People v. Witherow
Decision Date | 28 April 1983 |
Citation | 190 Cal.Rptr. 899,142 Cal.App.3d 485 |
Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
Parties | PEOPLE of the State of California, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. John WITHEROW, Defendant and Appellant. In re John WITHEROW, On Habeas Corpus. A018044, A020182. |
George Deukmejian, Atty. Gen., Robert H. Philibosian, Chief Asst. Atty. Gen., William D. Stein, Asst. Atty. Gen., Ann K. Jensen, Morris Lenk, Deputy Attys. Gen., San Francisco, William D. Curtis, Dist. Atty., Salinas, for plaintiff and respondent.
Richard A. Lieberman, San Francisco, for defendant and appellant.
We have consolidated defendant Witherow's appeal from a judgment, based upon his plea of guilty to a charge of possessing a concealable firearm by one who had previously been convicted of a felony (Pen.Code, § 12021), with his related initial and supplemental applications for a writ of habeas corpus.
For reasons we now state we affirm the judgment and deny the habeas corpus application.
It is first contended that: "The trial court committed reversible error in sentencing appellant without stating its reasons for imposing the upper term."
As further argued by Witherow:
It was part of the negotiated disposition on Witherow's guilty plea that he be given "the upper term of three years." Announcing to the court the plea bargain, his attorney said that a stipulation had been reached that "the sentencing be the maximum three years." (Our emphasis.) And the court thereupon expressly advised Witherow that the guilty plea's acceptance "was on the condition you be given the upper term." (Emphasis added.) To which Witherow replied, "Agreed."
In sentencing a defendant to an upper term pursuant to a plea bargain "the court, in stating its reasons for that sentence choice, need only give the bargain as its reason and need not give any other reason." (People v. Sutton, 113 Cal.App.3d 162, 163, 169 Cal.Rptr. 656.) And manifestly, the court need not iterate the terms of the bargain to which the defendant had expressly agreed. In such a case, "where a bargain is struck and the sentence is in accord with the bargain, there is no purpose to be served by the court discussing with the defendant, in the abstract, the possible range of punishments for the charge." (Scoggins v. Superior Court, 65 Cal.App.3d 873, 877, 135 Cal.Rptr. 619.) And: (In re Troglin, 51 Cal.App.3d 434, 438, 124 Cal.Rptr. 234.)
The instant contention is thus devoid of merit.
The remaining assignment of error on Witherow's appeal is stated by him as follows: "The court failed to inform the appellant of the possibility that he may have to serve a term on parole following the completion of his sentence; thus, appellant was sentenced improperly as well as denied full advisement of the consequences of his plea."
Here we note that upon acceptance of Witherow's proffered plea bargain the court stated, "its on the condition you be given the upper term, strike the [prior] prison term, plus the parole period ...," to which condition Witherow also expressly "agreed." And as the proceedings were ending, the court asked: "Do you have any questions you want to ask me as to the potential consequences?" Witherow answered, "No, sir."
Witherow was reasonably and properly informed of the possibility of a parole period following his prison term.
Moreover, the record indicates that Witherow, a repetitive criminal offender, was knowledgeable and wise in matters such as that, ordinarily if not inevitably, periods of parole follow prison terms. Indeed, the ostensible purpose of his plea bargain was to gain some real, or imagined, advantage in relation to a parole which he explained as follows----a result which he hoped to avoid by his guilty plea.
Again, no merit is seen in the contention.
On his habeas corpus application and the supplements thereto, Witherow first tells us that his attorney, discussing the contemplated plea bargain, The information, he states, was incorrect because a parole period would be added to the three-year (or two-year) prison term. He then declares that he was not aware of the parole period, and would not have entered his guilty plea had he been informed of it.
Witherow's contention is refuted by the record which, as noted, establishes that he was told by the court that he would be given the upper three-year term, "plus the parole period," to which he expressly "agreed."
Another contention of the habeas corpus application is that, upon his guilty plea, Witherow was not advised that "he would automatically be subjected to forfeiture of credit towards his federal sentence for all the time he served on parole under the provisions of [U.S.Code, Title 18] Section 4210(b)(2)." He misconstrues the cited statute as providing for "automatic forfeiture" of parole credits. Instead, it provides that the Federal Parole Commission shall, in its discretion, as to one situated as was Witherow, "determine ... whether all or any part of the unexpired term being served at the time of parole shall run concurrently or consecutively with the sentence imposed for the new offense, ..."
Here again the record appears to belie Witherow's argument. At the plea bargain proceedings, and as we have heretofore pointed out, he explained to the court and counsel: ...
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