People v. Woody

• Decision Date: 01 April 1968
• Docket Number: No. 31,31
• Citation: 380 Mich. 332,157 N.W.2d 201
• Parties: PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Creede WOODY, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

Page 201

157 N.W.2d 201

380 Mich. 332

PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Creede WOODY, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 31.

Supreme Court of Michigan.

April 1, 1968.

William L. Cahalan, Pros. Atty., Samuel J. Torina, Chief Appellate Lawyer, Luvenia D. Dockett, Asst. Pros. Atty., Detroit, for the People.

Earl T. Prosser, Detroit, for defendant and appellant; Stephen M. Taylor, Detroit, of counsel.

Before the Entire Bench.

O'HARA, Justice.

This case involves a determination of rights of a defendant in a criminal prosecution in which a notice of the defense of not guilty by reason of insanity was interposed and the defendant did not take the witness stand.

Appellant states the sole question to be whether it was error to permit the prosecuting attorney to examine certain psychiatrists as to the accused's alleged past antisocial and pathological behavior and prior felony convictions under the circumstances above set forth.

Defendant-appellant was charged with first degree murder. He was alleged to have killed his wife. Upon his arraignment in the recorder's court the prosecuting attorney petitioned for his examination by a sanity commission to determine his capability to understand the nature of the proceedings against him, and to assist in his defense, i.e., to stand trial. The commission determined that he possessed the requisite capacity. Thereupon, he gave due notice of the defense of insanity at the time of the killing. The trial proceeded and at the completion of the State's case, the defendant called as a witness, a psychiatrist. He testified that in his opinion, based upon his examination of the defendant that at the time of the act charged, he was incapable of differentiating between right and wrong as a result of being in an acute state of mental disease which he had before the commission of the act charged.

In rebuttal, the State first cross-examined the psychiatrist at great length and in minute detail concerning the basis upon which he concluded the defendant was at the time of the offense alleged legally insane. In questioning the psychiatrist the prosecutor asked whether in the course of his examination the defendant told him that he:

(1) escaped from a boys' training school;

(2) committed a burglary and was returned to that school;

(3) escaped again from that school;

(4) was arrested for and convicted of second degree murder and was sentenced to 20--30 years therefor, and while so serving was sentenced to an additional 5 years for assaulting a prison guard.

The cross-examination also was directed to the general background of the accused as it bore upon his alleged 'assaultive character' and antisocial and sociopathic past behavior.

To supplement this rebuttal cross-examination of the defense-called expert witness the State also called 2 of the 3 psychiatrists who were members of the court-appointed sanity commission. They were examined along the same line.

It should be noted here that before the trial judge permitted any of the foregoing examination he excused the jury and allowed the prosecuting attorney to ask the questions claimed to be objectionable. He permitted defense counsel to note his objections and the reasons therefor. He then recalled the jury and the substance of all the foregoing questions and answers were admitted in the presence of the jury. On this jury-witnessed examination, defense objections were again noted and overruled.

The case was submitted to the jury and it returned a guilty verdict. Appeal of right was taken to the Court of Appeals. That Court affirmed. We granted leave.

In affirming the conviction the Court of Appeals held: ¹

'The plea of not guilty by reason of insanity made the issue defendant's sanity at the time of the offense, not whether he killed his wife.'

We feel obligated to point out that any implication from the above language that in these circumstances the jury cannot bring in a general verdict of not guilty should be dispelled. This was early decided and we do not find the holding has ever been disturbed.

In People v. Marion, 29 Mich. 31 (1874), at pp. 40, 41, we said:

'As it is one of the most essential features of the right of trial by jury at common law, that no jury should be compelled to find any but a general verdict in criminal cases, and the removal of this safeguard would violate its design and destroy its spirit, we cannot suppose the legislature intended to introduce such a revolution into the criminal law by any indirection.'

In Underwood v. People, 32 Mich. 1, at pp. 2, 3, we approved the holding:

'As suggested in People v. Marion, 29 Mich. 31, one of its (trial by jury) substantial elements is the right of the jury to give a general verdict on the merits. * * *; and while it is not competent to prevent an acquittal on a reasonable doubt of insanity, which would require a general verdict of not guilty, yet if the jury agree that the prisoner was insane and that he would have been guilty if not so, they are undoubtedly at liberty, though they cannot be compelled, to find that fact specially.'

To the extent then that the language of the Court of Appeals be read to mean the contrary, we disapprove it.

We examine therefore the admissibility of the afforementioned testimony in light of the issues which were before the jury. One of those issues was the sanity of the defendant at the time of the commission of the act involved. In this...