People v. Woody

• Decision Date: 24 August 1964
• Docket Number: Cr. 7788
• Court: California Supreme Court
• Parties: , 394 P.2d 813 The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Jack WOODY et al., Defendants and Appellants.

Page 69

40 Cal.Rptr. 69

61 Cal.2d 716, 394 P.2d 813

The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Jack WOODY et al., Defendants and Appellants.

Cr. 7788.

Supreme Court of California, In Bank.

Aug. 24, 1964.

Rufus W. Johnson, Anaheim, for defendants and appellants.

Mitchel J. Ezer, Beverly Hills, A. L. Wirin and Fred Okrand, Los Angeles, as amici curiae on behalf of defendants and appellants.

Stanley Mosk, Atty. Gen., William E. James, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Jack K. Weber, Deputy Atty. Gen., for plaintiff and respondent.

TOBRINER, Justice.

On April 28, 1962, a group of Navajos met in an Indian hogan in the desert near Needles, California, to perform a religious ceremony which included the use of peyote. Police officers, who had observed part of the ceremony, arrested defendants, who were among the Indians present. Defendants were later convicted of violating section 11500 of the Health and Safety Code, which prohibits the unauthorized possession of peyote. We have concluded that since the defendants used the peyote in a bona fide pursuit of a religious faith, and since the practice does not frustrate a compelling interest of the state, the application of the statute improperly defeated the immunity of the First Amendment of the Constitution of the United States.

When the police entered the hogan and charged the participants with the use of peyote, one of the Indians handed the officers a gold-colored portrait frame containing a photostatic copy of the articles of incorporation of the Native American Church of the State of California. The articles declared: 'That we as a people place explicit faith and hope and belief in the Almighty God and declare full, competent, and everlasting faith in our Church things which and by which we worship God. That we further pledge ourselves to work for unity with the sacramental use of peyote and its religious use.'

The state stipulated at trial at the time of the arrest defendants and the other Indians were performing a religious ceremony which involved the use of peyote. Defendants pleaded not guilty to the crime of illegal possession of narcotics, contending that their possession of peyote was incident to the observance of their faith and that the state could not constitutionally invoke the statute against them without abridging their right to the free exercise of their religion. The trial proceeded without a jury; the court held defendants guilty and imposed suspended sentences.

Defendants' defense, if any, must lie in their constitutional objection. We do not doubt that even though technically peyote is an 'hallucinogen' rather than a narcotic, the state, pursuant to the police power, may proscribe its use. (Reetz v Michigan (1903) 188 U.S. 505, 23 S.Ct. 390, 47 L.Ed. 563; Sandelin v. Collins (1934) 1 Cal.2d 147, 33 P.2d 1009, 93 A.L.R. 956.) Only if the application of the proscription improperly infringes upon the immunity of the First Amendment can defendants prevail; their case rests upon that Amendment, which is operative upon the states by means of the Fourteenth Amendment (Cantwell v. Connecticut (1940) 310 U.S. 296, 60 S.Ct. 900, 84 L.Ed. 1213, 128 A.L.R. 1352). The First Amendment reads 'Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. * * *' ¹

Although the prohibition against infringement of religious belief is absolute, the immunity afforded religious practices by the First Amendment is not so rigid. (Sherbert v. Verner (1963) 374 U.S. 398, 403, 83 S.Ct. 1790, 10 L.Ed.2d 965; In re Jenison (1963) 375 U.S. 14, 84 S.Ct. 63, 11 L.Ed.2d 39; West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette (1942) 319 U.S. 624, 63 S.Ct. 1178, 87 L.Ed. 1628, 147 A.L.R. 674; Braunfeld v. Brown (1960) 366 U.S. 599, 81 S.Ct. 1144, 6 L.Ed.2d 563; Cantwell v. Connecticut, supra, 310 U.S. 296, 60 S.Ct. 900, 84 L.Ed. 1213, 128 A.L.R. 1352; Reynolds v. United States (1878) 98 U.S. 145, 25 L.Ed. 244.) But the state may abridge religious practices only upon a demonstration that some compelling state interest outweighs the defendants' interests in religious freedom. (Sherbert v. Verner, supra, 374 U.S. 398, 406, 83 S.Ct. 1790, 10 L.Ed.2d 965; In re Jenison, supra, 375 U.S. 14, 84 S.Ct. 63, 11 L.Ed.2d 39; Braunfeld v. Brown, supra, 366 U.S. 599, 613-614, 81 S.Ct. 1144, 6 L.Ed.2d 563; Cantwell v. Connecticut, supra, 310 U.S. 296, 311, 60 S.Ct. 900, 84 L.Ed. 1213, 128 A.L.R. 1352; West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, supra, 319 U.S. 624, 643-644, 63 S.Ct. 1178, 87 L.Ed. 1628, 147 A.L.R. 674.)

The Supreme Court of the United States recently in Sherbert v. Verner, supra, restated the rule. In Sherbert a South Carolina employer discharged appellant, a Seventh-day Adventist, because she refused to work on Saturdays. Since her 'conscientious scruples' against Saturday work precluded her from obtaining other employment, appellant applied for unemployment compensation benefits. The South Carolina Employment Security Commission rejected appellant's claim upon the ground that she had '* * * failed, without good cause * * * to accept available suitable work. * * * ' The South Carolina courts affirmed the commission's ruling despite appellant's contention that application of the disqualifying provision of the statute abridged her right to the free exercise of her religion.

The United States Supreme Court reversed, finding, first, that the denial of compensation benefits clerly constituted a burden upon the free exercise of appellant's religion. The court then stated that it must '* * * consider whether some compelling state interest enforced in the eligibility provisions of the South Carolina statute justifies the substantial infringement of appellant's First Amendment right. It is basic that no showing merely of a rational relationship to some colorable state interest would suffice; in this highly sensitive constitutional area, '(o)nly the gravest abuses, endangering paramount interests, give occasion for permissible limitation. (Citation.)" (374 U.S. p. 406, 83 S.Ct. p. 1795.)

Despite the plea by South Carolina that fraudulent religious objections to Saturday work would dilute the state compensation fund and interfere with employers' scheduling of necessary Saturday work, the court held that 'no such abuse or danger has been advanced in the present case' which would justify the abridgement of appellant's religious freedom.

The court in Sherbert thus utilized a two-fold analysis which calls for a determination of, first, whether the application of the statute imposes any burden upon the free exercise of the defendant's religion, and second, if it does, whether some compelling state interest justifies the infringement. ²

The first step requires an exploration into the particulars of this case to determine whether section 11500 of [61 Cal.2d 720] the Health and Safety Code imposes any burden upon the free exercise of defendants' religion. An examination of the record as to the nature of peyote and its role in the religion practiced by defendants as members of the Native American Church of California compels the conclusion that the statutory prohibition most seriously infringes upon the observance of the religion.

The plant Lophophora williamsii, a small, spineless cactus, found in the Rio Grande Valley of Texas and northern Mexico, produces peyote, which grows in small buttons on the top of the cactus. Peyote's principal constituent is mescaline. When taken internally by chewing the buttons or drinking a derivative tea, peyote produces several types of hallucinations, depending primarily upon the user. In most subjects it causes extraordinary vision marked by bright and kaleidoscopic colors, geometric patterns, or scenes involving humans or animals. In others it engenders hallucinatory symptoms similar to those produced in cases of schizophrenia, dementia praecox, or paranoia. Beyond its hallucinatory effect, peyote renders for most users a heightened sense of comprehension; it fosters a feeling of friendliness toward other persons.

Peyote, as we shall see, plays a central role in the ceremony and practice of the Native American Church, a religious organization of Indians. Although the church claims no official prerequisites to membership, no written membership rolls, and no recorded theology, estimates of its membership range from 30,000 to 250,000, the wide variance deriving from differing definitions of a 'member.' As the anthropologists have ascertained through conversations with members, the theology of the church combines certain Christian teachings with the belief that peyote embodies the Holy Spirit and that those who partake of peyote enter into direct contact with God.

Peyotism discloses a long history. A reference to the religious use of peyote in Mexico appears in Spanish historical sources as carly as 1560. Peyotism spread from Mexico to the United States and Canada; American anthropologists describe it as well established in this country during the latter part of the nineteenth century. Today, Indians of many tribes practice Peyotism. Despite the absence of recorded dogma, the several tribes follow surprisingly similar ritual and theology; the practices of Navajo members in Arizona practically parallel those of adherents in California, Montana, Oklahoma, Wisconsin, and Saskatchewan.

The 'meeting,' a ceremony marked by the sacramental use of peyote, composes the cornerstone of the peyote religion. The meeting convenes in an enclosure and continues from sundown Saturday to sunrise Sunday. To give thanks for the past good fortune or find guidance for future conduct, a member will 'sponsor' a meeting and supply to those who attend both the peyote and the next morning's breakfast. The 'sponsor,' usually but not always the 'leader,' takes charge of the meeting; he decides the order of events and the amount of peyote to be consumed. Although the individual leader exercises an absolute control of...