People v. Winfield

• Decision Date: 05 December 1988
• Parties: The PEOPLE, etc., Respondent, v. Kevin Eugene WINFIELD, Appellant.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

Page 619

535 N.Y.S.2d 619

145 A.D.2d 449

The PEOPLE, etc., Respondent, v. Kevin Eugene WINFIELD, Appellant.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division,

Second Department.

Dec. 5, 1988.

Noel Tepper, Poughkeepsie, for appellant.

William V. Grady, Dist. Atty., Poughkeepsie (Bridget Rahilly Steller, of counsel), for respondent.

Before MANGANO, J.P., and THOMPSON, BROWN and KUNZEMAN, JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY THE COURT.

Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the County Court, Dutchess County (Hillery, J.), rendered July 31, 1984, convicting him of grand larceny in the third degree (two counts), upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.

ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed.

The trial court's Sandoval ruling (People v. Sandoval, 34 N.Y.2d 371, 357 N.Y.S.2d 849, 314 N.E.2d 413), which permitted the prosecutor to cross-examine the defendant for impeachment purposes concerning the underlying facts of certain prior convictions involving primarily theft-related crimes, in the event the defendant testified at the trial, was not an improvident exercise of discretion. The defendant has an extensive criminal record. The mere fact that a defendant has committed crimes similar to the one charged does not automatically preclude the prosecutor from using evidence of such crimes for impeachment purposes (see, People v. Pavao, 59 N.Y.2d 282, 292, 464 N.Y.S.2d 458, 451 N.E.2d 216; People v. Rahman, 62 A.D.2d 968, 404 N.Y.S.2d 110, affd. 46 N.Y.2d 882, 414 N.Y.S.2d 683, 387 N.E.2d 614). The prior convictions were highly relevant on the issue of credibility and demonstrated the defendant's willingness to deliberately further his self-interest at the expense of society (see, People v. Sandoval, supra, 34 N.Y.2d at 377, 357 N.Y.S.2d 849, 314 N.E.2d 413; People v. Brooks, 139 A.D.2d 657, 658, 527 N.Y.S.2d 296). The trial court minimized the potential prejudice to the defendant by limiting the number of convictions which could be used for impeachment purposes (see, People v. Pavao, 59 N.Y.2d 282, 464 N.Y.S.2d 458, 451 N.E.2d 216, supra; People v. Hudson, 134 A.D.2d 615, 521 N.Y.S.2d 510; People v. Magee, 126 A.D.2d 573, 510 N.Y.S.2d 690) and by indicating that it would charge the jury as to the limited use that it might make of such evidence.

Similarly unavailing is the defendant's claim that the evidence adduced by the People was legally insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he stole a credit card. Specifically, the defendant asserts that there was no proof of the validity of the allegedly stolen credit card which factor he claims was an essential element of the crime of grand larceny in the third degree as charged under Penal Law § 155.30(4). For purposes of this statute, it is immaterial whether the credit card in question either had expired, or whether it had previously been canceled or revoked (...