People v. Wilson

• Decision Date: 02 February 1968
• Docket Number: Cr. 6151
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of California, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Mark Everette WILSON, Defendant and Appellant.

Page 839

65 Cal.Rptr. 839

258 Cal.App.2d 578

The PEOPLE of the State of California, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Mark Everette WILSON, Defendant and Appellant.

Cr. 6151.

Court of Appeal, First District, Division 4, California.

Feb. 2, 1968.

Hearing Denied March 28, 1968.

Richard S. Buckley, Public Defender of Los Angeles County, California, Steven H. Hough, Philip H. Smith, James L. McCormick, Deputy Public Defenders, Los Angeles, for appellant.

Thomas C. Lynch, Atty. Gen. of the State of California, William E. James, Asst. Atty. Gen., Lola M. McAlpin, Deputy Atty. Gen., Los Angeles, for respondent.

CHRISTIAN, Associate Justice.

Appellant was convicted in the municipal court of disturbing the peace, a misdemeanor. The judge received information that appellant had been a user of narcotics; therefore an order was entered reciting that it appeared that 'by reason of repeated use of narcotics (defendant) may be in imminent danger of becoming addicted to narcotics * * * ' Thereupon, pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 3050, the criminal action was adjourned and appellant was certified to the superior court for further proceedings.

The superior court appointed two physicians to examine appellant and after a hearing found that appellant was in imminent danger of addiction and committed him to the custody of the Director of Corrections for placement at the California Rehabilitation Center, Corona.

Appellant then requested trial by jury. The verdict of the jury confirmed the order of commitment and this appeal followed. The order of commitment is appealable as a final judgment in a special proceeding. (In re De La O (1963) 59 Cal.2d 128, 156, 28 Cal.Rptr. 489, 378 P.2d 793, 98 A.L.R.2d 705). ¹ On appeal it is urged that the evidence does not support the finding of imminent danger of addiction. Certain other attacks are made upon the judgment, but we do not reach them because clearly prejudicial errors in the court's instructions to the jury require a reversal.

The only evidence received at the jury trial was the testimony of the two medical examiners and that of appellant himself. The physicians testified that they had together examined appellant briefly and taken a history from him on April 1, 1966. The entire examination lasted less than 25 minutes.

On appellant's right arm the examiners found, over a collapsed vein, a scar which in their opinion was about six months old, indicating repeated injections (probably more than three times) of corrosive material such as heroin. Appellant's right wrist was heavily scarred; he related that this injury was self-inflicted in a suicide attempt in April, 1965, while he was under the influence of seconal.

Appellant's entire history of drug abuse was succinctly reviewed by one of the physicians as follows:

'Subject stated he had used marijuana three years ago, some pills about a year ago; that he had injected seconal in a vein once in 1965; that he had first used heroin in July of 1965. The most he had ever used in one day, he stated, was one cap and the frequency, twice a month. He stated further that he had only used heroin three times, and that was all in July of 1965. He stated further that he had used L.S.D. about twenty times in the summer of 1965, up to a last use on December 31st, 1965. He stated that he had used cough syrup approximately ten months ago, and that he had used emperin compound containing codeine, a prescription belonging to a friend about twenty pills, all used in a week about six weeks ago, referring to the time of the examination. He stated that he preferred L.S.D. and marijuana to heroin or the codeine, and that he had used, but that he had used the various drugs about as often as they were made available to him. He stated that his arrest was made three weeks previous to the time of examination for being under the influence of seconal. He stated further that his suicide attempt, made in April, '65, in which he had cut his left wrist, from the scar apparently quite deeply, had been while under the influence of seconal.'

Both physicians found in appellant's history and demeanor evidence of marked emotional instability and a strong propensity to turn to drugs for relief of the anxiety and stress which beset him. Appellant also showed a lack of insight regarding the danger he was exposing himself to by using drugs. Both examiners concluded that appellant was not yet physically dependent upon narcotics. One gave his opinion that appellant was already emotionally dependent upon narcotics while the other disagreed. Both predicted with certainty that appellant would continue his established pattern of using narcotics and other prohibited drugs and concluded that addiction was inevitable and imminent.

Appellant testified that a few days before the trial he had learned that the pills he had been taking were not codeine as he had told the examiners but Miltown, a non-narcotic transquilizer. He admitted injecting heroin three times and taking cough syrup containing codeine, but denied using any other narcotics since July of 1965. ² Appellant declared that he had no desire to return to the use of narcotics, that he had achieved an understanding of the personal problems which had caused him to use drugs, and that he no longer associates with the people who formerly encouraged him to take narcotics.

It is true, as appellant contends, that a mere showing of preliminary experimentation with narcotics is insufficient to support a finding that a person is 'by reason of repeated use of narcotics * * * in imminent danger of becoming addicted thereto * * *.' In upholding the constitutionality of the statutes authorizing involuntary commitment of persons in imminent danger of addiction, the Supreme Court in People v. Victor (1965) 62 Cal.2d 280, 305, 42 Cal.Rptr. 199, 215, 398 P.2d 391, 407, declared: 'the legislation is not vulnerable to defendant's charge that it subjects to narcotic commitment proceedings individuals who simply suffer from 'personality disturbances' or predisposition toward addiction. The legislation does not reach such persons until by repeated Acts of obtaining, preparing, and ingesting an addictive drug they demonstrate that they have failed to resolve their problems by socially acceptable methods and that total addiction is just a matter of time. When that stage is reached, the state has the right and duty to intervene for the protection of the individual in question and of society at large.'

The requirement of the statute that a finding of imminent danger of addiction must be based upon repeated actual use of narcotics was again recognized and applied by the Supreme Court in People v. Bruce (1966) 64 Cal.2d 55, 64, 48 Cal.Rptr. 719, 724, 409 P.2d 943, 948. The evidentiary test was summarized with the statement that no showing of actual addiction or withdrawal symptoms is required, 'if other evidence is sufficient to show repeated use of heroin to the extent that the person has failed to solve his problems by socially accepted methods and that he is emotionally or physically dependent upon narcotics and is, therefore, in the opinion of qualified examiners either addicted thereto or in imminent danger of becoming so addicted.' Applying that test to the facts presented, the Supreme Court in Bruce reversed the order of commitment.

In the Bruce case the Supreme Court also considered what information the medical examiners were entitled to take into account in arriving at their opinions. There the defendant complained that 'the medical witnesses should not have been permitted to review the report of the probation officer which was in the file, asserting that such report includes hearsay evidence and that the effect was to deny the defendant a fair trial. This objection has no merit because it ignores the nature of these proceedings. The law clearly contemplates that the medical examiners shall have the benefit of all relevant information to better enable them to make their diagnoses, and, as pointed out, the form of the certificate required of the doctors specifically includes 'pertinent case history." (64 Cal.2d at 60, 48 Cal.Rptr. at 721, 409 P.2d at 946.)

In the case at hand the objective facts of repeated use of narcotics were indicated by proof of the scar at the site of the heroin injections, by appellant's own admission at the trial that he had used heroin three times and had used codeine on a number of occasions and by his admissions to the examining physicians related by them in the medical history.

The next element of proof identified in People v. Bruce is the existence of present emotional or physical dependency upon narcotics. Welfare and Institutions Code section 3050 lays down no such requirement for a...