People v. Yartz

• Decision Date: 05 December 2005
• Docket Number: No. S117964.,S117964.
• Citation: 37 Cal.4th 529,36 Cal.Rptr.3d 328,123 P.3d 604
• Court: California Supreme Court
• Parties: The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Norman YARTZ, Defendant and Appellant.

36 Cal.Rptr.3d 328

37 Cal.4th 529

123 P.3d 604

The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Norman YARTZ, Defendant and Appellant.

No. S117964.

Supreme Court of California.

December 5, 2005.

As Modified December 5, 2005.

Linn Davis, Norco, under appointment by the Supreme Court, and Cynthia A. Thomas, Sacramento, for Defendant and Appellant.

Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, Manuel M. Medeiros, State Solicitor, Robert R. Anderson, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Mary Jo Graves, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Janet E. Neeley and Paul A. Bernardino, Deputy Attorneys General, Sacramento, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

CHIN, J.

We must decide whether a 1978 conviction based on a nolo contendere, or no contest, plea may serve as a predicate prior conviction in a civil commitment proceeding under the Sexually Violent Predators Act (SVPA or Act). (Welf. & Inst.Code,¹ §§ 6600 et seq.) Before its 1982 amendment, Penal Code section 1016, former subdivision (3), provided that a defendant's nolo contendere plea "may not be used against the defendant as an admission in any civil suit based upon or growing out of the act upon which the criminal prosecution is based." (Stats.1976, ch. 1088, § 1, p. 4931.) The issue is whether an SVPA proceeding is a "civil suit" for purposes of this former subdivision.

For reasons that follow, we conclude that an SVPA civil commitment proceeding is a special proceeding of a civil nature, and not a "civil suit" under Penal Code section 1016, former subdivision (3). As such, defendant Norman Yartz's 1978 conviction for child molestation may be used as a predicate prior conviction to support his SVPA civil commitment. (§ 6600, subd. (a)(1).)

Thus, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeal, which held to the contrary.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In 1978, defendant pled no contest to, and was convicted of, committing a lewd or lascivious act on a child under the age of 14. (Pen.Code, § 288.) The victim was a 10-year-old girl who was living with her mother and defendant at defendant's residence for several weeks. He admitted molesting the victim over a period of one week. He was committed to Atascadero State Hospital as a mentally disordered sex offender (MDSO). After the medical director determined defendant was not amenable to treatment, defendant's MDSO commitment was terminated. On January 22, 1980, a superior court sentenced defendant to five years in state prison. In 1985, defendant was again convicted of violating Penal Code section 288 involving another victim, an eight-year-old girl who was a friend of defendant's daughter. Defendant was sentenced to 22 years in state prison.

On May 16, 1997, the San Joaquin County District Attorney petitioned to commit defendant as a sexually violent predator (SVP) under the Act. (§ 6601.) The petition alleged that defendant had two prior convictions for sexually violent offenses against two separate victims, one in 1978 and the other in 1985. Defendant moved to exclude evidence of his 1978 conviction. He argued that this conviction was based on his no contest plea, which at the time was governed by Penal Code section 1016, former subdivision (3). This former subdivision, defendant maintained, prohibited the use of his no contest plea in a later civil suit, including an SVPA civil commitment proceeding.

The trial court denied the motion. A jury found defendant to be a sexually violent predator and the court committed him to the Department of Mental Health for two years. Defendant appealed. The Court of Appeal reversed.

Citing Leake v. Superior Court (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 675, 680, 104 Cal.Rptr.2d 767 (Leake), which concluded that an SVPA proceeding is a "civil action or a special proceeding of a civil nature," the Court of Appeal agreed with defendant that his 1978 conviction was subject to the limitation of Penal Code section 1016, former subdivision (3): "Certainly, it must be said that an SVP proceeding which relies in part on defendant's earlier conviction for violating [Penal Code] section 288 necessarily is a civil action based upon or growing out of the act upon which that criminal prosecution was based." In addition, the Court of Appeal concluded that the 1982 amendment to Penal Code section 1016, subdivision (3), which made a no contest plea to a felony charge "the same as that of a plea of guilty for all purposes," did not apply to defendant's 1978 conviction to permit its use in the current SVPA proceeding. "In effect, what the People seek is an impermissible retroactive application of the amendment to section 1016 in 1982."

Based on the foregoing, the Court of Appeal concluded defendant's 1978 conviction based on his no contest plea could not be used as a predicate offense to support his civil commitment under the SVPA. (§ 6600, subd. (a).) It reversed the trial court's commitment order. We granted review.

DISCUSSION

Relying on Penal Code section 1016, former subdivision (3), defendant argues that his 1978 conviction based on his nolo contendere plea may not support his civil commitment as an SVP. From 1976 to 1982, Penal Code section 1016, former subdivision (3), governed nolo contendere pleas.² "The legal effect of [a nolo contendere] plea shall be the same as that of a plea of guilty, but the plea and any admission required by the court during any inquiry it makes as to the voluntariness of and factual basis for the plea may not be used against the defendant as an admission in any civil suit based upon or growing out of the act upon which the criminal prosecution is based." (Stats.1976, ch. 1088, § 1, p. 4931, italics added.) At issue here is whether an SVPA commitment proceeding is a "civil suit" for purposes of Penal Code section 1016, former subdivision (3). We begin with a discussion of the SVPA.

A. The SVPA

"The SVPA provides for the involuntary civil commitment of an offender immediately upon release from prison, for a two-year period, if the offender is found to be an SVP." (Cooley v. Superior Court (2002) 29 Cal.4th 228, 243, 127 Cal.Rptr.2d 177, 57 P.3d 654 (Cooley).) To establish that an offender is a "[s]exually violent predator," the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the person (1) "has been convicted of a sexually violent offense against two or more victims," and (2) "has a diagnosed mental disorder that makes the person a danger to the health and safety of others in that it is likely that he or she will engage in sexually violent criminal behavior." (§§ 6600, subd. (a)(1), 6604.)³

The SVPA is not punitive in purpose or effect. (Hubbart v. Superior Court (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1138, 1166, 1171, 81 Cal.Rptr.2d 492, 969 P.2d 584 (Hubbart).) Its proceedings are "civil in nature...." (Cooley, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 250, 127 Cal.Rptr.2d 177, 57 P.3d 654, citing Hubbart, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 1172, 81 Cal.Rptr.2d 492, 969 P.2d 584; People v. Superior Court (Preciado) (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 1122, 1128, 105 Cal.Rptr.2d 159.) More than 40 years before the SVPA's 1995 enactment, we concluded that "[s]exual psychopathy proceedings are special proceedings of a civil nature which are collateral to the criminal case. [Citations.]" (Gross v. Superior Court (1954) 42 Cal.2d 816, 820, 270 P.2d 1025 (Gross) [former § 5500 et seq., recodified as former § 6300 et seq.]; see also In re Gary W. (1971) 5 Cal.3d 296, 309, 96 Cal.Rptr. 1, 486 P.2d 1201 [§ 1800 "[c]ommitment proceedings are `special proceedings of a civil nature'"].)

Relying in part on Hubbart, several Courts of Appeal have described an SVPA commitment proceeding as a "special proceeding of a civil nature." (People v. Superior Court (Cheek) (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 980, 988, 114 Cal.Rptr.2d 760 (Cheek); see Bagration v. Superior Court (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 1677, 1685, 3 Cal.Rptr.3d 292 (Bagration) [following Cheek]; see also Leake, supra, 87 Cal.App.4th at p. 680, 104 Cal.Rptr.2d 767; People v. Hedge (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 1466, 1477, 86 Cal.Rptr.2d 52.) However, the Leake Court of Appeal also concluded that the Legislature enacted the SVPA "as a civil action." (Leake, supra, 87 Cal.App.4th at p. 680, 104 Cal.Rptr.2d 767.) Based on Leake, the Court of Appeal here declared that an SVPA proceeding is a civil action, and as such, concluded that Penal Code section 1016, former subdivision (3), prohibited the use of defendant's 1978 conviction. We conclude that Leake incorrectly implied that an SVPA proceeding is a civil action. (See Gross, supra, 42 Cal.2d at p. 820, 270 P.2d 1025.)

In Leake, the Court of Appeal held that the Civil Discovery Act of 1986 (Code Civ. Proc., § 2016 et seq.) applies to SVPA proceedings. (Leake, supra, 87 Cal.App.4th at p. 679, 104 Cal.Rptr.2d 767.) In so holding, the Court of Appeal first noted the 1986 act applies to an "action," which includes "a civil action and a special proceeding of a civil nature" under Code of Civil Procedure section 2016, subdivision (b)(1). (Leake, supra, 87 Cal.App.4th at p. 679, 104 Cal.Rptr.2d 767.) Citing several civil commitment schemes as support, the court next concluded: "It is apparent that the Legislature designed the SVPA as a civil action or special proceeding of a civil nature because it set the SVPA in the Welfare and Institutions Code among other civil commitment statutory schemes." (Leake, supra, 87 Cal.App.4th at p. 680, 104 Cal.Rptr.2d 767 [citing Lanterman-Petris-Short Act (LPS Act) (§ 5000 et seq.), Mentally Disordered Sex Offenders Act (former § 6300 et seq., repealed in 1981), Mentally Retarded Persons Law (§ 6500 et seq.)].)

However, in correlating a civil action with a special proceeding, the Leake Court of Appeal incorrectly suggested that proceedings under one or more of the civil commitment schemes constituted "civil actions." (See Bagration, supra, 110 Cal.App.4th at p. 1685, fn. 7, 3 Cal.Rptr.3d 292 ["special proceedings" include proceedings under LPS Act and § 6500]; People v. Succop (1967) 67 Cal.2d 785, 789, 63 Cal.Rptr. 569, 433 P.2d 473 [former § 5500...