People v. Wright

Decision Date18 October 2021
Docket NumberB311217
CourtCalifornia Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
PartiesTHE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. DALLAS RAY WRIGHT, Defendant and Appellant.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County No MA044175 Kathleen Blanchard, Judge. Affirmed.

Allen G. Weinberg, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant Attorney General, Noah P. Hill and Thomas C. Hsieh, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

EDMON P. J.

In 2010, a jury convicted Dallas Ray Wright of two counts of willful, deliberate, and premeditated attempted murder, with gang and firearm enhancements. In 2021, after passage of Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 1437), Wright petitioned for vacation of his attempted murder convictions and resentencing pursuant to Penal Code section 1170.95.[1] Finding Wright statutorily ineligible for relief, the trial court denied the petition, and Wright appeals. We affirm the order.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND[2]

1. The murder, Wright's conviction, and original appeal

On November 25, 2008, Los Angeles County Sheriff's Detective Richard Cartmill and Sergeant Allen Harris were at a Lancaster mobile home park investigating graffiti related to the Mid Town Criminals (MTC) criminal street gang. They were in an unmarked vehicle, and were wearing civilian clothing. Harris pulled the car over on the wrong side of the road while Cartmill pointed out graffiti on one of the trailers. Cartmill observed Wright drive past in a Honda Civic, which slowed as it passed the officers' vehicle. Cartmill recognized Wright and knew him to be an MTC member who did not live in the mobile home park.

The officers decided to stop Wright to question him about the graffiti. They caught up with his car, displayed their badges, and yelled at him to stop. However, he sped off and led them on a five-to-ten minute pursuit in a "big circle" around east Lancaster. At one point, Wright appeared to be talking on a cellular telephone.

The officers followed Wright back to an area near an apartment complex next to the mobile home park. Wright's Honda slowed. Sixteen-year-old MTC gang member Marcos R. emerged from behind some bushes. Wright pointed at Marcos, then at the officers. Marcos immediately pulled out a gun and fired five to six shots at the officers, some of which hit their vehicle. Wright sped off and Marcos retreated into the mobile home park. After a search, Marcos was discovered hiding in the bathroom of a trailer home; a nine-millimeter semiautomatic pistol was also found in the bathroom. Wright was apprehended nearby.

After his arrest, Wright told detectives that he was driving away from the mobile home park when he saw the officers' vehicle. He believed they were rival gang members. Rival gang members had previously shot at his car, and when he saw the deputies' vehicle speed up, he fled. He telephoned Marcos and told him he was being chased. Marcos told him," 'Don't even trip. I got you.'" Marcos suggested that Wright drive near some apartments near the mobile home park. He did so. After Wright passed Marcos, Wright heard gunshots. He was startled to learn the occupants of the vehicle following him were officers. He admitted knowing that Marcos had a gun, and expected Marcos to react violently in some fashion when his pursuers drove past.

At Wright's trial, the court instructed the jury on direct aiding and abetting and the natural and probable consequences doctrine. The jury convicted Wright of the willful, deliberate, and premeditated attempted murders of Harris and Cartmill (§§ 664, 187, subd. (a)), and two counts of assault with a semiautomatic firearm (§ 245, subd. (b)), a lesser included offense of assault on a peace officer with a semiautomatic firearm. As to each offense, the jury also found true a section 186.22 gang enhancement, and that a principal personally used and discharged a firearm (§ 12022.53, subds. (b), (c), & former (e)(1)).[3] The trial court sentenced Wright to 40 years to life in prison.

A different panel of this Division affirmed Wright's judgment, with a minor sentence modification, in 2011. (People v. Wright (Dec. 1, 2011, B226877) [nonpub. opn.].)

2. The section 1170.95 petition

On January 26, 2021, Wright filed a section 1170.95 petition for vacation of his attempted murder convictions and resentencing. He averred that the jury's verdicts were premised on the natural and probable consequences doctrine, and "[b]ased on [S]enate [B]ill 1437 (P.C. sec. 1170.95) my sentence is invalid and unlawful." He appended to his petition a portion of the jury instructions in the case and the verdict forms. He also requested the appointment of counsel.

On January 28, 2021, the trial court summarily denied the petition. Wright was not present, and was not represented by counsel. The court took judicial notice of the trial court records in the case, and reasoned as follows. "The record reveals that the defendant herein was convicted of two counts of attempted murder, and two counts of assault with a firearm on a peace officer. He was not charged with, nor was he convicted of, murder, under any theory. Because the defendant was not convicted of murder, Penal Code section 1170.95 does not apply to him. [Citation.] The Petition is DENIED for failure to establish a prima facie case. (Pen. Code sec. 1170.95(c).)" (Fn. omitted.) The court acknowledged that the question of Senate Bill 1437's application to attempted murder was on review before the California Supreme Court, but observed that no published appellate case had ever found Senate Bill 1437 applied retrospectively to cases that were final before the bill's passage. Wright timely appealed the trial court's order.

DISCUSSION

Wright contends that the trial court erroneously concluded section 1170.95 does not apply to attempted murder convictions, and improperly denied the petition on that basis. We disagree.

1. Senate Bill 1437

Senate Bill 1437, which took effect on January 1, 2019, limited accomplice liability under the felony-murder rule and eliminated the natural and probable consequences doctrine as it relates to murder, to ensure that a person's sentence is commensurate with his or her individual criminal culpability. (People v. Gentile (2020) 10 Cal.5th 830, 842-843; People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 957, 971.) To achieve these goals, Senate Bill 1437 amended the felony-murder rule by adding section 189, subdivision (e), which provides that a participant in the perpetration of qualifying felonies is liable for felony murder only under specified conditions. Senate Bill 1437 also amended the natural and probable consequences doctrine by adding subdivision (a)(3) to section 188, which states that "[m]alice shall not be imputed to a person based solely on his or her participation in a crime."

Senate Bill 1437 also added section 1170.95, which created a procedure whereby persons convicted of murder under a now-invalid felony-murder or natural and probable consequences theory may petition for vacation of their convictions and resentencing. A defendant is eligible for relief under section 1170.95 if he or she meets three conditions: he or she (1) must have been charged with murder by means of a charging document that allowed the prosecution to proceed under a felony murder or natural and probable consequences theory; (2) must have been "convicted of first or second degree murder following a trial or accepted a plea offer in lieu of a trial at which the petitioner could be convicted for first degree or second degree murder"; and (3) could no longer be convicted of first or second degree murder due to changes to sections 188 and 189 effectuated by Senate Bill 1437. (§ 1170.95, subd. (a).)

To obtain section 1170.95 relief, the defendant must file a petition with the sentencing court that contains, among other things, a" 'declaration by the petitioner that he or she is eligible for relief under [section 1170.95], based on all the requirements of subdivision (a).'" (People v. Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 968.) The defendant is entitled to the appointment of counsel, if requested, upon the filing of a facially sufficient petition. (Id. at p. 957.) After briefing by the parties, the court determines whether the petitioner has made a prima facie case for entitlement to relief. (Id. at pp. 957, 966, 968.) In making that determination, the court may consider the record of conviction. (Id. at pp. 957, 960, 970-971.) "The record of conviction will necessarily inform the trial court's prima facie inquiry under section 1170.95, allowing the court to distinguish petitions with potential merit from those that are clearly meritless." (Id. at p. 971.) If the record, including the court's own documents,"' "contain[s] facts refuting the allegations made in the petition," '" then the court may determine that the petitioner has not made a prima facie case. (Ibid.) If, on the other hand, the trial court determines that the petitioner has made a prima facie showing, it must issue an order to show cause and hold a hearing to determine whether to vacate the murder conviction and resentence the petitioner on any remaining counts. (§ 1170.95, subd. (d)(1).) At that hearing, the prosecution has the burden to prove the petitioner's ineligibility beyond a reasonable doubt. (§ 1170.95, subd. (d)(3).)

2. Wright is statutorily ineligible for relief as a matter of law because he was not convicted of murder

Wright's sole contention on appeal is that, contrary to the trial court's ruling, section 1170.95 applies to convictions for...

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