People v. Wilson
| Decision Date | 23 June 2011 |
| Docket Number | No. 09CA1073.,09CA1073. |
| Citation | 397 P.3d 1090 |
| Parties | The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. Douglas Eugene WILSON, Defendant–Appellant. |
| Court | Colorado Court of Appeals |
John W. Suthers, Attorney General, Patricia R. Van Horn, Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff–Appellee.
Alison Ruttenberg, Boulder, Colorado, for Defendant–Appellant.
Opinion by Judge CASEBOLT.
In this postconviction proceeding, the primary issue is whether the federal constitution, as interpreted in Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164, 128 S.Ct. 2379, 171 L.Ed.2d 345 (2008), requires state trial courts to employ a particular test to determine a defendant's mental competency to waive counsel and represent himself at trial or, instead, courts need only determine mental competency to stand trial under the standards set forth in Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 396, 113 S.Ct. 2680, 125 L.Ed.2d 321 (1993). We reject the contention of defendant, Douglas Eugene Wilson, that Edwards requires a different standard. We also decline to address defendant's contention that he was mentally incompetent to stand trial, because he could and should have raised that issue on direct appeal, and thus his claim here is successive. We further reject defendant's contention that his attorneys were ineffective for failing to request a competency determination before they withdrew from representing him. Accordingly, we affirm the postconviction court's order denying defendant's Crim. P. 35(c) motion without a hearing. We also deny defendant's pro se motion requesting that new appellate counsel be appointed or, alternatively, that he be permitted to represent himself in this appeal.
In September 2001, the prosecution charged defendant with first degree murder. The court appointed attorneys from the Public Defender's office to represent him. In December 2001, when defendant claimed that a conflict existed with these attorneys, the trial court held a hearing on the matter and rejected the claim. When defendant nevertheless insisted upon appointment of new attorneys, the court responded that he could either be represented by the appointed attorneys or represent himself. After the court advised defendant of the risks and disadvantages of self-representation pursuant to People v. Arguello, 772 P.2d 87 (Colo.1989), defendant waived his right to representation and chose to proceed pro se, effective December 10, 2001. The court appointed attorney R.W. as advisory counsel.
At a hearing on January 14, 2002, defendant appeared at times confused and became argumentative. The next day the trial court, over defendant's vigorous objection, ordered a competency evaluation.
In March 2002, after evaluating defendant and adjusting his medications, a doctor at the Colorado Mental Health Institute in Pueblo (CMHIP) opined that defendant was competent to stand trial. In April 2002, based on this evidence, the trial court found defendant competent to proceed. At a hearing nine days later, defendant asked that R.W. be appointed to represent him. The trial court did so.
In February 2003, about one month before his scheduled trial date, defendant accused R.W. of using drugs and requested new counsel. The trial court did not find the allegations to be true but nevertheless determined that an actual conflict existed and allowed R.W. to withdraw. The court appointed attorney S.M. to represent defendant and continued the trial date to allow time to prepare a defense.
In December 2003, about one month before his rescheduled trial, defendant accused S.M. of failing to communicate with him. The trial judge (Judge Kane) requested a different judge (Judge Martinez) to hear the matter. On December 11, 2003, Judge Martinez determined that S.M. had not failed to communicate with defendant and therefore no conflict existed.
On December 16, before Judge Kane, defendant again requested appointment of a new attorney. The court responded that defendant could either be represented by the appointed attorney or represent himself. The court advised defendant of the risks and disadvantages of self-representation pursuant to Arguello, and defendant stated that he still wished to proceed pro se. However, defendant also made additional allegations of misconduct against attorney S.M. Accordingly, Judge Kane set another conflict hearing before Judge Martinez and delayed ruling on defendant's request.
At a hearing on December 18, 2003, Judge Martinez determined that no conflict existed and refused to appoint a different attorney. Defendant stated that he wanted to represent himself. Judge Martinez gave an Arguello advisement and defendant stated that he understood the risks but nonetheless wanted to represent himself. Among other inquiries, Judge Martinez asked defendant if he was under the influence of any medications. Defendant answered that he was on medications to control epilepsy. The following colloquy then ensued:
After completing the Arguello advisement, Judge Martinez stated:
[T]he Court will find that the defendant is making a knowing, intelligent waiver of his rights to be represented by counsel and that he will be able to present his own defense.
The same day, Judge Kane held another hearing on defendant's request to proceed without an attorney. After referencing his earlier Arguello advisements, Judge Kane asked defendant if it was still his decision to represent himself. Defendant responded:
Yes, it is, Your Honor, and I will have control of all my faculties.... I do understand my rights and I am in control of my faculties. I am not under any mind altering drugs. And it is my desire to dismiss counsel....
Judge Kane then found:
The court continued the trial date to May 10, 2004, and defendant represented himself until May 4, 2004, when he asserted that he was not competent to present his case at trial. Defendant requested an evaluation for competency and appointment of counsel to represent him in the case. The trial court ordered a second competency evaluation and again continued the trial.
In June 2004, a CMHIP doctor opined that defendant was incompetent to stand trial because jail personnel had dropped Trileptal
from his medication regimen. The trial court, based on this evidence, determined that defendant was incompetent to proceed to trial.
In September 2004, the CMHIP doctor opined that defendant had been restored to competency, so long as he took certain prescribed medications, including Trileptal
. The trial court then found defendant competent to proceed.
Later that same month, defendant asserted that his competency was being negatively affected because medical personnel at the jail had changed his medication and had also administered it in a crushed form, rather than in solid pill form. The trial court conducted a lengthy hearing, which included testimony from the CMHIP doctor who prescribed the medications, and from the medical personnel at the jail. It heard testimony that administration of Trileptal
in crushed form would not affect defendant's competency. Nevertheless, it ordered jail personnel to administer the medication in pill form. The court determined that jail personnel were administering the correct medications to defendant and found him competent to proceed because he was taking the correct medications. In addition, it found:
I'm also persuaded that Mr. Wilson remains competent by his presence here. He has made a presentation for himself. He has been oriented to the issues and oriented to the presentation of testimony and to the issues that are before the Court.
At the end of the hearing, defendant requested the court to appoint attorney C.M., who was representing him in another case, to represent him in this case. C.M. was not available for the scheduled trial date and the court thus declined to appoint her. Defendant requested another attorney. The trial court stated that it did not believe it could find another attorney to handle the case within speedy trial limits. It asked defendant if he was willing to waive his right to a speedy trial so that another attorney could be appointed. Defendant stated that he did not wish to continue the trial beyond the speedy trial period. The court set the trial for the end of November 2004.
In an early October 2004 hearing, defendant asserted that he had been incompetent when he waived his right to counsel in December 2003. The trial court declined to address the matter at the hearing and ordered defendant to present his argument in a written motion so that the prosecution could respond. Defendant did not do so.
Defendant represented himself at trial, assisted by an investigator. Advisory counsel was present two days during the ten-day trial. The jury returned guilty verdicts for first degree murder and a crime of violence sentence enhancer. A division of this court affirmed the judgment of conviction on appeal, where defendant was represented by counsel. People v. Wilson, No. 05CA0189, 2008 WL 383525 (Colo.App. Feb. 14, 2008) ().
Defendant, through current counsel, then filed the present Crim. P. 35(c) motion. H...
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People v. Davis
...this result, we are careful to point out that the Constitution does not mandate this result; it merely permits it. People v. Wilson, 397 P.3d 1090, –––– (Colo.App.2011).¶ 3 The second and third issues also arise out of the trial that was held in this case. Did the trial court make adequate ......
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People v. Hunsaker
...matter of law, if the defendant does not make sufficient allegations that, if true, would entitle him to relief. See People v. Wilson , 397 P.3d 1090, 1097 (Colo. App. 2011), aff'd on other grounds , 2015 CO 37, 349 P.3d 257. ¶ 25 To prove an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, a defen......
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People v. Hunsaker
...a matter of law, if the defendant does not make sufficient allegations that, if true, would entitle him to relief. See People v. Wilson, 397 P.3d 1090, 1097 (Colo. App. 2011), aff'd on other grounds, 2015 CO 37.¶ 25 To prove an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, a defendant must show ......