People v. Williams

• Decision Date: 28 August 2017
• Docket Number: No. 1-14-2733,1-14-2733
• Citation: 88 N.E.3d 66,2017 IL App (1st) 142733
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Torolan WILLIAMS, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

2017 IL App (1st) 142733

88 N.E.3d 66

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.Torolan WILLIAMS, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 1-14-2733

Appellate Court of Illinois, First District, FIRST DIVISION.

Filed August 28, 2017

Rehearing denied September 20, 2017

Michael J. Pelletier, Patricia Mysza, and Deepa Punjabi, of State Appellate Defender's Office, of Chicago, for appellant.

Kimberly M. Foxx, State's Attorney, of Chicago (Alan J. Spellberg, Jon Walters, and Nancy Colletti, Assistant State's Attorneys, of counsel), for the People.

JUSTICE HARRIS delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

¶ 1 The defendant-appellant, Torolan Williams (hereinafter "defendant"), was charged with five counts of first degree murder and one count of armed robbery. During the ensuing trial, the State used historical cell phone site data and defendant's own statement that he was a lookout to implicate him in the crimes. After hearing all the evidence, the jury found defendant guilty on all counts. The trial court sentenced him to life in prison for the five murders and 20 years in prison for the armed robbery.

¶ 2 Defendant raises several issues on appeal. Defendant argues that (1) the trial court erred in failing to suppress statements that he acted as a lookout because they were the product of coercion, (2) the trial court erred in admitting the historical cell phone site records into evidence, (3) the State improperly presented evidence concerning possible sentencing, (4) the State violated a pretrial ruling concerning the use of the historical cell phone site records, and (5) he suffered prejudice when the trial court referred to three of the verdict forms as "guilty forms."

¶ 3 Based on the record before this court, the trial court did not err in admitting the historical cell site records or incriminating statements, and defendant was not denied a fair trial.

¶ 4 JURISDICTION

¶ 5 On May 22, 2014, a jury found defendant guilty of five counts of first degree murder and one count of armed robbery. On June 22, 2014, he filed a motion for a new trial. On August 15, 2014, the trial court denied defendant's motion and sentenced him to life in prison on the murder convictions and 20 years on the armed robbery conviction. Defendant timely filed his notice of appeal on the same day. Accordingly, this court has jurisdiction pursuant to article VI, section 6, of the Illinois Constitution and Illinois Supreme Court Rules 603 and 606, governing appeals from a final judgment of conviction in a criminal case entered below.

Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, § 6 ; Ill. S. Ct. Rs. 603, 606 (eff. Feb. 6, 2013).

¶ 6 BACKGROUND

¶ 7 On appeal, defendant does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence used to convict him. We therefore only discuss the facts relevant to the disposition of this appeal.

¶ 8 On the night of April 22, 2008, Lakesha Doss, Whitney Flowers, Anthony Scales, Reginald Walker, and Donovan Richardson were shot to death in a house at 7607 South Rhodes Avenue in Chicago, Illinois. On the morning of June 9, 2008, defendant was at Northwestern Hospital for the birth of his son when two Chicago police detectives arrested him in connection with the murders.

¶ 9 Prior to trial, defendant filed a motion to suppress statements he made while in police custody. The motion alleged that due to defendant's "physical, mental, and psychological state, the police refusal to allow Torolan to make a phone call coerced Torolan to make statements that were not freely and rationally given." At the hearing on the motion, Chicago Police Detective Murphy testified that, upon arrival at Area 2 Police Headquarters, defendant was placed into an interview room, advised of his Miranda rights, and indicated that he understood them. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). Defendant first requested to make a phone call at 10:08 a.m., which was denied. His second request was denied just after 11:00 a.m. At that time, Det. Murphy, who was preparing defendant to be transported to a nearby location, told defendant that he could make a phone call when he went to lockup. The detectives drove defendant to the area of 69th and Martin Luther King Drive, and then returned to Area 2 around 1:00 p.m. At that time, defendant agreed to take a polygraph. On the way to take the test, and while still shackled, defendant jumped out of the officers' vehicle and started running down the street. After returning to Area 2, defendant stated he jumped out because he was trying to make a phone call.

¶ 10 At just after 2:00 p.m., defendant stated that his son was born prematurely after a risky and complicated delivery. He told the detectives his son was being tested every 20 minutes due to medical problems. Defendant informed the officers he knew who did it and would talk to a State's Attorney, but wanted to make sure his son was okay. The detectives declined his request for a phone call again—his fifth request.

¶ 11 Shortly thereafter, defendant indicated that he had additional information about the murders. In response, defendant was given his Miranda rights and again stated that he understood them. Defendant asked to speak with a State's Attorney and began speaking to detectives about the offense. Defendant had denied any involvement, but during this conversation, he stated that he had acted as a lookout for Michael King, who he claimed committed the murders.

¶ 12 At 5:45 p.m. Assistant State's Attorney (ASA) Fabio Valentini arrived to speak with the defendant. At around 6:30 p.m., defendant invoked his right to counsel and questioning ceased. About a half-hour later, defendant experienced stomach pains, and detectives transported him to Roseland Hospital. While at the hospital, and unknown to the detectives, defendant phoned a friend, who then called an attorney. Attorney John Lyke testified that he went to Roseland Hospital to see defendant but was not allowed entry to defendant's room. Attorney Lyke left the hospital without seeing defendant.

¶ 13 In its ruling on defendant's motion to suppress, the trial court ruled that defendant's statement made prior to his invocation of counsel at 6:28 p.m. would be admissible because defendant had not yet requested an attorney. The trial court suppressed the statements made at the hospital because attorney Lyke was denied access to the defendant. The trial court also suppressed statements made to the ASA later in the evening after the hospital.

¶ 14 Prior to trial, defendant also sought a Frye hearing on the State's proposed use of cell phone tower evidence. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). The State sought to use the cell phone records of Michael King and Arthur Brown to establish that their cell phones had connected to cell towers near the crime scene at the time of the offense. The State argued that the court did not need to hold a Frye hearing because there was nothing novel about the technology or science at issue. The court heard testimony from FBI Agent Joseph Raschke (hereinafter "Agent Raschke") that cell phones connect to cell towers via radio waves and the cell phone companies collect certain information during this process. Agent Raschke testified that he used the records provided to plot King's and Brown's cell phones on a map. After hearing this testimony, the court denied defendant's request for a Frye hearing. The court ruled that Agent Raschke could testify as to the location of the cell towers activated by the pair's cell phones the night of the murders. The trial court would not let Agent Raschke testify as to the exact location of the cell phones, or the precise coverage area of the connecting tower.

¶ 15 At trial, the State called Arthur Brown to testify concerning the events of the night of the murder. He acknowledged that he signed a cooperation agreement with the State on May 24, 2015. Brown agreed to testify at King's and defendant's trials in exchange for pleading guilty to one count of first degree murder for which he would serve 24 years in prison.

¶ 16 Brown explained that he and defendant were old high school friends. In April 2008, Brown lived in Lansing, Illinois. On April 22, Brown and his friend, Michael McKeel, were in Lansing drinking and smoking marijuana together. Eventually they ran out of drugs and decided to drive into the city using McKeel's car to buy more. After failing to find any, Brown called defendant and asked him if he knew where he could get some "kush," a high grade marijuana. Defendant invited them to his home, and the pair drove to 71st and Eggleston. When they arrived at defendant's residence, defendant stated that he would call Michael King to see if King had any kush. King told the group to meet him at 77th and Rhodes. When they arrived, defendant used Brown's phone to call King. Defendant left the car for several minutes and upon returning informed the pair that he had a "sweet lick," which Brown testified meant an easy robbery. Defendant asked Brown to stay and assist, which Brown did.

¶ 17 Brown explained that about an hour later, defendant called from a number he did not recognize. Defendant asked him to come down to the alley, and Brown went to the alley south of 76th off of Rhodes, where he observed King's Ford Focus parked by a garage. Brown sat on the steps of a nearby fire escape and waited. Eventually, King approached while carrying a flat screen television. Brown identified this television as being part of the State's evidence. Brown then saw defendant carrying a duffle bag. Brown placed the television in the car along with three others. Brown explained that they formed an assembly line, with King and defendant bringing items out of the house and Brown loading the goods. After they were done, the three drove back to defendant's place. In the car, defendant and King were talking and saying things like, "you're crazy, you're crazy," and "that was some crazy stuff that just went on." Upon arriving back at defendant's house, defendan...