People v. Jones

• Decision Date: 23 December 1982
• Docket Number: Docket No. 66011,No. 12,12
• Citation: 331 N.W.2d 406,416 Mich. 354
• Parties: PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Jesse James JONES, Defendant-Appellant. Calendar
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

Page 406

331 N.W.2d 406

416 Mich. 354

PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Jesse James JONES, Defendant-Appellant.

Docket No. 66011.

Calendar No. 12.

Supreme Court of Michigan.

Argued Dec. 2, 1981.

Decided Dec. 23, 1982.

Donald A. Kuebler, Chief, Appellate Div., Robert E. Weiss, Pros. Atty., Genesee County, Flint, for plaintiff-appellee.

Earl R. Spuhler, Fenton, for defendant-appellant.

KAVANAGH, Justice (for reversal).

Jesse James Jones was convicted of first-degree murder by a jury and was sentenced to life imprisonment. M.C.L. Sec. 750.316; M.S.A. Sec. 28.548. The conviction was based in part on his confessional statement, admitted into evidence over his objection.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed in an unpublished opinion, finding under the "totality of circumstances" that the defendant's confession was admissible. Defendant asserts that the statement made by him pursuant to a plea agreement that he later refused to carry out was improperly admitted into evidence.

We reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and hold that the statement made by the defendant required by the plea agreement is inadmissible per se. We remand for a new trial.

On December 28, 1977, Thomas Chiavares was murdered at the Hockstad Pharmacy in Flint, Michigan, during the course of an armed robbery. On April 27, 1978, defendant Jones was arrested for unlawfully carrying a sawed-off shotgun. Sergeant Darby of the Flint Police Department met with Jones on April 28, 1978, while Jones was in custody for federal and state weapons offenses. Jones was advised of his rights under Miranda, ¹ and, upon a waiver of his rights, he discussed the weapons charges.

During that interview, Jones was told that he was a suspect in the Hockstad murder case. Sergeant Darby asked Jones if he wanted to discuss that crime and reminded him of his Miranda rights. Jones denied knowing anything about the murder, and the discussion returned to the weapons charges. Jones asked about the possible penalty for the federal and state weapon offenses. Darby told Jones that the federal firearms charge had a ten-year maximum sentence and that the state charge had a possible sentence of five years. Jones was also told that he could possibly be sentenced to prison for violating parole. Jones inquired as to what consideration he would be given if he were to discuss the Hockstad murder. He said he knew a great deal and could clear up the case.

Sergeant Darby contacted the prosecutor and a federal agent and advised Jones that if he would give a statement implicating himself in the Hockstad murder and would testify against the others involved, the federal and state gun charges would be dropped and Jones could plead guilty to manslaughter. Jones was again advised of his Miranda rights, and he voluntarily waived his right to counsel and agreed to tell all he knew about the Hockstad case. He then made the confessional statement now at issue to the police. His statement detailed the planning and carrying out of the robbery attempt and killing, fully implicating himself and two others.

Later Jones refused to carry out the plea agreement. He was charged with murder in the perpetration of an armed robbery. A pretrial motion to suppress the confession was filed by defendant's trial attorney, and an evidentiary hearing was conducted. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court determined that the confession was voluntary and thus was admissible as evidence.

On the morning of the trial, the prosecutor acknowledged a willingness to fulfill the plea agreement, but Jones again refused. At trial, defendant's confession was admitted into evidence and presented to the jury over the objection of defendant's attorney. Jones was convicted of first-degree murder and received a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment.

The Court of Appeals affirmed defendant's conviction and found under the "totality of the circumstances" that the trial court's decision that defendant's confession was properly admissible as evidence was not erroneous. ²

The use of involuntary admissions in a criminal prosecution is prohibited by the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination:

"In criminal trials, in courts of the United States, wherever a question arises whether a confession is incompetent because not voluntary, the issue is controlled by that portion of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, commanding that no person 'shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.' " Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 542, 18 S.Ct. 183, 42 L.Ed. 568 (1897).

The Fifth Amendment's right against compulsory self-incrimination is also protected by the Fourteenth Amendment against abridgment by the states. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 6, 84 S.Ct. 1489, 12 L.Ed.2d 653 (1964).

The reason that involuntary confessions are not admissible evidence was set forth by the Court in Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 540-541, 81 S.Ct. 735, 739-40, 5 L.Ed.2d 760 (1961):

"Our decisions under [the Fourteenth] Amendment have made clear that convictions following the admission into evidence of confessions which are involuntary, i.e., the product of coercion, either physical or psychological, cannot stand. This is so not because such confessions are unlikely to be true but because the methods used to extract them offend an underlying principle in the enforcement of our criminal law: that ours is an accusatorial and not an inquisitorial system--a system in which the State must establish guilt by evidence independently and freely secured and may not by coercion prove its charge against an accused out of his own mouth. See Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 60 S.Ct. 472, 84 L.Ed. 716 (1940); Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 236, 62 S.Ct. 280 [289-90], 86 L.Ed. 166 (1941); Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172-174, 72 S.Ct. 205 [209-11], 96 L.Ed. 183 (1952); Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 320-321, 79 S.Ct. 1202 [1205-06], 3 L.Ed.2d 1265 (1959); Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 206-207, 80 S.Ct. 274 [279-80], 4 L.Ed.2d 242 (1960). And see Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 54-55, 69 S.Ct. 1347 [1350], 69 S.Ct. 1357, 93 L.Ed. 1801 (1949)."

In determining whether a confession is voluntary, the test is whether the confession was " 'extracted by any sort of threats or violence, [or] obtained by any direct or implied promises, however slight, [or] by the exertion of any improper influence.' " Bram, supra, 168 U.S. at pp. 542-543, 18 S.Ct. at 187. (Emphasis supplied.)

This test has been applied by several recent federal and state courts, which have found that confessions induced by promises of leniency are inadmissible. ³ The decision of the court in Gunsby v. Wainwright, 596 F.2d 654 (CA5, 1979) cert. den. 444 U.S. 946, 100 S.Ct. 307, 62 L.Ed.2d 315 (1979), is particularly noteworthy because of the similarity of its factual situation to the case at bar. In Gunsby, in exchange for a maximum sentence of 7 1/2 years and no objection from the state to probation, the defendant agreed to plead guilty and testify against two codefendants. Additionally, pursuant to the plea bargain, the defendant gave a statement incriminating himself and a codefendant. However, the plea bargain was set aside after the defendant testified because his testimony tended to exculpate rather than incriminate his codefendant. The confession was admitted into evidence at trial over objection, and the defendant was convicted and sentenced to twenty years in prison.

In granting the defendant's petition for habeas corpus, the Fifth Circuit held that because the statement was given as a result of promises made by the state in the plea bargain, "[t]he district court's conclusion that the statement was legally involuntary and inadmissible at Gunsby's state trial was thus compelled under Hutto v. Ross, 429 U.S. 28, 97 S.Ct. 202, 50 L.Ed.2d 194 (1976)." "The [Hutto ] Court held that the confession was not the result of any direct or implied promise and was voluntarily given. Conversely, a confession given as the result of a direct or implied promise would be legally involuntary." Gunsby, supra, p. 656.

In the instant case, the confession was made as part of an agreement. In return for a statement implicating himself in the Hockstad murder and testimony against the others included, Jones would be permitted to plead guilty to manslaughter for the Hockstad murder, and the unrelated federal and state gun charges would be dropped. There is no question but that Jones' confession was "obtained by" the prosecutor's promise.

The people contend that where an accused initiates the bargaining session with the police and prosecuting authorities, he should not be heard to complain that his statement was involuntary. Several state courts, ⁴ along with the Michigan Court of Appeals, ⁵ have held that a confession is not "induced" when a defendant initiates the bargaining. However, the distinction is irrelevant. ⁶ The confession is a product of the plea agreement whether the defendant, the prosecutor, or a police officer initiates the bargaining.

The fact that the defendant initiates the bargaining does not mean that the defendant is not influenced by the state's promises. The confession is no more reliable simply because the defendant begins the negotiating. In People v. Wolcott, 51 Mich. 612, 615, 17 N.W. 78 (1883), Justice Cooley agreed with the reasoning of many other courts and found that no reliance can be placed on admissions of guilt obtained by assurances of leniency "for the very obvious reason that they are not made because they are true, but because, whether true or false, the accused is led to believe it is for his interest to make them." (Citations omitted.) However, it is no less in the defendant's interest to accept a plea bargain when he initiates the bargaining than when bargaining is initiated by the state. Therefore, because the defendant is still influenced by the...