People v. Wright
| Decision Date | 01 October 1987 |
| Docket Number | Docket No. 78396,No. 1,1 |
| Citation | 430 N.W.2d 133,431 Mich. 282 |
| Parties | , 57 USLW 2247 PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Atlee WRIGHT Defendant-Appellant. Calendar, |
| Court | Michigan Supreme Court |
Defendant asserts that, contrary to Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 101 S.Ct. 1866, 68 L.Ed.2d 359 (1981), he was not properly informed that he had a Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination and a Sixth Amendment right to counsel at his presentence psychiatric examination. We hold that defendant's Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights were adequately protected by the procedures followed by the trial court and the Detroit Recorder's Court psychiatric clinic. We thus uphold the Court of Appeals affirmance of defendant's conviction.
Following a jury trial in Recorder's Court, defendant was convicted of second-degree murder. At the end of trial in the presence of counsel, the trial judge ordered the defendant to be examined in the Recorder's Court psychiatric clinic prior to sentencing. Neither defendant nor his counsel objected. The examining psychologist concluded that defendant was assaultive, antisocial, and posed a high risk to the community. At sentencing, the trial judge referred to these findings and sentenced defendant to forty to seventy years' imprisonment. In addition to other issues raised in the Court of Appeals, defendant asserted noncompliance with Estelle v. Smith, supra, in which the United States Supreme Court held that when the results of a psychiatric examination are used in determining the nature and severity of a convicted defendant's sentence, the defendant's Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination and Sixth Amendment right to counsel attach. The Court of Appeals affirmed defendant's conviction in an unpublished opinion without discussing Estelle.
We granted leave to appeal limited to the issue whether the psychiatric examination was improperly conducted in violation of defendant's Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. 426 Mich. 864 (1986). Although not included within our order granting leave, we will also discuss the alleged violation of defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel, which was briefed by both parties.
Before discussing the Estelle holding and the present issues, it is helpful to summarize the three types of psychiatric examinations which are typically performed at forensic psychiatric clinics, and the importance of the one involved here. 1 When a defendant's competency to stand trial is questioned, a competency examination is given to determine his mental state at the time of trial to assure that he understands the charges against him and can knowingly assist in his defense. 2 When a defendant pleads not guilty by reason of insanity, a criminal responsibility or sanity examination is given to determine the defendant's mental state at the time of the offense. 3
In Michigan, the results of competency examinations may not be used at trial as evidence of a defendant's guilt, obviating Fifth Amendment concerns regarding self-incrimination. 4 Also, a defendant must submit to, and participate in, a criminal responsibility examination before being allowed to present a sanity defense at trial. 5 Statements made during that examination are not admissible on any issue other than the defendant's mental illness or insanity at the time of the alleged offense. 6 The Estelle Court confirmed that the Fifth Amendment right to remain silent is not implicated when the results of the competency and sanity examinations are used for their intended purposes:
"[T]he interview with Dr. Grigson [the examining psychiatrist] cannot be characterized as a routine competency examination restricted to ensuring that respondent understood the charges against him and was capable of assisting in his defense. Indeed, if the application of Dr. Grigson's findings had been confined to serving that function, no Fifth Amendment issue would have arisen.
The third type of psychiatric examination is the postconviction presentence evaluation, which is either court-ordered or requested as part of the presentence investigative process to determine the defendant's character traits for purposes of sentencing. In Michigan, the Legislature has expressly provided for the preparation of a presentence investigation report in Sec. 14 of the Code of Criminal Procedure:
"(1) Before sentencing any person charged with a felony, ... the probation officer shall inquire into the antecedents, character, and circumstances of the person, and shall report in writing to the court." M.C.L. Sec. 771.14(1); M.S.A. Sec. 28.1144(1).
Implicit within Sec. 14 is the option of having a psychiatric examination performed during the presentence investigation. M.C.L. Sec. 771.14(7); M.S.A. Sec. 28.1144(7). This is the type of examination which was performed in the present case.
Deciding the appropriate sentence for a convicted criminal is perhaps the most critical stage of a successful criminal prosecution. The information gathered during the state's presentence investigation is usually heavily relied on by the sentencing judge, hence its importance cannot be overemphasized. 7 In Estelle, the Supreme Court held that the prosecution's use of certain psychiatric testimony at the sentencing phase of the defendant's murder trial violated his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights. In that case, the defendant was convicted of first-degree murder in Texas and was sentenced to death. At the time of the defendant's trial, Texas law required two jury proceedings to impose the death penalty: one to decide guilt and one to determine the penalty. Following conviction in the guilt phase, the state had the burden of proof on three questions in the penalty phase. If the jury answered the questions affirmatively, the judge was bound to impose the death penalty. Of these three inquiries, the one at issue in Estelle was the defendant's future dangerousness. The examination which produced the objectionable information was a pretrial competency examination which had been routinely ordered by the judge because the defendant faced the death penalty. The examining psychiatrist, however, was also called as a witness during the penalty phase where he testified extensively regarding the defendant's sociopathic character and future dangerousness. The jury answered the "future dangerousness" question and the other two questions affirmatively, and the defendant was sentenced to death.
The Estelle Court held that because the psychiatric examination was used in determining the nature and severity of defendant's sentence, his Fifth Amendment right attached at the examination:
"The essence of this basic constitutional principle is 'the requirement that the State which proposes to convict and punish an individual produce the evidence against him by the independent labor of its officers, not by the simple, cruel expedient of forcing it from his own lips.' " 451 U.S. 462, 101 S.Ct. 1872.
We agree with the defendant in the present case that he, too, had a Fifth Amendment right to remain silent at his presentence psychiatric examination. It is not relevant that the defendant's examination occurred prior to trial in Estelle and after trial here. Both examinations were used in determining the severity of the defendant's sentence, which was what the Estelle Court focused on:
"Just as the Fifth Amendment prevents a criminal defendant from being made ' "the deluded instrument of his own conviction," ' ... it protects him as well from being made the 'deluded instrument' of his own execution.
"We can discern no basis to distinguish between the guilt and penalty phases of respondent's capital murder trial so far as the protection of the Fifth Amendment privilege is concerned." 451 U.S. 462-463, 101 S.Ct. 1873.
The Estelle Court rejected the state's argument that, like voice and handwriting exemplars, lineups, and blood samples, the defendant's statements were not used for their testimonial content:
As in Estelle, defendant's statements in the present case were testimonial in nature. The examining psychologist relied on the content of defendant's statements to draw several conclusions about him, including that he was prone to act out in an aggressive manner, and that he was a high social risk to the community. 8 The Estelle Court concluded that defendant Smith's Fifth Amendment right had not been adequately protected because the defendant was not advised that the results of the competency examination would be later used by the state in seeking the death penalty:
"The state trial judge, sua...
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