People v. Yost
| Decision Date | 27 March 2008 |
| Docket Number | Docket No. 270938. |
| Court | Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US |
| Parties | PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Donna Alice YOST, Defendant-Appellant. |
Martha G. Mettee, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for the people.
State Appellate Defender (by Gail Rodwan) for the defendant.
Before: FITZGERALD, P.J., and MARKEY and SMOLENSKI, JJ.
Defendant appeals as of right her jury conviction of second-degree murder and first-degree felony murder predicated on an underlying felony of first-degree child abuse. See MCL 750.316, MCL 750.317, and MCL 750.136b(2). On appeal, defendant argues that the trial court committed several errors that deprived her of a fair trial. Defendant contends that the trial court erred when it prevented her from presenting testimony about her limited intellectual functioning and by preventing her from calling an expert toxicologist. Defendant also contends that the trial court violated her right to confront the witnesses against her when it allowed the prosecution to play a videotape of an informant's testimony. Finally, defendant contends that the trial court erred when it permitted the prosecution's medical examiner to offer an opinion that seven-year-old children do not have the maturity to decide to end their own lives and when it permitted the prosecution to elicit testimony about other acts of abuse or neglect by defendant against her children to show that defendant had bad character and acted in conformity with that character. We agree that the trial court should have permitted defendant to present evidence about her limited intellectual functioning, should have allowed defendant to call a toxicologist, and erred when it permitted the prosecution to elicit testimony about defendant's involvement with Child Protective Services without appropriately limiting the nature and the extent of the testimony. Because these errors deprived defendant of a fair trial, we reverse defendant's convictions, vacate her sentence, and remand for a new trial.
This case arises out of the death of defendant's seven-year-old daughter, Monique, on October 10, 1999.1 On that day, defendant was home alone with Monique. Sometime after 11 a.m., Monique left home without permission. When Monique returned, defendant angrily told her to take a nap on the couch. At around 6 p.m., defendant tried to wake Monique, but Monique did not respond. Shortly thereafter, a couple who lived next door came over to visit. Defendant again tried to wake Monique but to no avail. When one of the neighbors entered the room where Monique was lying, Monique suffered a seizure and stopped breathing. The neighbor began efforts to resuscitate Monique and told his girlfriend to call for help. Emergency personnel arrived shortly thereafter. The emergency personnel immediately transported Monique to the hospital, where she was pronounced dead.
After conducting an autopsy, the medical examiner was not able to determine the cause and the manner of Monique's death. But a blood test later revealed that Monique had a significant amount of Imipramine, an antidepressant drug, in her system. Monique had months earlier been prescribed the Imipramine to control bedwetting and anxiety. On the basis of the level of Imipramine found in Monique's body and the ratio of Imipramine to its metabolite, the medical examiner concluded that Monique died of acute Imipramine poisoning. Further, the medical examiner determined that it would take more than 90 of the pills prescribed to Monique to reach the level of Imipramine found in her system. Because the medical examiner found no pill residue in Monique's stomach, he concluded that the pills must have been dissolved in liquid before Monique ingested them. From this evidence, the medical examiner concluded that Monique's death was a homicide.
The prosecution brought two counts against defendant. The first count was for first-degree premeditated murder and the second count was for felony murder with first-degree child abuse as the underlying felony. The primary issues at trial were (1) whether Monique died from an overdose of Imipramine and, if she did, (2) whether defendant caused Monique to ingest the Imipramine.
The prosecution centered its case on the unlikelihood that Monique would deliberately or accidentally take such a large overdose of Imipramine along with evidence that defendant had both a motive and the opportunity to cause Monique to ingest the Imipramine. For her defense, defendant presented evidence that Monique had a heart defect that may have caused her death and tried to present evidence that the level of Imipramine found in Monique was not lethal. The defense also suggested that Monique suffered from depression and may have deliberately or accidentally ingested the Imipramine.
After a lengthy trial, the jury found defendant not guilty of premeditated murder under the first count, but convicted defendant of the lesser-included offense of second-degree murder, and found defendant guilty of first-degree felony-murder under the second count. The trial court sentenced defendant to life in prison without the possibility of parole for the felony-murder conviction.
This appeal followed.
Defendant first argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it prevented defendant's expert psychologist, Dr. Siroza VanHorn, from testifying about defendant's intellectual functioning, cognitive processing, judgment, and problem solving and parenting abilities. Defendant also contends that the trial court erred when it prevented another daughter of the defendant, Roxanne Davis, from testifying about her mother's limited intellectual capabilities and how these limitations affected defendant's ability to function in the family and react to life situations. We agree that the trial court erred when it prevented VanHorn and Davis from testifying about defendant's limited intellectual capability as a means of shedding light on defendant's behaviors and statements.
At trial, the prosecution spent a significant portion of its case eliciting testimony about defendant's unnatural reactions and conduct during the events leading up to and surrounding Monique's death and the subsequent investigation. The prosecution used the testimony as proof of motive and consciousness of guilt.
Several witnesses offered testimony that together tended to suggest that defendant had deliberately tried to keep the prosecutor from interviewing Monique as part of an investigation into allegations that a houseguest had sexually abused Monique. Because this behavior was not consistent with how a mother would normally respond to allegations of abuse against her child, it strongly supported the prosecution's theory that defendant had an ulterior motive to prevent Monique from participating in the investigation.
The prosecution also elicited testimony from medical personnel and persons who attended Monique's funeral that defendant's reaction to her daughter's death was inconsistent with that of an innocent mother who had lost a child.
One of the paramedics who responded to the Yost home testified that defendant was unemotional and that after she told defendant that her daughter was in grave condition, defendant merely responded, "okay." This was in contrast to defendant's husband, who was "pretty emotional; he was crying." The paramedic also noted that defendant declined the invitation to ride in the ambulance with Monique. Another paramedic testified that defendant's reaction was "odd." He said that defendant answered all his questions, but that she was "unemotional" and that this was not "something I typically see ... when we have a sick child."
A nurse at the hospital where Monique was treated testified that defendant turned her emotions on and off at will. She explained that when she entered the room and made eye contact with defendant, defendant would cry and exclaim "my baby, my baby." But that when she left the room, defendant would immediately stop crying and become unemotional.
Likewise, Monique's family therapist testified that she went to Monique's funeral and observed that defendant had an unusual demeanor: she appeared nervous.
In addition, the prosecution made effective use of several recorded statements of conversations between defendant and the officers investigating Monique's death. In these conversations, defendant made seemingly odd statements about Monique's death and the events surrounding the investigation. These statements suggested that defendant had a guilty conscience or was, at the least, apathetic about her daughter's death. In addition to these recordings, two officers testified about defendant's reactions to their investigation into Monique's death.
Amado Arceo, who was an officer of the Michigan State Police, testified that defendant said she felt "responsible" for Monique's death and that she deserved a second chance. He also testified that he asked defendant about the worst thing that ever happened to her and defendant responded, "Two weeks ago, I was in jail, and Monique lying to everybody."
Detective Dean Vosler also testified that defendant's reactions were odd. He stated that the only time defendant showed any emotion about her daughter was when she described being angry with her. Vosler explained:
I never noticed in any of the interviews with [defendant] that she cried from — over Monique's death. She cried because she thought she was in trouble. She told me how it was hard for Lonnie and Josh and Jessica, Monique's death, but she never even told me it was hard for her. It didn't appear to me that she felt any sorrow for her.
Vosler also said that defendant told him that she did...
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