People v. Woods

• Decision Date: 25 March 1963
• Docket Number: No. 36917,36917
• Citation: 27 Ill.2d 393,189 N.E.2d 293
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Defendant in Error, v. Luther WOODS, Plaintiff in Error.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Page 293

189 N.E.2d 293

27 Ill.2d 393

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Defendant in Error, v. Luther WOODS, Plaintiff in Error.

No. 36917.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

March 25, 1963.

Mitchell J. Overgaard, Chicago, for plaintiff in error.

William G. Clark, Atty. Gen., Springfield, and Daniel P. Ward, State's Atty., Chicago (Fred G. Leach and E. Michael O'Brien, Asst. Attys. Gen., and Edward J. Hladis and Matthew J. Moran, Asst. State's Attys., of counsel), for defendant in error.

UNDERWOOD, Justice.

Luther Woods was found guilty, following a jury trial in the criminal court of Cook County, of assault with intent to rape, and sentenced to imprisonment for a term of five to ten years. He brings the case here on writ of error, contending the prosecutor's final argument was prejudicial, that proceedings were held outside his presence in violation of his constitutional rights, and that he was not proved guilty beyond all reasonable doubt.

Defendant's contention that his constitutional rights were violated by conducting proceedings in his absence is apparently predicated upon the fact that he was represented by a member of the Chicago Bar Association appointed by the court at the defendant's request, and that counsel for defendant appeared on June 23, 1959, in open court, waived the necessity for defendant's presence and, in defendant's absence, agreed that the cause be advanced from June 29, to which it had previously been continued, to June 23, and then continued by agreement to July 24, 1959.

The fact that a defendant in a criminal prosecution is entitled to appear and defend in person is guaranteed by section 9 of article II of the constitution of 1870, S.H.A. The cases cited by defendant allude to the right of every defendant accused of a felony to be personally present at every stage of the trial. (People v. Smith, 6 Ill.2d 414, 129 N.E.2d 164; People v. McGrane, 336 Ill. 404, 168 N.E. 321; People v. Weinstein, 298 Ill. 264, 131 N.E. 631), and the question for our decision is whether a motion for a continuance made prior to the commencement of the actual trial is a part thereof, or involves such a substantial right of the accused that his absence from the hearing thereon vitiates any action taken. We have repeatedly held that the constitutional guaranty is not infringed upon by holding hearings outside defendant's presence which do not involve substantial rights of the accused, (People v. Kidd, 357 Ill. 133, 191 N.E. 244; People v. Brindley, 369 Ill. 486, 17 N.E.2d 218; Pippin v. People, 398 Ill. 128, 75 N.E.2d 347), and defendant's right to be present at the trial itself, or any portion thereof, may be voluntarily waived even in felony cases. People v. Weinstein, 298 Ill. 264, 131 N.E. 631; People v. Harris, 302 Ill. 590, 135 N.E. 75; People v. Connors, 413 Ill. 386, 108 N.E.2d 774.

The well-nigh unanimous rule in this country is that the defendant's constitutional right to be present at the trial does not 'embrace a right to be present also at the argument of motions prior to trial or subsequent to verdict.' (United States v. Lynch, 3rd cir., 132 F.2d 111, cert. den., Lynch v. United States, 318 U.S. 777, 63 S.Ct. 831, 87 L.Ed. 1146; Snyder v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 54 S.Ct. 330, 78 L.Ed. 674.) In the Snyder case Justice Cardozo provides an excellent discussion of the principle underlying the court's decision regarding the scope of the defendant's right to be personally present during his trial. The rule there announced is that 'in a prosecution for a felony the defendant has the privilege under the Fourteen Amendment to be present in his own person whenever his presence has a relation, reasonably substantial, to the fulness of his opportunity to defend against the charge.' (291 U.S. at 105, 54 S.Ct. at 332). The opinion then proceeds to hold that denial of defendant's request to accompany the jury to the scene of the murder, where counsel were permitted to point out specific features and ask the jury to note them in the involuntary absence of defendant, was not a violation of the constitutional guaranty.

In our judgment the ordinary, uncontested motion for a continuance, or to advance and then continue a case, does not involve rights of the accused of such a substantial nature as to invalidate any action thereon occurring in his absence. Even assuming a contrary conclusion, the right to be present at a hearing upon a motion for a continuance, or advancement and continuance, may be waived by defendant, or by his counsel on his behalf. The record in this case...