State v. Reaves
| Decision Date | 25 May 1977 |
| Docket Number | Nos. 59065 and 59066,s. 59065 and 59066 |
| Citation | 254 N.W.2d 488 |
| Parties | STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. George H. REAVES, Appellant. |
| Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
Bertram B. Metcalf, Davenport, for appellant.
Richard C. Turner, Atty. Gen., and Edward N. Wehr, County Atty., for appellee.
Considered en banc.
Defendant has brought separate appeals after entering pleas of guilty in two separate charges brought against him in Scott County. In cause # 17274 defendant was charged with the crime of breaking and entering in violation of § 708.8, The Code. He twice entered guilty pleas to the charge. After first entering a plea of guilty he was sentenced to a ten-year term at the men's reformatory. Thereafter he was permitted to withdraw the guilty plea and enter a plea of not guilty. Thereafter he withdrew the plea of not guilty and again entered a plea of guilty. The second guilty plea proceeding is challenged in this appeal.
In a separate cause # 17919 defendant was charged with larceny of a motor vehicle in violation of § 321.82, The Code. He was allowed to enter a plea of guilty to the lesser-included offense of operating a motor vehicle without the owner's consent in violation of § 321.76, The Code.
Defendant assigns the same propositions as grounds for reversal in both appeals. He claims: "The trial court erred in failing to inform the defendant that one of the essential elements of the crime of breaking and entering and of the crime of operating a motor vehicle without the owner's consent is intent."
The present question excepted, our review of the record discloses the trial court exhaustively complied with the suggestions contained in State v. Sisco, 169 N.W.2d 542 (Iowa 1969) and Brainard v. State, 222 N.W.2d 711 (Iowa 1974). In the proceeding in which defendant pleaded guilty to breaking and entering the record discloses the following:
In the proceeding in which defendant pleaded guilty to operating a motor vehicle without owner's consent the record discloses the following:
Of course intent is an essential and necessary element of the crime of breaking and entering. State v. Berenger, 161 N.W.2d 798, 800 (Iowa 1968). It is equally clear intent is an essential element of the crime of operating a motor vehicle without consent. State v. Drummer, 254 Iowa 324, 330, 117 N.W.2d 505, 507-508 (1962).
It is clear defendant possessed in each case the required criminal intent. But it is less clear he understood intent was an element of each of the two crimes. The trial court omitted any specific reference to intent when listing the elements of the offenses. The question is whether, under these circumstances, the failure vitiated the guilty plea. Notwithstanding language in some of our prior opinions we now believe and hold it did not.
I. This case provides a graphic example of how even the most careful trial court can be charged with omitting some part of a guilty plea litany. Both guilty pleas were the result of a plea bargain. No questions are raised as to defendant's awareness of the penal consequences of his pleas. It is not contended the pleas were involuntary or lacked a factual basis. Defendant's sole claim is that the trial court failed to determine he understood the charge. The claimed error is based entirely on the trial court's failure to inform him that one of the essential elements of each crime was intent. The record discloses that when the trial court recited the elements of the two offenses to the accused no mention of intent was included. The county attorney's information contained no allegation of intent. Such was not required. § 773.14, The Code.
Throughout the period of time we have applied the Sisco principles we have refused to reverse judgments based on a guilty plea on the grounds the trial court failed specifically to explain each element if under all the circumstances it is apparent the accused understood the nature of the charge. We have recognized "understanding the charge" did not inevitably require a complete listing by the trial court of the legal elements of the offense. State v. Townsend, 238 N.W.2d 351, 355 (Iowa 1976); State v. Oberbreckling, 235 N.W.2d 121, 122 (Iowa 1975); State v. Watts, 225 N.W.2d 143, 144-145 (Iowa 1975); State v. Hansen, 221 N.W.2d 274, 276 (Iowa 1974); State v. Bedell, 220 N.W.2d 891, 892 (Iowa 1974).
What is meant by the term "understood the nature of the charge?" Obviously it cannot mean the accused should be able to write a bar examination question on the subject. Neither can the expression mean merely that the accused was generally aware of the practical realities of the situation. The required level of an accused's understanding must lie somewhere between the two extremes. The question is only part of a broader one.
II. In reviewing guilty plea proceedings justice and logic now require us to turn our focus from courtroom litanies to the accused's awareness of the requisites outlined in Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969) and McCarthy v. U. S., 394 U.S. 459, 89 S.Ct. 1166, 22 L.Ed.2d 418 (1969). Our approach to these requisites has been explained in many cases principally State v. Sisco, supra, and Brainard v. State, 222 N.W.2d 711 (Iowa 1974).
These and a host of other authorities point out the crucial importance of guilty pleas and as a consequence require: The trial court must determine the accused understands the charge. The accused must be aware of the penal consequences of the plea. The plea must be voluntary. Before the plea is accepted the trial court must find a factual basis for the plea.
The first three of these principles (defendant's understanding of the charge, his awareness of the plea's penal consequences, and the voluntariness of his plea) are subjective matters relating to the accused's state of mind. Problems are encountered in proving a subjective understanding. Tension developed between the necessity of the understanding and the difficulty of showing it.
In Sisco and especially in Brainard, relying upon the ABA Standards, we seized upon a colloquy between the trial judge and the accused as the tool for demonstrating understanding. Use of such a colloquy for this purpose has at least two disadvantages. It duplicates an advisory function that should be provided, often at great public expense, by defendant's own counsel. It proceeds on the highly doubtful premise an accused can thoughtfully assimilate and act upon the information given him in the emotionally charged circumstances existing in the courtroom. The colloquy's saving advantage...
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