People v. Williams

• Decision Date: 19 November 2009
• Docket Number: No. 105453.,105453.
• Citation: 920 N.E.2d 446,235 Ill.2d 178,336 Ill.Dec. 237
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellant, v. Paul WILLIAMS, Appellee.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

920 N.E.2d 446

235 Ill.2d 178

336 Ill. Dec. 237

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellant, v. Paul WILLIAMS, Appellee.

No. 105453.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

November 19, 2009.

Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, Springfield, Richard A. Devine and Anita Alvarez, State's Attorneys, Chicago (James E. Fitzgerald, Alan J. Spellberg, Anthony M. O'Brien, Assistant State's Attorneys, of counsel), for the People.

Michael J. Pelletier, State Appellate Defender, Patricia Unsinn, Deputy Defender, Ahmed A. Kosoko, Assistant Appellate Defender, Office of the State Appellate Defender, Chicago, for appellee.

OPINION

Justice THOMAS delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

This case involves the constitutionality of Illinois statutory provisions that make criminal offenses out of the acts of pirating sound recordings produced by others and failing to identify sound recordings with a label containing the actual name and address of the person who manufactured the recording. The appellate court found that the antipiracy provision was preempted by the federal Copyright Act of 1976, but it then rejected due process and first amendment challenges to the constitutionality of the labeling provision, which proscribes use of unidentified sound recordings. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the judgment of the appellate court in all respects.

BACKGROUND

The State charged defendant, Paul Williams, in a four-count information with violating sections 16-7 and 16-8 of the Criminal Code of 1961 (the Code) (720 ILCS 5/16-7, 16-8 (West 2004)). Section 16-7 of the Code is an antipiracy provision, which states in relevant part:

"(a) A person commits unlawful use of recorded sounds or images when he:

(1) Intentionally, knowingly or recklessly transfers or causes to be transferred without the consent of the owner any sounds or images recorded on any sound or audio visual recording with the purpose of selling or causing to be sold, or using or causing to be used for profit the article to which such sounds or recordings of sound are transferred.

(2) Intentionally, knowingly or recklessly sells, offers for sale, advertises for sale, uses or causes to be used for profit any such article described in subsection 16-7(a)(1) without consent of the owner." 720 ILCS 5/16-7(a)(1), (a)(2) (West 2004).

Section 16-7 defines "owner" as "the person who owns the master sound recording on which sound is recorded and from which the transferred recorded sounds are directly or indirectly derived, or the person who owns the rights to record or authorize the recording of a live performance." 720 ILCS 5/16-7(b)(2) (West 2004). A "master sound recording" is the original physical object on which a given set of sounds were first recorded and from which all other recordings are derived. 720 ILCS 5/16-7(b)(4) (West 2004).

Section 16-8 is the unidentified use of sound recordings statute and provides in relevant part as follows:

"(a) A person commits unlawful use of unidentified sound or audio visual recordings when he intentionally, knowingly, recklessly or negligently for profit manufactures, sells, distributes, vends, circulates, performs, leases or otherwise deals in and with unidentified sound or audio visual recordings or causes the manufacture, sale, distribution, vending, circulation, performance, lease or other dealing in and with unidentified sound or audio visual recordings." 720 ILCS 5/16-8(a) (West 2004).

The Code defines "unidentified sound or audio visual recording" as a "sound or audio visual recording without the actual name and full and correct street address of the manufacturer, and the name of the actual performers or groups prominently and legibly printed on the outside cover or jacket and on the label of such sound or audio visual recording." 720 ILCS 5/16-7(b)(5) (West 2004).

Counts I and II of the information charged defendant with violations of section 16-7 (unlawful use of recorded sounds or images), and counts III and IV charged violations of section 16-8 (unlawful use of unidentified sounds or audio visual images). Specifically, count I alleged that defendant intentionally or knowingly offered for sale sounds recorded on compact discs (CDs) without the consent of the owner of the master recording, and count II alleged that defendant committed the offense with respect to sounds or images recorded on digital video discs (DVDs). See 720 ILCS 5/16-7 (West 2008). Count III alleged that defendant failed to identify the manufacturer of the CDs he offered for sale, and count IV alleged that he failed to identify the manufacturer of the DVDs he offered. See 720 ILCS 5/16-8 (West 2008).

The cause proceeded to a bench trial in the circuit court of Cook County, and the evidence presented at trial is fully set forth by the appellate court in its opinion, and we will set forth here only those facts necessary to the disposition of the present appeal. 376 Ill.App.3d 875, 315 Ill.Dec. 235, 876 N.E.2d 235. It is sufficient to note that the evidence showed that defendant attempted to sell pirated compact disc recordables (CDRs) at a laundromat in Chicago. It was explained that illegal music is burned from CDs to CDRs. Many of the CDRs that defendant possessed and offered for sale contained songs of contemporary artists; the master recording to those songs or CDs was owned by the five major labels—Universal, Sony, EMI, BMG and Time-Warner—and defendant was not authorized to distribute this music. It was also shown that the CDs did not have a label containing the true name and address of the manufacturer.

Defendant was convicted of all four counts and sentenced to two years' probation. The appellate court affirmed defendant's conviction under count III, which was based on a violation of section 16-8 of the Code. 376 Ill.App.3d 875, 315 Ill.Dec. 235, 876 N.E.2d 235. But it reversed the remaining counts. In doing so, it found that count I, which was based on a violation of section 16-7 of the Code, was expressly preempted by section 301 of the federal Copyright Act of 1976 (Act or Copyright Act) (17 U.S.C. § 101 et seq. (2000)). 376 Ill.App.3d at 891, 315 Ill.Dec. 235, 876 N.E.2d 235. It also found that the evidence presented pertaining to the nature of the DVDs was insufficient to support the convictions under counts II and IV. 376 Ill.App.3d at 885-86, 315 Ill.Dec. 235, 876 N.E.2d 235.

The State filed a petition for leave to appeal challenging the appellate court's ruling that section 16-7 was preempted. We allowed the State's petition for leave to appeal. See 210 Ill.2d R. 315. Before this court, the State challenges only the reversal of count I based on preemption and does not challenge the appellate court's reversal of counts II and IV based on the insufficiency of the evidence. Defendant in turn challenges the appellate court's ruling that affirmed his conviction under count III, contending that section 16-8 violates the free speech clause of the first amendment (U.S. Const., amend. I) and the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment (U.S. Const., amend. XIV). See 155 Ill.2d R. 318(a) ("[A]ny appellee * * * may seek and obtain any relief warranted by the record on appeal without having filed a separate petition for leave to appeal or notice of cross-appeal or separate appeal").

ANALYSIS

I. Federal Preemption of Section 16-7

We first address the State's claim that the appellate court incorrectly determined that the state's antipiracy provision of section 16-7 is preempted by federal law. The supremacy clause of article VI of the United States Constitution provides that the laws of the United States "shall be the supreme Law of the Land * * * any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding." U.S. Const., art. VI, cl. 2. Thus, state law is null and void if it conflicts with federal law. Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, 197 Ill.2d 112, 117, 258 Ill. Dec. 690, 757 N.E.2d 75 (2001), rev'd on other grounds, 537 U.S. 51, 123 S.Ct. 518, 154 L.Ed.2d 466 (2002). Generally, there is a presumption that historic state police powers are not superseded by federal law. Sprietsma, 197 Ill.2d at 117, 258 Ill.Dec. 690, 757 N.E.2d 75. This presumption does not apply, however, where the proscribed activity is also within the realm of traditional federal regulation and federal concerns predominate in the case. Sprietsma, 197 Ill.2d at 118-19, 258 Ill. Dec. 690, 757 N.E.2d 75.

Here, we do not believe that the presumption is applicable. Illinois first enacted a statute specifically protecting sound recordings on August 14, 1975, with the enactment of section 16-7. See Ill. Ann.Stat., ch. 38, par 16-7, Historical Note, at 224 (Smith-Hurd 1977). But Congress first protected sound recordings with an amendment to the Copyright Act in 1971. Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 552, 93 S.Ct. 2303, 2307, 37 L.Ed.2d 163, 171 (1973) (the amendment was passed to allow federal copyright protection of sound recordings fixed, published and copyrighted on and after February 15, 1972). It did so pursuant to its authority under the federal constitution, which grants Congress the power "[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries." U.S. Const., art. I, § 8, cl. 8. Despite this constitutional provision, the power to define and protect copyrightable property was regarded as concurrent, that is, shared by the federal and state governments; the constitutional provision did not, of itself, vest exclusive control of the field to Congress. See Hicks v. State, 109 Md. App. 113, 120-21, 674 A.2d 55, 59 (1996), citing Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591, 604, 8 L.Ed. 1055, 1060 (1834). Until the enactment of the Copyright Act of 1976, federal law, for the most part, protected only certain kinds of published works; it was state law, to the extent that it existed at all, that protected unpublished works. See Hic...