People v. Wolfe
| Decision Date | 12 March 2021 |
| Docket Number | B305833 |
| Parties | THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. ERIC JONATHAN WOLFE, Defendant; BRAD WOLFE, as Special Administrator, etc., Appellant. |
| Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
(Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. BA425130)
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. William C. Ryan, Judge. Affirmed.
Michael Evan Beckman for Appellant.
Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Michael R. Johnsen and Paul M. Roadarmel, Jr., Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
The special administrator of the Estate of Eric Jonathan Wolfe, as successor in interest to defendant Eric Jonathan Wolfe,1 appeals portions of the superior court's March 9, 2020 restitution order.
From 2007 to 2013, appellant and his codefendants engaged in a predatory real estate and mortgage fraud scheme through which they acquired properties from homeowners in financial distress by falsely promising to assist the homeowners with short sales or loan modifications. As part of a fake loan modification or short sale process, appellant would forge or have the homeowners sign grant deeds conveying the properties to one of appellant's many companies operating under various names. Unbeknownst to the homeowners, appellant would later alter the deeds to indicate the properties had been conveyed as gifts.
After appellant wrongfully acquired the properties from the homeowners, payments on the mortgages for those properties would cease, and appellant would rent out or sell the properties, pocketing the proceeds. In some instances, appellant paid the lending institutions less than the amounts outstanding on the mortgages based on fraudulent below-market valuations and then sold the properties at a profit. On other occasions, when the lending institutions attempted to foreclose on the properties, appellant would seek to prevent or delay foreclosure in order toextract more rents by submitting fictitious offers and/or by filing fraudulent lawsuits and lis pendens on the properties.
On June 25, 2014, the Los Angeles County Grand Jury returned a 118-count indictment against appellant and 10 codefendants,2 charging them in connection with the scheme under Penal Code3 sections 182, subdivision (a), 487, subdivision (a), 115, subdivision (a), and 532f, as well as failing to file and filing false state tax returns.
On June 26, 2015, appellant pleaded guilty to 22 of the 118 counts in the indictment. Specifically, appellant pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy to commit grand theft of personal property as charged in count 1 (Pen. Code, §§ 182, subd. (a), 487, subd. (a)), ten counts of grand theft of personal property (Pen. Code, § 487, subd. (a); counts 3, 16, 33, 40, 44, 53, 54, 65, 96, and 105), four counts of procuring or offering a false instrument (Pen. Code, § 115, subd. (a); counts 12, 28, 75, and 83), one count of forgery (Pen. Code, § 475, subd. (a); count 15), two counts of mortgage fraud (Pen. Code, § 532f, subd. (a)(1); counts 50 and 88), one count of filing a false tax return (Rev. & Tax. Code, § 19705, subd. (a); count 110), and three counts of failing to file a tax return (Rev. & Tax. Code, § 19706; counts 111, 112, and 113). Appellant also admitted an aggravated white collar special allegation under Penal Code section 186.11, subdivision (a)(2) as to counts 1, 3, 13, 16, 33, 40, 44, 53, 54, 65, 96, and 105, as well as the special allegation that the loss exceeded $200,000 (Pen. Code, former § 12022.6, subd. (a)(2)), based on the total amount of the theft. The remaining counts of the indictment were dismissed.
Appellant was sentenced to 16 years 8 months in state prison. A restitution hearing was deferred until after the case was resolved against all defendants.4
The restitution hearing took place over five days in June, September, and December 2019. The prosecution presented 121 exhibits in support of its restitution claims, including two exhibits (People's exhibits 97 & 98) setting forth the losses and calculations of those losses as to each property, and called Special Agent Thomas Donohue and Investigative Auditor Hengru Connie Chen to testify. Several individuals gave victim impact statements. No witnesses testified on behalf of the special administrator.
The trial court issued a detailed memorandum of decision on March 9, 2020, awarding restitution to several lending institutions, two estates, and various individuals, as well asinterest on the stipulated amount owed to the Franchise Tax Board. Asserting many of the same arguments raised below, appellant challenges the restitution awarded to the Estates of Jean Ablott ($208,777.03) and Lyle Gilmor Skarsten ($231,636.91) (the Estates), the lending institutions—Fannie Mae ($48,248.45 and $44,584.16), Bank of America ($54,250, $66,300, $34,535, $67,496, and $99,472.50), GMAC Mortgage ($16,250 and $43,750), JP Morgan Chase ($54,250), IndyMac/One West Bank5 ($36,050), and Wells Fargo Bank ($62,546.42) (collectively the Lending Institutions)—and Guillermo Cilia ($112,117). Appellant also contests the award of interest to the Franchise Tax Board.
A. Relevant legal principles
Passed by the voters in 1982, Proposition 8 " (People v. Giordano (2007) 42 Cal.4th 644, 652 (Giordano).)
Section 1202.4 represents the Legislature's implementation of Proposition 8's broad constitutional mandate. (People v. Stanley (2012) 54 Cal.4th 734, 736 (Stanley).) The statute begins with a declaration of the Legislature's intent "that a victim of crime who incurs an economic loss as a result of the commission of a crime shall receive restitution directly from a defendant convicted of that crime." (§ 1202.4, subd. (a)(1); Giordano, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 656.) Section 1202.4, subdivision (f) provides that "in every case in which a victim has suffered economic loss as a result of the defendant's conduct, the court shall require that the defendant make restitution to the victim or victims in an amount established by court order, based on the amount of loss claimed by the victim or victims or any other showing to the court." (Italics added; Stanley, at p. 737.) The statute further requires that the restitution award "shall be of a dollar amount that is sufficient to fully reimburse the victim or victims for every determined economic loss incurred as the result of the defendant's criminal conduct." (§ 1202.4, subd. (f)(3), italics added; Stanley, at p. 737; Giordano, at p. 656.) Finally, "the trial court 'shall order full restitution unless it finds compelling and extraordinary reasons' not to do so." (Stanley, at p. 737, italics added, quoting former § 1202.4, subd. (f); see also Giordano, at p. 656, quoting former § 1202.4, subd. (g).)
Section 1202.4's mandate that the restitution order reimburse the victim to the extent that the victim's economic loss occurs "as a result of" the defendant's criminal conduct requires a showing of direct causation. (§ 1202.4, subds. (a) & (f); In re S.E. (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 795, 803; People v. Jones (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 418, 425.) California courts have adopted the "substantial factor" test in analyzing whether a victim's economic loss results from the defendant's criminal conduct for purposes of mandatory victim restitution. (People v. Lockwood (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 91, 102; People v. Holmberg (2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 1310.) That standard is relatively broad, requiring only that the defendant's criminal conduct be more than a negligible or theoretical cause of the injury to the victim. (Holmberg, at p. 1321.) " 'Thus, "a force which plays only an 'infinitesimal' or 'theoretical' part in bringing about injury, damage, or loss is not a substantial factor" [citation], but a very minor force that does cause harm is a substantial factor.' " (Id. at p. 1322, quoting Bockrath v. Aldrich Chemical Co. (1999) 21 Cal.4th 71, 79.)
A "victim" is any individual or entity who has suffered economic loss as a result of the commission of a crime of which the defendant was convicted, including a "corporation, business trust, estate, trust, partnership, association, joint venture, government, governmental subdivision, agency, or instrumentality, or any other legal or commercial entity when that entity is a direct victim of a crime." (§ 1202.4, subds. (k)(2), (a)(1), (f)(3); People v. Martinez (2005) 36 Cal.4th 384, 393; People v. Crow (1993) 6 Cal.4th 952, 957 [].) Further, ...
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