People v. Woods

Decision Date15 September 1980
Docket NumberNo. 52923,52923
Citation410 N.E.2d 866,81 Ill.2d 537,43 Ill.Dec. 733
Parties, 43 Ill.Dec. 733 The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellee, v. Sterlyn W. WOODS, Appellant.
CourtIllinois Supreme Court

James J. Doherty, Public Defender, Chicago (James H. Reddy, Asst. Public Defender, Chicago, of counsel), for appellant.

William J. Scott, Atty. Gen., Chicago, and Bernard Carey, State's Atty., Chicago (Donald B. Mackay and Melbourne A. Noel, Jr., Asst. Attys. Gen., Chicago, and Marcia B. Orr and Iris E. Sholder, and Armand L. Andry, Asst. State's Attys., Chicago, of counsel), for the People.

RYAN, Justice:

Sterlyn Woods, defendant, was charged with the murder of Tarran Jones in the circuit court of Cook County. After a bench trial, he was found guilty of involuntary manslaughter. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1977, ch. 38, par. 9-3.) He was sentenced to four years in the penitentiary with an additional one-year term of mandatory supervised release. The appellate court affirmed the decision of the circuit court. (80 Ill.App.3d 56, 35 Ill.Dec. 136, 398 N.E.2d 1086.) We granted leave to appeal. The only issue raised on appeal is whether the State has proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant's actions did not constitute self-defense under the facts of the case.

Defendant was charged with the September 25, 1978, fatal beating of Tarran Jones. At the time of the occurrence the defendant was 18 years old, 6 feet 3 inches tall, weighed 200 pounds, was employed as a meat cutter, and had been a football player in high school. The evidence discloses that at approximately 9 p. m. on the evening of the incident, the defendant was at Miss Quincy's Lounge, where occasionally he was called upon to maintain order and sometimes to assist in spinning records as a disc jockey. He was not compensated for these services by the owner of the tavern.

On that evening, either three or four young men entered the lounge together. They were loitering and did not buy any drinks. A barmaid asked the defendant to tell the men that if they did not purchase drinks, they would have to leave. The defendant relayed the message, which seemed to anger at least one of the men. After an exchange of words and shoving, a fight ensued between one of the men and the defendant. During the fight the companions of the original combatant joined the fight and the defendant was struck over the head with a beer bottle and a flower pot. He suffered cuts on his head which caused bleeding. The defendant hit the combatant five or six times in the face before being held back by someone in the lounge. The combatant ran from the lounge and the defendant gave chase. The companions left the bar after the defendant. Shortly thereafter the people who worked at the lounge got everyone out of the lounge and closed the door. The police were summoned, but by the time they arrived, "everything was over so they left."

The defendant did not catch the combatant so he returned to the lounge. While returning the defendant encountered Tarran Jones walking toward him in front of the lounge. He did not know Jones, but he testified at trial that he thought Jones might have been one of the attackers from the bar. (The medical examiner's testimony was that Jones was 6 feet and weighed 130 pounds.) The defendant testified that, as he and Jones approached each other, the defendant's arm was raised and his fist was clenched as he asked Jones, "you one of them too, ain't you?" Jones did not answer the question verbally, but punched defendant in the face. The defendant then struck Jones on the left side of his head, knocking him into an iron gate. His head did not hit the gate. Jones bounced off the gate. Although he was not attempting to throw another punch, the defendant struck him twice more in the face, knocking him back into the gate. Jones began to slide down the gate, covering his face. Defendant hit him a fourth and possibly a fifth time as Jones was falling. Defendant stated he would have hit Jones again, but someone pulled him away.

The police were called again and the victim was taken to the hospital, where he died from his head wounds on September 26. The forensic pathologist testified that Jones died of a brain hemorrhage caused by traumatic injuries or blunt-force injuries. Defendant turned himself in on October 2, 1978.

At the trial, the defendant testified that he believed Jones was one of the men he fought with in the lounge, although he was unsure, and that at the time of the encounter with Jones he believed he was in danger of being hurt but not killed. He also admitted on cross-examination that Jones was not armed and the blow rendered by Jones did not hurt him. Further, Jones swung at him only once. Defendant admitted, when questioned about whether he thought Jones was one of his attackers when he hit him, "you know how revenge builds up inside me."

The trial court found defendant had not acted in self-defense but was guilty of manslaughter. He was sentenced to imprisonment for four years, plus one year mandatory supervised release. The appellate court affirmed the ruling of the trial court. We affirm the judgment of the appellate court.

The defendant contends that his actions constitute the affirmative defense of self-defense and that he was not proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt by the State. On the subject of self-defense, the Criminal Code of 1961 provides in pertinent part:

"(A person) is justified in the use of force which is intended or likely to cause death or great bodily harm only if he reasonably believes that such force is necessary to prevent imminent death or great bodily harm to himself or another * * *." (Ill.Rev.Stat.1977, ch. 38, par. 7-1.)

Self-defense is an affirmative defense (Ill.Rev.Stat.1977, ch. 38, par. 7-14), and once it is raised by presenting some evidence tending to prove the defense, the State then has the burden of proving the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt as to that issue, together with all the other elements of the offense. Ill.Rev.Stat.1977, ch. 38, par. 3-2; People v. Williams (1974), 57 Ill.2d 239, 242, 311 N.E.2d 681, cert. denied (1974), 419 U.S. 1026, 42 L.Ed.2d 302, 95 S.Ct. 506; People v. Warren (1965), 33 Ill.2d 168, 173, 210 N.E.2d 507.

Whether a killing is justified under the law of self-defense depends upon the surrounding facts and circumstances and is to be determined by the trier of fact. (People v. Jordan (1960), 18 Ill.2d 489, 492, 165 N.E.2d 296.) When a cause is tried without a jury, the law commits...

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    ...court to decide. The majority is not entitled to substitute its judgment for that of the trial court. People v. Woods, 81 Ill.2d 537, 542, 43 Ill.Dec. 733, 410 N.E.2d 866 (1980). Defendant's trial testimony that she bought the number from “a random guy” and that she believed that it was an ......
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    ...The right of self-defense does not justify a person in committing an act of retaliation and revenge. People v. Woods (1980), 81 Ill.2d 537, 543, 43 Ill.Dec. 733, 410 N.E.2d 866; Belpedio, 212 Ill.App.3d at 161, 155 Ill.Dec. 761, 569 N.E.2d CLOSING ARGUMENT Finally, the defendant claims that......
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    ...of whether deadly force is legally justifiable is dependent upon the circumstances involved. See People v. Woods, 81 Ill.2d 537, 542, 43 Ill.Dec. 733, 410 N.E.2d 866 (1980). The decisive question is whether the defendant's belief that it was necessary to use deadly force was reasonable unde......
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