People v. Wright

• Decision Date: 03 July 2014
• Citation: 119 A.D.3d 972,989 N.Y.S.2d 180,2014 N.Y. Slip Op. 04976
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Terrance J. WRIGHT, Appellant.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

119 A.D.3d 972

989 N.Y.S.2d 180

2014 N.Y. Slip Op. 04976

The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent,

v.Terrance J. WRIGHT, Appellant.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Third Department, New York.

July 3, 2014.

Norbert A. Higgins, Binghamton, for appellant.

Gerald F. Mollen, District Attorney, Binghamton (Joann Rose Parry of counsel), for respondent.

Before: STEIN, J.P., McCARTHY, GARRY, LYNCH and DEVINE, JJ.

LYNCH, J.

Appeal from a judgment of the County Court of Broome County (Smith, J.), rendered September 12, 2012, convicting defendant upon his plea of guilty of the crime of robbery in the second degree.

In April 2008, defendant was indicted on one count of robbery in the first degree for forcibly stealing money from a cab driver in the City of Binghamton, Broome County in February 2008. He moved out of state and was not arraigned on the indictment until December 2011. He then moved to dismiss the indictment based upon a violation of his statutory and constitutional rights to a speedy trial. During the pendency of the hearings on that motion and before any ruling was made, defendant accepted a plea agreement and entered a guilty plea to robbery in the second degree and waived all pending pretrial motions, as well as his right to appeal. He was thereafter sentenced, as agreed, as a second felony offender to a prison term of eight years, with five years of postrelease supervision. He now appeals.

Defendant's primary contention on appeal is that his guilty plea must be vacated because it was the product of coercion in that the plea agreement offered by the People was impermissibly conditioned on his waiver of his pending constitutional speedy trial motion, which he argues was meritorious ( see People v. Blakley, 34 N.Y.2d 311, 313–315, 357 N.Y.S.2d 459, 313 N.E.2d 763 [1974];People v. White, 32 N.Y.2d 393, 399–400, 345 N.Y.S.2d 513, 298 N.E.2d 659 [1973];see also People v. Alexander, 19 N.Y.3d 203, 205, 212–219, 947 N.Y.S.2d 386, 970 N.E.2d 409 [2012];People v. Callahan, 80 N.Y.2d 273, 278–279, 282, 590 N.Y.S.2d 46, 604 N.E.2d 108 [1992];People v. Seaberg, 74 N.Y.2d 1, 9, 543 N.Y.S.2d 968, 541 N.E.2d 1022 [1989] ). While the claims regarding the coercive and involuntary nature of the plea survive his guilty plea and appeal waiver ( see People v. Seaberg, 74 N.Y.2d at 9, 543 N.Y.S.2d 968, 541 N.E.2d 1022),¹ they were not raised in a postallocution motion to withdraw the plea ( seeCPL 220.60[3] ) but, rather, were raised for the first time on appeal.² As such, the People contend that defendant failed to preserve this claim for appellate review.

Generally, a claim that a guilty plea is invalid is not preserved for appellate review unless first raised in the trial court ( see People v. Lopez, 71 N.Y.2d 662, 665, 529 N.Y.S.2d 465, 525 N.E.2d 5 [1998];People v. Jones, 114 A.D.3d 1080, 1081, 981 N.Y.S.2d 465 [2014] ). Except as set forth below, this holds true for a claimed violation of a defendant's constitutional right to a speedy trial ( see People v. Archie, 116 A.D.3d 1165, 1165, 983 N.Y.S.2d 358 [2014] ). “Under certain circumstances, this preservation requirement extends to challenges to the voluntariness of a guilty plea” ( People v. Peque, 22 N.Y.3d 168, 182, 980 N.Y.S.2d 280, 3 N.E.3d 617 [2013] [citations omitted]; see People v. Tyrell, 22 N.Y.3d 359, 363–364, 981 N.Y.S.2d 336, 4 N.E.3d 346 [2013];People v. Murray, 15 N.Y.3d 725, 726, 906 N.Y.S.2d 521, 932 N.E.2d 877;People v. Louree, 8 N.Y.3d 541, 546, 838 N.Y.S.2d 18, 869 N.E.2d 18 [2007] ). Notably, the Court of Appeals has recently cited to People v. Blakley (34 N.Y.2d at 315, 357 N.Y.S.2d 459, 313 N.E.2d 763) as an example of the “mode of proceedings” exception to the preservation rule ( People v. Hanley, 20 N.Y.3d 601, 604, 605 n. 2, 964 N.Y.S.2d 491, 987 N.E.2d 268 [2013] ). In that case, the Court held that conditioning a plea on a waiver of a constitutional speedy trial claim is “inherently coercive” ( People v. Blakley, 34 N.Y.2d at 313, 357 N.Y.S.2d 459, 313 N.E.2d 763). The narrow mode of proceedings exception speaks to fundamental flaws that implicate “rights of a constitutional dimension that go to the very heart of the process” ( People v. Hanley, 20 N.Y.3d at 604, 964 N.Y.S.2d 491, 987 N.E.2d 268 [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]; see People v. Becoats, 17 N.Y.3d 643, 650–651, 934 N.Y.S.2d 737, 958 N.E.2d 865 [2011] ). Where, as in Blakley, the People condition a plea offer on the defendant's waiver of his or her constitutional speedy trial claim, the integrity of the judicial process has been undermined ( see People v. Callahan, 80 N.Y.2d at 280, 590 N.Y.S.2d 46, 604 N.E.2d 108;People v. Seaberg, 74 N.Y.2d at 9, 543 N.Y.S.2d 968, 541 N.E.2d 1022;People v. Blakley, 34 N.Y.2d at 315, 357 N.Y.S.2d 459, 313 N.E.2d 763;People v. White, 32 N.Y.2d at 400, 345 N.Y.S.2d 513, 298 N.E.2d 659).

Here, the People expressly conditioned the plea offer on defendant's withdrawal of his constitutional speedy trial motion, while the hearing on this issue was still pending. To make matters worse, the offer was set to expire as soon as the hearing resumed ( see People v. White, 32 N.Y.2d at 400, 345 N.Y.S.2d 513, 298 N.E.2d 659). This is the type of prosecutorial bartering expressly prohibited as “inherently coercive” in People v. Blakley (34 N.Y.2d at 313, 357 N.Y.S.2d 459, 313 N.E.2d 763). A trial court has a core obligation to recognize and prevent such an unfair tactic, but here the court simply reiterated the impermissible condition of the plea and waiver ( compare People v. Walston, 23 N.Y.3d 986, ––––, –––N.Y.S.2d ––––, ––– N.E.2d –––– 2014 N.Y. Slip Op. 04229, 2014 WL 2608462, *3 [2014] ). Inasmuch as this case involves a “mode of proceedings error for which preservation is not required” ( People v. Tyrell, 22 N.Y.3d at 364, 981 N.Y.S.2d 336, 4 N.E.3d 346), we find that defendant's claim that his plea was coerced is reviewable on direct appeal. Further, based upon the foregoing, we find merit in this claim and, therefore, conclude that the plea must be vacated.

We turn next to defendant's further claim that he was denied his constitutional right to a speedy trial and that the indictment should, therefore, be dismissed. On the first day of the speedy trial hearing, the People presented testimony from the investigating officers as to efforts made to identify and locate defendant prior to the indictment.³ The matter was adjourned at defendant's request to assess whether he would testify. Prior to adjourning the proceeding, County Court reminded the People that “if you want to call warrant witnesses, feel free to do that. I've indicated I'd let you do that anyway.” At the next appearance, defendant entered a plea of guilty without further testimony being presented. Accordingly, since the record is insufficient to resolve the merits of defendant's constitutional speedy trial claim, the case must be remitted to County Co...