People v. Woollums

• Decision Date: 25 August 1978
• Docket Number: No. 14816,14816
• Citation: 379 N.E.2d 1385,20 Ill.Dec. 317,63 Ill.App.3d 602
• Parties: , 20 Ill.Dec. 317 The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Lavada Leon WOOLLUMS, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

Page 1385

379 N.E.2d 1385

63 Ill.App.3d 602, 20 Ill.Dec. 317

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Lavada Leon WOOLLUMS, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 14816.

Appellate Court of Illinois, Fourth District.

Aug. 25, 1978.

Michael B. Metnick, Springfield, for defendant-appellant.

Robert J. Bier, State's Atty., Quincy, for plaintiff-appellee.

WEBBER, Justice:

Following a jury verdict of guilty in the circuit court of Adams County, defendant Lavada Leon Woollums was sentenced to imprisonment for 3 years 4 months to 10 years for the offense of aggravated battery. He appeals both the conviction and the sentence. We affirm.

The factual background and the chronology of events are out of the ordinary. A Quincy attorney, upon leaving his law office late in the evening hours of September 4, 1973, discovered defendant tampering with his automobile. He returned to his office where he knew several Quincy police officers were conferring with one of his partners. The lawyer and the officers returned to the car. One of the officers, Rost by name, inquired of the defendant concerning his actions. Defendant claimed the car belonged to his brother-in-law whose name Officer Rost requested. Looking at the car registration which he had just obtained from the glove box of the car, defendant gave the name of the lawyer. Rost riposted that this was unusual because the registered owner, I. e., the lawyer, was at this moment standing beside him.

Defendant, apparently concluding that flight would be more fruitful than logic under the circumstances, hit Rost behind the ear and took to his heels with Rost in pursuit. A short distance away defendant lost his footing and while lying on the ground kicked Rost on the right leg. He was subdued by Rost and the other officers.

The next day Rost had a large bruise on the inner aspect of his thigh, a black-and-blue ear, a bruise on the back of his neck, a cut on his nose and a mark around his eye where his glasses were broken in the scuffle with defendant. He did not require medical treatment.

As a result of this encounter, defendant was charged with two Quincy ordinance violations: "Intoxication" and "Interfering with an Officer." The charges were made out on a Uniform Illinois Citation and Complaint Form with the box checked requiring a mandatory court appearance under the Supreme Court Rule then in effect, 551(f) (50 Ill.2d R. 551(f)). Defendant did not sign the portion of the form waiving trial and consenting to an Ex parte judgment as further provided in Rule 556(b) (50 Ill.2d R. 556(b)).

On the following day, September 5, 1973, defendant appeared in court, posted $100 cash bail and a trial date of September 26 1973, was set. Defendant was then released on bond. On the trial date defendant failed to appear and the court entered the following order:

"Defendant called three times, fails to appear and is found to be in default. Ex parte judgment entered herein against the Defendant in the amount of $100.00. It is therefore ordered that the Defendant's cash bond heretofore posted by Defendant shall be applied in satisfaction of the judgment rendered herein."

There ensued an hiatus of eighteen months and seven days. On April 2, 1975, defendant was indicted for aggravated battery in that he intentionally and knowingly, without legal justification, caused bodily harm to an individual when he knew the individual harmed to be a peace officer and where the officer was engaged in the execution of his official duties. Ill.Rev.Stat.1971, ch. 38, par. 12-4(b)(6).

Again there intervened an hiatus of more than two and one-half years. A jury trial on the indictment commenced on November 21, 1977, with the resultant verdict of guilty and on December 30, 1977, defendant was sentenced as above described. This appeal followed on January 5, 1978.

Defendant raises five issues on appeal: (1) Double jeopardy under the provisions of the United States and Illinois Constitutions, under the provisions of the Illinois Criminal Code and under due process principles; (2) restriction of cross-examination; (3) failure to prove that the officer was "harmed" within the meaning of the statute; (4) application of the Sentencing Act of 1977; and (5) abuse of discretion by the trial court in imposing the maximum sentence.

In order to succeed with the double jeopardy argument defendant must establish that multiple punishments were imposed for the same offense. (North Carolina v. Pearce (1969), 395 U.S. 711, 89 S.Ct. 2072, 23 L.Ed.2d 656; People v. Gray (1977), 69 Ill.2d 44, 12 Ill.Dec. 886, 370 N.E.2d 797.) This requires a close analysis of the action of the trial court in entering the order of September 26, 1973; not only what was actually done, but also the legal import of that order.

The action must be viewed in the light of the governing rule and statute. The Rule is 556(c) (50 Ill.2d R. 556(c)) which read as follows:

"If a defendant fails to appear on the date set for appearance, or any date to which the case may be continued, and a court appearance is required under Rule 551, bail or security shall be forfeited and the judge may order the filing of a verified complaint and issue a summons or warrant of arrest for the defendant."

Section 110-8(g) of the Criminal Code of 1963 (Ill.Rev.Stat.1973, ch. 38, par. 110-8(g)), read as follows:

"If the accused does not comply with the conditions of the bail bond the court having jurisdiction shall enter an order declaring the bond to be forfeited. Notice of such order of forfeiture shall be mailed forthwith by the clerk of the court to the accused and his sureties at their last known address. If the accused does not appear and surrender to the court having jurisdiction within 30 days from the date of the forfeiture or within such period satisfy the court that appearance and surrender by the accused is impossible and without his fault the court shall enter judgment for the State against the accused and his sureties for the amount of the bail and costs of the proceedings."

While the language of the court's order is not couched precisely in the words of the rule and statute, its meaning is obvious. The bail was forfeited, but the court did not order a verified complaint and warrant. The proceedings stopped short of prosecution. The court was premature in entering a judgment, since under the statute 30 days must elapse from the forfeiture to the judgment, but the purported entry of judgment only reinforces what was the evident intent of the court: a civil judgment on the bond in lieu of criminal prosecution.

The nature of bail forfeiture was clearly explained by our predecessors on this bench in People v. Brown (1962), 35 Ill.App.2d 182, 186, 182 N.E.2d 347, 350, where the court said "A forfeiture is a judgment, effective as of the term taken and entered of record. It is not a determination of the amount due under a bond, but is rather that accused stood charged with a public offense, that he obtained his release under bond, that the bond was executed in the particular case, and that some condition of such bond was broken."

In People v. Canaccini (1977), 52 Ill.App.3d 811, 10 Ill.Dec. 647, 368 N.E.2d 133, the court held that bail forfeiture orders were governed by the Civil Practice Act, and in United States v. Barger (9th Cir. 1972), 458 F.2d 396, the court said:

"A bail bond in a criminal action is a form of contract between the government on the one part and the accused and the surety on the other. Such bonds are conditioned upon the presence of the accused at specified times during the criminal proceedings and provide a monetary penalty upon condition broken. This penalty is one for damages and is deemed civil, not criminal, in nature."

We also find the Committee Comments to section 110-8(g) instructive:

"In traffic cases, or others, where the practice is for the accused to post cash bail and then forfeit in lieu of trial, this practice may be continued under section 110-8. Of course, it should be realized that the forfeiture of bail does not release the accused from prosecution if the state or city desires to prosecute, but that has always been the law and section 110-8 constitutes no change in that regard. In practice it is usually cheaper for the state, or city, in traffic cases and other minor offenses in which a fine would probably be imposed as punishment, to accept the bail forfeiture in lieu of the fine which would probably be imposed and not go to the expense (which would be borne by the taxpayers), of bringing every traffic violator and minor offender into court for a full-blown trial." Ill.Ann.Stat., ch. 38, par. 110-8(g), at 322 (Smith-Hurd, 1970).

We are thus led to the ineluctable conclusion that whatever the specific language of the trial court was on September 26, 1973, the defendant suffered only a money penalty for damages for nonappearance, not punishment, for hitting the police officer, and therefore the first element of the two-pronged constitutional test, multiple punishments same offense, has not been met.

Nor do we find the second element, same offense, has been met. Under both the Federal and Illinois Constitutions, the test is whether each offense requires proof of a fact which the other does not. Blockburger v. United States (1932), 284 U.S. 299, 52 S.Ct. 180, 76 L.Ed. 306; People v. Flaherty (1947), 396 Ill. 304, 71 N.E.2d 779.

The significant portion of the Quincy ordinance is as follows:

"It shall be unlawful to interfere with or hinder any officer or employee of the city while engaged in the duties of his office."

The crux of the aggravated battery charge was bodily harm to an individual knowing the individual was a peace officer engaged in the execution of his official duties.

Viewed in the abstract, the offenses require different elements of proof. Aggravated battery requires bodily harm which the ordinance does not. The ordinance requires interference which is a much broader concept than bodily harm....