People v. Wright, Docket Nos. 60399

• Decision Date: 16 November 1983
• Docket Number: Docket Nos. 60399,61672
• Citation: 340 N.W.2d 93,128 Mich.App. 374
• Parties: PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Glenn WRIGHT, Defendant-Appellee. PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Reginald CHESTNUT, Defendant-Appellee. 128 Mich.App. 374, 340 N.W.2d 93
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

Page 93

340 N.W.2d 93

PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Glenn WRIGHT, Defendant-Appellee.

PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Reginald CHESTNUT, Defendant-Appellee.

Docket Nos. 60399, 61672.

128 Mich.App. 374, 340 N.W.2d 93

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

Submitted June 6, 1983.

Decided Aug. 31, 1983.

Released for Publication Nov. 16, 1983.

[128 MICHAPP 375] Frank J. Kelley, Atty. Gen., Louis J. Caruso, Sol. Gen., William L. Cahalan, Pros. Atty., Edward Reilly Wilson, Chief Appellate Asst. Pros. Atty., and Larry L. Roberts, Asst. Pros. Atty., for the People.

Cohn & Slameka by Robert E. Slameka, Detroit, for Wright.

[128 MICHAPP 376] Andreas M. Getschmann, Detroit, for Chestnut.

Before WALSH, P.J., and BEASLEY and SULLIVAN, ^* JJ.

WALSH, Presiding Judge.

The prosecutor appeals the dismissal with prejudice of charges filed against defendants Glenn Wright and Reginald Chestnut. In docket no. 63099, defendant Wright was charged with, and bound over to Detroit Recorder's court on, kidnapping, two counts of first-degree criminal sexual conduct, and felony-firearm. M.C.L. Sec. 750.349; M.S.A. Sec. 28.581, M.C.L. Sec. 750.520b(1); M.S.A. Sec. 28.788(2)(1), M.C.L. Sec. 750.227b; M.S.A. Sec. 28.424(2). Defendant Chestnut was charged with kidnapping and felony-firearm but was bound over to recorder's court only on the kidnapping charge. In docket no. 61672, defendant Wright was charged with possession of heroin with intent to deliver. M.C.L. Sec. 333.7401(2)(a)(iii); M.S.A. Sec. 14.15(7401)(2)(a)(iii). In each case, the trial court granted defendants' motions to dismiss all charges, ruling that the 180-day rule had been violated. M.C.L. Sec. 780.131 et seq.; M.S.A. Sec. 28.969(1) et seq.

At the time of their arrests and detention in Wayne County jail, both of these defendants were parolees. Immediately after their arrests, and because of the possibility of violations of the terms of their paroles, parole holds were placed on them by the Department of Corrections. For purposes of this appeal, we accept the trial court's finding that the prosecutor failed to take good faith action to bring defendants to trial within 180 days of the filing of the parole holds. If the 180-day rule applies to those facts, the court lost jurisdiction in [128 MICHAPP 377] these cases. See People v. Hendershot, 357 Mich. 300, 98 N.W.2d 568 (1959).

1957 P.A. 177, provides:

"Sec. 1. Whenever the department of corrections shall receive notice that there is pending in this state any untried warrant, indictment, information or complaint setting forth against any inmate of a penal institution of this state a criminal offense for which a prison sentence might be imposed upon conviction, such inmate shall be brought to trial within 180 days after the department of corrections shall cause to be delivered to the prosecuting attorney of the county in which such warrant, indictment, information or complaint is pending written notice of the place of imprisonment of such inmate and a request for final disposition of such warrant, indictment, information or complaint. The request shall be accompanied by a statement setting forth the term of commitment under which the prisoner is being held, the time already served, the time remaining to be served on the sentence, the amount of good time earned, the time of parole eligibility of the prisoner and any decisions of the parole board relating to the prisoner. The written notice and statement provided herein shall be delivered by certified mail. [M.C.L. Sec. 780.131; M.S.A. Sec. 28.969(1).]

"Sec. 3. In the event that, within the time limitation set forth in section 1 of this act, action is not commenced on the matter for which request for disposition was made, no court of this state shall any longer have jurisdiction thereof, nor shall the untried warrant, indictment, information or complaint be of any further force or effect, and the court shall enter an order dismissing the same with prejudice." [M.C.L. Sec. 780.133; M.S.A. Sec. 28.969(3) ].

In People v. Hill, 402 Mich. 272, 280-281, 262 N.W.2d 641 (1978), the Supreme Court discussed the issue of when the 180-day period begins to run:

[128 MICHAPP 378] "We hold that the statutory period begins with the coincidence of either conditions 1 or 2 and condition 3:

"(1) The issuance of a warrant, indictment or complaint against a person incarcerated in a state prison or under detention in any local facility awaiting incarceration in any state prison;

"(2) The incarceration of a defendant in a state prison or the detention of such defendant in a local facility to await such incarceration when there is an untried warrant, indictment, information or complaint pending against such defendant; and

"(3) The prosecutor knows or should know that the defendant is so incarcerated when the warrant, indictment, information or complaint is issued or the Department of Corrections knows or should know that a warrant, indictment, or complaint is pending against one sentenced to their custody."

The issue presented in this case is whether a person detained in a local facility,...