People v. Wolford

• Decision Date: 21 May 1991
• Docket Number: Docket No. 118146
• Parties: PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. William WOLFORD, Defendant-Appellant. 189 Mich.App. 478, 473 N.W.2d 767
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

Page 767

473 N.W.2d 767

PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. William WOLFORD, Defendant-Appellant.

Docket No. 118146.

189 Mich.App. 478, 473 N.W.2d 767

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

Submitted Jan. 16, 1991, at Grand Rapids.

Decided May 21, 1991, at 9:20 a.m.

Released for Publication Sept. 19, 1991.

[189 MICHAPP 479] Frank J. Kelley, Atty. Gen., Gay Secor Hardy, Sol. Gen., James J. Gregart, Pros. Atty., and Anne M. McCarthy, Asst. Pros. Atty., for the People.

State Appellate Defender by Ronald J. Bretz, for defendant-appellant on appeal.

Before DOCTOROFF, P.J., and MAHER and CAVANAGH, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Defendant was convicted by a jury of burning a dwelling house, M.C.L. Sec. 750.72; M.S.A. Sec. 28.267, and he subsequently pleaded guilty of being an habitual offender, second offense, M.C.L. Sec. 769.10; M.S.A. Sec. 28.1082. He was sentenced to a prison term of eighteen to thirty years. He appeals as of right, claiming that the evidence was insufficient to support the jury's verdict, that the trial court erred in instructing the jury that a false statement he made could be used as evidence of guilt, and that he was denied a fair trial by the prosecutor's failure to produce an endorsed witness. We affirm.

Defendant first claims that the evidence was insufficient to support the arson conviction. Specifically, he argues that the prosecutor failed to negate the possibility that the fire was caused by accidental means and that the prosecutor failed to prove he was responsible for the fire.

When reviewing an issue of the sufficiency of the evidence, this Court views the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution and determines [189 MICHAPP 480] whether a rational trier of fact could have found that the essential elements of the crime were proven beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Hampton, 407 Mich. 354, 368, 285 N.W.2d 284 (1979), cert. den. 449 U.S. 885, 101 S.Ct. 239, 66 L.Ed.2d 110 (1980). The evidence is sufficient if the prosecution proves its theory beyond a reasonable doubt in the face of whatever contradictory evidence the defendant may provide. People v. Daniels, 163 Mich.App. 703, 707, 415 N.W.2d 282 (1987), and cases cited therein. The prosecutor is not required to present direct evidence linking the defendant to the crime. Circumstantial evidence and reasonable inferences arising from the evidence may constitute satisfactory proof of the elements of the offense. People v. Drayton, 168 Mich.App. 174, 176, 423 N.W.2d 606 (1988); People v. Richardson, 139 Mich.App. 622, 625, 362 N.W.2d 853 (1984). Intent may be inferred from all the facts and circumstances. People v. Safiedine, 163 Mich.App. 25, 29, 414 N.W.2d 143 (1987).

We have thoroughly reviewed the record and find that there was sufficient evidence from which a rational trier of fact could have found that the essential elements of burning a dwelling house were proven beyond a reasonable doubt. The prosecutor presented sufficient evidence concerning the incendiary origin of the fire. Tests performed on a carpet sample revealed the presence of an accelerant. The State Police fire investigator, on the basis of his investigation and interviews with witnesses, opined that the fire was intentionally set. The investigator gave a detailed explanation of how he arrived at his opinion, including that there was evidence of extreme low burning, which indicates that a flammable liquid was poured in the area, and that witnesses saw a lot of fire within ten or fifteen minutes after someone left the trailer.

The prosecutor presented sufficient evidence that [189 MICHAPP 481] defendant was responsible for the fire. There was testimony that defendant was seen outside the trailer approximately ten minutes before witnesses saw flames coming from the trailer. One witness testified that defendant was driving out of the trailer park when he stopped and asked if the witness had seen William Cordray, a co-owner of the trailer that burned. When the witness said no, defendant said, "Well, if you see him, tell him that his trailer's on fire," and asked the witness to call the fire department. Defendant claimed that he called the fire department from a pay phone at a restaurant located 1.2 miles away from the trailer. However, according to the records of calls made to 911 on the night of the fire, no call was made from that pay phone. Furthermore, defendant's sister, a co-owner of the burned trailer, testified that the day after the fire defendant stated, in a joking manner, that he had burned her trailer. Thus, the prosecutor's evidence showed more than that defendant had the opportunity to commit arson. Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecutor, a rational trier of fact could find that defendant, acting wilfully or maliciously, intentionally set the trailer on fire.

Defendant's second claim is that the trial court erred in instructing the jury that a false statement made by defendant could be used as evidence of guilt.

Jury instructions are reviewed as a whole rather than extracted piecemeal to establish error. People v. Watkins, 178 Mich.App. 439, 450, 444 N.W.2d 201 (1989), lv. gtd. on other grounds 435 Mich. 867, 457 N.W.2d 692 (1990). Even if somewhat imperfect, there is no error if the instructions fairly presented the issues to be tried and sufficiently protected the defendant's rights. Id.

The trial court did not err in instructing the [189 MICHAPP 482] jury that it could consider defendant's false statement to the police as evidence of guilt. The statement, if believed, tends to lead suspicion and investigation in another direction. People v. Dandron, 70 Mich.App. 439, 443-444, 245 N.W.2d 782 (1976), quoting People v. Arnold, 43 Mich. 303, 304-306, 5 N.W. 405 (1880). We also reject defendant's assertion that the instruction was erroneously given because other evidence of guilt was weak. The false statement by defendant that he called 911 from the restaurant was not the sole basis for conviction. See Dandron, supra, 70 Mich.App. p. 443, n. 2, 245 N.W.2d 782.

Defendant's third claim is that he was denied a fair trial by the prosecutor's failure to produce an endorsed witness.

The prosecutor listed William Cordray, co-owner of the trailer that burned, on the list of witnesses attached to the information and on the list of witnesses the prosecutor intended to produce at trial. A subpoena was served on Cordray in accordance with MCR 2.506(G)(2). Cordray contacted the prosecutor's office after he received the subpoena. Cordray's signed return was received in the prosecutor's office on February 6, 1989. Trial commenced on February 14, 1989. Cordray did not appear. When Cordray did not appear on the second day of trial, the prosecutor petitioned the court for a bench warrant. The petition was granted and the bench warrant was conveyed to the police that afternoon. Cordray did not appear and had not been located before the prosecutor rested his case on February 16, 1989.

Defendant objected to the prosecutor's...