People v. Williams

• Decision Date: 25 September 2015
• Docket Number: No. 1–13–1359.,1–13–1359.
• Citation: 41 N.E.3d 607
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. Sandy WILLIAMS, Defendant–Appellant.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

41 N.E.3d 607

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff–Appellee

v.Sandy WILLIAMS, Defendant–Appellant.

No. 1–13–1359.

Appellate Court of Illinois, First District, Sixth Division.

Sept. 25, 2015.

Michael J. Pelletier, Alan D. Goldberg, and Yasaman Hannah Navai, all of State Appellate Defender's Office, Chicago, for appellant.

Anita M. Alvarez, State's Attorney, Chicago (Anita M. Alvarez, Alan J. Spellberg, and Amy M. Watroba, Assistant State's Attorneys, of counsel), for the People.

OPINION

Justice DELORT

delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

¶ 1 This case is a postconviction sequel to a case heard on direct appeal, and on the merits, not merely by this court, but also by the Illinois Supreme Court and the United States Supreme Court. Defendant Sandy Williams claims that if he had been represented by better lawyers, it is arguable that United States Supreme Court Justice Clarence Thomas would have changed his deciding vote and invalidated crucial evidence introduced at Williams's trial. Williams filed a postconviction petition under the Post–Conviction Hearing Act (725 ILCS 5/122–1 et seq.

(West 2012)). The circuit court dismissed the petition, and we affirm.

¶ 2 The State charged defendant with two counts of aggravated criminal sexual assault, and one count each of aggravated kidnapping and aggravated robbery. At trial, the State elicited evidence that on February 10, 2000, defendant abducted a woman who was walking home from work. Defendant forced the victim into his car, sexually assaulted her, robbed her of both money and other belongings, and then pushed her out of the car and into the street. The victim ran home, told her mother what happened and the mother called the police. An ambulance arrived and transported the victim to the hospital where she provided a blood sample and a vaginal swab for a sexual assault kit. The kit was sent to the Illinois State Police crime lab for testing as well as to Cellmark Diagnostics Laboratory (Cellmark) in Germantown, Maryland, for additional testing.

¶ 3 On August 3, 2000, defendant was arrested on an unrelated offense. While in custody, he was required to provide a blood sample for a police database. When defendant's blood sample was tested and analyzed, his DNA matched the DNA of the unidentified suspect in the sexual assault. The victim viewed a lineup in which defendant participated, and she identified him as her attacker. Multiple forensic scientists from the Illinois State Police crime lab testified during trial concerning the testing, analysis and matching of the forensic evidence. In particular, forensic scientist Sandra Lambatos testified as an expert witness in forensic biology and forensic DNA analysis. She stated a match was made between the DNA profile of the assailant in the sexual assault produced by Cellmark with the DNA profile of defendant from his blood sample. While she admitted to not personally observing the testing at Cellmark, she did acknowledge that Cellmark was an accredited laboratory. The Cellmark report was not introduced into evidence, and Lambatos only referenced the report as background for forming her opinion that the DNA profiles matched.

¶ 4 Defendant's trial counsel moved to strike the portion of Lambatos's testimony concerning Cellmark's testing based on a violation of defendant's sixth amendment right to confrontation. The court denied defendant's motion and ultimately found him guilty on all counts. The court sentenced him to two concurrent terms of natural life in prison for the aggravated criminal sexual assaults, a consecutive term of 60 years in prison for aggravated kidnapping and a concurrent term of 15 years in prison for aggravated robbery.

¶ 5 Defendant appealed his conviction, contending, inter alia, that the report from Cellmark that Lambatos referenced in her testimony and used in her analysis was testimonial. Accordingly, he claimed that his right to confrontation was violated when no employee from Cellmark testified at his trial. In People v. Williams, 385 Ill.App.3d 359, 324 Ill.Dec. 246, 895 N.E.2d 961 (2008)

, this court, with one justice dissenting, affirmed defendant's convictions and held that “the report was not introduced to prove the truth of Cellmark's results” and “consequently the Confrontation Clause was not violated.” Id. at 370, 324 Ill.Dec. 246, 895 N.E.2d 961.

¶ 6 The Illinois Supreme Court subsequently granted defendant's petition for leave to appeal. In People v. Williams, 238 Ill.2d 125, 345 Ill.Dec. 425, 939 N.E.2d 268 (2010)

, our supreme court affirmed the lower courts' findings that Lambatos's reference to the Cellmark report did not violate defendant's right to confrontation because “the State did not offer Lambatos' testimony regarding the Cellmark report for the truth of the matter asserted and this testimony did not constitute ‘hearsay.’ ” Id. at 150, 345 Ill.Dec. 425, 939 N.E.2d 268.

¶ 7 The United States Supreme Court subsequently granted certiorari. In Williams v. Illinois, 567 U.S. ––––, 132 S.Ct. 2221, 183 L.Ed.2d 89 (2012)

, a plurality of justices (Chief Justice Roberts, and Justices Alito, Breyer and Kennedy) held that the Cellmark report was not offered for the truth of the matter asserted, but rather for the sole purpose of “explaining the assumptions on which that [expert] opinion rests.” Id. at ––––, 132 S.Ct. at 2228 (plurality op.). Consequently, defendant's right to confrontation was not violated. Id. at ––––, 132 S.Ct. at 2228. The plurality held, alternatively, that even if the Cellmark report had been admitted into evidence, it still would not have violated defendant's right to confrontation because the “report was sought not for the purpose of obtaining evidence to be used against” defendant, but rather to find an unidentified criminal on the loose. Id. at ––––, 132 S.Ct. at 2228.

¶ 8 Justice Thomas agreed with the plurality that the Cellmark report did not violate defendant's right to confrontation, but disagreed with its reasoning. Id. at ––––, 132 S.Ct. at 2255

(Thomas, J., concurring). He concluded that the report did not violate defendant's right to confrontation “solely” because the report “lacked the requisite formality and solemnity to be considered testimonial for purposes of the Confrontation Clause.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. at ––––, 132 S.Ct. at 2255.

¶ 9 Justice Kagan dissented, stating the report “was made to establish some fact in a criminal proceeding” and “identical * * * in all material respects” to other forensic reports the Court had already decided were testimonial. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. at ––––, 132 S.Ct. at 2266

(Kagan, J., dissenting, joined by Scalia, Ginsburg, and Sotomayor, JJ.) (citing Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 564 U.S. ––––, ––––, 131 S.Ct. 2705, 2717, 180 L.Ed.2d 610 (2011), and Melendez–Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 310, 129 S.Ct. 2527, 174 L.Ed.2d 314 (2009) ).

¶ 10 Defendant then filed a pro se postconviction petition, which is the subject of this appeal. The petition first alleged that his “trial counsel” was ineffective for failing to “question the State's expert witness concerning the partial forensic DNA profile that was completed by a [sic ] outsourced laboratory.” Second, his petition alleged that his “trial counsel” was also ineffective “for not raising the constitutional violation argument that the authors (experts) of the report's [sic ] effectively certified the report by signing it, thus violating the confrontation clause.” The petition concluded by stating that if the report had been deemed certified, Justice Thomas of the United States Supreme Court would have ruled in his favor. Finally, his petition requested additional forensic testing.

¶ 11 Defendant attached three documents to the petition to support his second claim: (1) Rule 11.1.2 of the FBI Quality Assurance Standards for Forensic DNA Testing Laboratories (the FBI Standards), which required “[a] signature and title, or equivalent identification, of the person(s) accepting responsibility for the content of the report;” (2) a 2008 manual from the Crime Laboratory Accreditation Program of the American Society of Crime Laboratory Directors/Laboratory Accreditation Board (ASCLD/LAB), which stated that laboratories accredited with ASCLD/LAB in the “Biology subdiscipline of DNA will be inspected under * * * the applicable standards of the FBI's Quality Assurance Standards for Forensic DNA Testing Laboratories;” and (3) a transcript containing testimony from Dr. Robyn Cotton, a former manager of research and laboratory director at Cellmark, from a proceeding unrelated to defendant's. Highlighted in the Cotton transcript was a portion where Cotton stated that Cellmark was accredited by ASCLD/LAB from 1994 until the laboratory closed in 2005. Additionally, the petition alleged that in the transcript, Cotton “testified that, under Cellmark's procedures, when she signs off on a report, the expert is personally vouching for the accuracy of the Report.”

¶ 12 The circuit court dismissed defendant's petition based on procedural grounds because defendant's claims could have been raised on direct appeal. Therefore, the court concluded the “doctrine of waiver” precluded it from entertaining the petition's claims. Alternatively, the court noted that even if the petition's claims were not “waive[d],” they were nevertheless meritless. This appeal followed.

¶ 13 As a threshold matter, we must address the parties' dispute regarding whether defendant properly preserved his contention for appeal. On appeal, defendant contends that the court erred in dismissing his petition where it set forth an arguable claim that his “appellate counsel” was ineffective arguing before the United States Supreme Court for “failing to properly respond to a dispositive argument advanced by the State.” Specifically, defendant argues that appellate counsel should have cited to the documents attached to his petition. The State counters, arguing that defendant's...