14, 2015, following a bench trial on priors, the trial court granted the prosecution's request to amend the information to allege that the Oregon burglary conviction constituted a serious felony conviction (§ 667, subd. (a)) and concluded that the prior Oregon convictions qualified as strikes under the Three Strikes Law.
The trial court sentenced defendant on September 25, 2015. The court imposed a term of 85 years to life, consisting of an indeterminate term of 75 years to life on the murder conviction plus an additional 10-year term for the two section 667, subdivision (a) enhancements. The court struck the prison prior (§ 667.5(b)) pursuant to section 1385.
Defendant timely appealed.
Defendant contends the trial court erred in instructing the jury on felony murder because the underlying felony—arson—was merely incidental to the killing. Specifically, he says there was no evidence he harbored an intent to commit arson separate from any intent to kill, such that the theory of felony murder was inapplicable and the instruction at issue was unsupported by substantial evidence. Alternatively,defendant says the instruction was incomplete in that jurors were not informed that they could not convict him of felony murder if they concluded that the arson was merely incidental to the killing. The People respond that defendant forfeited his challenge, which, in any event, fails because the rule on which he relies applies only in the context of a felony-murder special circumstance allegation.
Defendant failed to object to the felony murder instruction below. The People contend he thereby forfeited his claim of instructional error. We reach the merits of defendant's claim despite the lack of objection for two reasons. First, defendant contends the error affected his "substantial rights," such that the instruction is reviewable "even though no objection was made . . . in the lower court . . . ." (§ 1259.) "Ascertaining whether claimed instructional error affected the substantial rights of the defendant necessarily requires an examination of the merits of the claim." (People v. Andersen (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 1241, 1249.) Second, defendant asserts his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to object. To resolve that claim, we must address the merits of the issue.
"It is error to give an instruction which, while correctly stating a principle of law, has no application to the facts of the case." (People v. Guiton (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1116, 1129.) (People v. Waidla (2000) 22 Cal.4th 690, 733.) In other words, our review of the claimed instructional error is de novo. (People v. Johnson (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 505, 509-510.)
Under the felony-murder doctrine, any killing "committed in the perpetration of, or attempt to perpetrate, arson [or another enumerated felony] . . . is murder of the first degree." (§ 189.) "Felony-murder liability does not require an intent to kill, or even implied malice, but merely an intent to commit the underlying felony." (People v. Gonzalez (2012) 54 Cal.4th 643, 654.) ...
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