People v. Wilson

• Decision Date: 06 February 1894
• Parties: PEOPLE v. WILSON.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

141 N.Y. 185

36 N.E. 230

PEOPLE

v.WILSON.

Court of Appeals of New York.

Feb. 6, 1894.

Appeal from court of oyer and terminer, Onondaga county.

Lucius R. Wilson was convicted of murder in the first degree, and appeals. Affirmed.

Harrison Hoyt, for appellant.

Benjamin J. Shove, Dist. Atty., for the State.

BARTLETT, J.

This is an appeal from the judgment of the court of oyer and terminer of Onondaga county, and from an order denying a new trial on the conviction of the defendant of murder in the first degree. The defendant was jointly indicted with one Charles Wilson for killing James Harvey, by shooting him with a revolver, at the city of Syracuse, on the 31st day of July, 1893. The defendants, on being arraigned, demanded separate trials. The murdered man, James Harvey, was a police detective of the city of Syracuse, about 60 years of age; had been a member of the police force 24 years, and a detective 18 years. Before examining that portion of the case relating to the homicide on the 31st day of July, 1893, it is necessary to consider a number of preliminary objections raised by the learned counsel for the defendant to portions of the district attorney's opening address to the jury, and to evidence introduced in pursuance thereof. It will be convenient to group these objections and consider them together, as well, also, the exception of defendant's counsel at the end of the people's case, when the court refused, on his motion, to strike out said evidence. The district attorney's declared intention in his opening address, and the evidence by which it was followed up, was substantially this, viz.: That on the night of June 5, 1893, the shoe store of McBride & Co., on South Salina street, in the city of Syracuse, was entered by burglars, and several hundred dollars' worth of property and some money carried away; that the defendants in this indictment, and a third person, all of them strangers in the city of Syracuse, for two or three days prior to the burglary, and on the day succeeding it, had taken meals at Palmer's restaurant, on Warren street, in said city; that Palmer and his head waiter were led to suspect that these persons were connected with the burglary at McBride & Co.'s store, and they communicated their suspicions to the officers at police headquarters, the strangers having in the mean time disappeared; that Palmer was instructed by the police authorities that, if the suspected persons should at any time appear in his restaurant, he was to telephone the fact to headquarters; that, a day or two after the burglary, the chief of detectives told the deceased of the burglary, of the persons resting under suspicion, of the arrangements made with Palmer to telephone headquarters if the suspected persons should appear again in his restaurant, and thereupon instructed the deceased that, if he received such a message from Palmer, he should go over and arrest the persons pointed out to him, and bring them to headquarters. The indefatigable and able counsel for the defendant, by numerous objections, opposed the offering of this evidence in its entirety and in detail. He strenuously insisted that it was fatal error for the court to admit this evidence, and urged with great earnestness and ability that it was an attempt to prove a crime not alleged in the indictment, and was calculated to greatly prejudice the minds of the jury. He also insisted that it was error to permit Chief Detective James Sheppard to testify as to the information conveyed and instructions given to Detective Harvey, the deceased, when he came on duty a day or two after the burglary. It was urged that this was permitting the declarations of outside parties, and the proof of conversations at which the defendant was not present.

When the counsel for the defendant, at the close of the people's case, moved to strike all this evidence from the record, the remarks of the court in denying this motion furnish the obvious answer to these objections. The trial judge said: ‘The evidence was not received, so stated at the time, for the purpose of showing the fact that this defendant committed the burglary, but for the purpose of showing that a felony was committed, and that certain facts, whether true or otherwise, were brought to the knowledge of Detective Harvey, tending to show that he had reasonable ground, or cause, if it has that tendency, for making the arrest, if he did make the arrest,-all of which are questions for the jury,-of the defendant here; and the evidence is admitted in the case and allowed to stand for no other purpose.’ The district attorney was equally explicit in his declarations as to the object of this line of proof. He said: ‘The purpose of it is to justify the officer; to show, in accordance with the provision of the Code, that a felony had been committed, and that he had reasonable cause to believe that the defendant had committed it, and that the persons arrested had committed it.’ The counsel for the defendant asked the district attorney if he intended to prove the burglary, and the reply was: ‘Certainly, I propose to prove it was committed.’ Then defendant's counsel asked: ‘And to trace it to this defendant?’ The district attorney replied: ‘Not at all.’ This was certainly as favorable a limitation of the proofs as the defendant could ask, and we do not wish to be understood as approving it.

At the close of the case, the court, of its own motion, struck out a portion of the evidence thus objected to, making this statement, viz.: ‘The only evidence that is allowed to stand is the evidence tending to establish the facts of the burglary, and the statements and circumstances which came to Chief Harvey, which tend to show, and have that tendency, that he had probable cause for making the arrest. That may stand in the case. That you will consider. But any evidence, as I stated before, tending to show that this defendant, or any other party, was guilty of this burglary, is stricken from the case, and you must give it no consideration.’ This instruction to disregard the evidence stricken out was repeated by the trial judge in his charge to the jury. We are of opinion that it was competent for the court, on its own motion, to strike out this evidence, and instruct the jury to disregard it, and it will be assumed the instructions were obeyed. Greenfield v. People, 85 N. Y. 75, 90, 91. The rule is also well settled that where a judge, in charging the jury, lays down erroneous propositions, but, upon his attention being called thereto by objection, corrects the misdirection, and lays down a proper rule, no error is presented for a review. Eggler v. People, 56 N. Y. 642;Greenfield v. People, 85 N. Y., at page 90, and cases cited. This rule involves the same principle invoked by the trial judge in case at bar. We think sufficient evidence was left in the record, after this action of the trial judge, to justify submitting to the jury the question whether Detective...