People v. Wolcott

• Citation: 17 N.W. 78,51 Mich. 612
• Court: Supreme Court of Michigan
• Decision Date: 24 October 1883
• Parties: PEOPLE v. WOLCOTT.

17 N.W. 78

51 Mich. 612

PEOPLE v. WOLCOTT.

Supreme Court of Michigan

October 24, 1883

Confessions or admissions of guilt, obtained by means of threats or promises of favor, are not admissible in evidence, for the obvious reason that they are not made because they are true but because, whether true or false, the accused is led to believe it is for his interest to make them.

The mere fact that a party accused of a crime appeared to be much excited when his boots were measured to ascertain whether or not they fitted the tracks found near where the crime was committed, affords no basis whatever for any deduction for or against the justice of the charge.

A witness for the accused was asked by the prosecuting attorney if he did not know that a warrant had been issued for his arrest, and as soon as he left the stand he was in open court arrested, but on request of counsel the trial judge directed that he should be produced as a witness again, if desired. The wife of the accused, a witness for him, was asked on cross-examination if she had not been guilty of a larceny and upon denial a witness was produced to contradict her, but subsequently the court struck out this testimony. Held, that these proceedings were manifestly calculated to prejudice the jury, and, with the other errors in the case, sufficient to entitle defendant to a new trial.

Exceptions from Kalamazoo.

J.J. Van Riper, for the People.

Oscar T. Tuthill and Howard & Roos, for respondent.

COOLEY, J.

Respondent was informed against and convicted of the larceny of a quantity of wheat. The theory of the prosecution was that the respondent, in concert with several other persons, stole the wheat in the night-time from a granary, took it to market and disposed of it. The evidence was in part circumstantial and in part consisted in the respondent's confessions. When evidence of confessions was offered, counsel for respondent insisted that it must first be shown that the confessions were not obtained by means of threats or promises of favor. The trial judge appears to have assented to the propriety of this, and considerable evidence was taken on the subject, at the conclusion of which the confessions were allowed to be proven. No exception appears to have been taken to this, and for that reason if the evidence was incompetent the respondent could not now take advantage of the error. But, as the case must go back for a new trial, it is proper to say that we think enough was shown to render the confessions altogether inadmissible.

If the statement of the respondent is believed, not only were promises of favor held out to him as an inducement to confess, but he was threatened with personal violence while in confinement, and though the party accused of the threats denies them, we find sufficient in the evidence of witnesses for the people to convince us that the respondent was treated in a manner which was altogether unwarranted. It appears without dispute that in the middle of the night, after the officer who had arrested him had retired for much-needed rest, the respondent, instead of being allowed the like privilege of rest, was visited by three persons in succession, whose mission appears to have been to obtain confessions by impressing upon the mind of the respondent that it would be better for him, or he would get off easier if he made confession. None of these persons was the officer in charge; but their admission to the cell at such an unreasonable hour carried with it an implication of the officer's consent to their mission, and respondent could scarcely fail to be impressed that their assurances were made with full authority. No reliance can be placed upon admissions of guilt so obtained; for the very obvious reason that they are not made because they are true, but because, whether true or false, the accused is led to believe it is for his interest to make them. The cases of State v. Phelps, 11 Vt. 116; S.C. 3. Amer.Dec. 672; State v. Walker, 34 Vt. 296; Hector v. State, 2 Mo. 166; S.C. 22 Amer.Dec. 454; State v. Bostick, 4 How. 563; State v. Guild, 10 N.J.Law, 163; S.C. 18 Amer.Dec. 404; Spears v. State, 2 Ohio St. 583; Com. v. Taylor, 5 Cush. 605; Com. v. Tuckerman, 10 Gray, 190; Smith v. State, 10 Ind. 106; Miller v. People, 39 Ill. 457; Cain v. State, 18 Tex. 387; Davis v. State, 2 Tex.Ct.App. 588; Van Buren v. State, 24 Miss. 512; Jordan v. State, 32 Miss, 382; People v. Barrie, 49 Cal. 342; State v. York, 37 N.H. 175; Miller v. State, 40 Ala. 58; Porter v. State, 55 Ala. 95; State v. Whitfield, 70 N.C. 356; and State v. Hagan, 54 Mo. 192, may all be cited in support of the views here expressed, and the list might easily be increased very considerably. The case of Flagg v. People, 40 Mich. 406, has sufficient resemblance to the one before us to render what is there said in point, and we refer to it for a further expression of our own views on the general subject.

The prosecution gave evidence that tracks were found and followed from where the wheat was taken, and that the boots of the accused parties were measured to see how they corresponded to the tracks. They were allowed also against objection, to show that while this was going on the respondent seemed to be excited. From this excitement the jury were expected to draw inferences unfavorable to the accused. No doubt a guilty party might be excited under such a charge, and so might an innocent party be; and the probability that one or the other would be most affected by the accusation would depend so much upon individual mental and physical peculiarities that the mere fact of excitement affords no basis whatever for any deduction for or against the justice of the charge. But the evidence of excitement is peculiarly objectionable, because it is likely to be given--as it evidently was in this case--by persons prepossessed with a belief in the guilt of the accused, and very certain from that fact to draw unfavorable inferences, and to have...