People v. Young, 124811. Calendar No. 2.

• Citation: 472 Mich. 130,693 N.W.2d 801
• Decision Date: 29 March 2005
• Docket Number: No. 124811. Calendar No. 2.,124811. Calendar No. 2.
• Parties: PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Wayne L. YOUNG, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: Supreme Court of Michigan

693 N.W.2d 801

472 Mich. 130

PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Wayne L. YOUNG, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 124811. Calendar No. 2.

Supreme Court of Michigan.

Argued November 9, 2004.

Decided March 29, 2005.

Michael A. Cox, Attorney General, Thomas L. Casey, Solicitor General, Kym L. Worthy, Prosecuting Attorney, Timothy A. Baughman, Chief of Research, Training, and Appeals, and Jon P. Wojtala, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for the people. [Detroit, MI].

State Appellate Defender (by Valerie R. Newman) for the defendant. [Detroit, MI].

Before the Entire Bench.

CORRIGAN, J.

In People v. McCoy, 392 Mich. 231, 220 N.W.2d 456 (1974), this Court invented a new rule regarding cautionary instructions on accomplice testimony. That rule provided that the trial court's failure to give a cautionary instruction upon a defense request requires reversal of a conviction. Moreover, reversal may be required even in the absence of a defense request if the issue of guilt is "closely drawn." We reject the McCoy rule because it has no basis in Michigan law. Indeed, it contravenes long-standing authorities according discretion to trial courts in deciding whether to provide a cautionary instruction on accomplice testimony. Moreover, the McCoy rule is inconsistent with MCL 768.29, which provides that the failure to instruct on a point of law is not a ground for setting aside a verdict unless the instruction is requested by the accused, and MCR 2.516(C), which states that a party may assign as error the failure to give an instruction only if the party objects on the record before the jury retires to consider the verdict.

We further clarify that an unpreserved claim of failure to give a cautionary accomplice instruction may be reviewed only in the same manner as other unpreserved arguments on appeal. That is, appellate review is confined to the plain-error test set forth in People v. Grant, 445 Mich. 535, 520 N.W.2d 123 (1994), and People v. Carines, 460 Mich. 750, 597 N.W.2d 130 (1999). We therefore affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals, because it reached the correct result in affirming defendant's convictions and sentences.

I. UNDERLYING FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Defendant shot and killed two people in an execution-style slaying while robbing a drug house in Detroit. Among other evidence of guilt, the prosecution presented testimony from two witnesses whom defendant now claims were his accomplices, Michael Martin and Eugene Lawrence.

Martin testified that defendant came to his house and asked him for a gun to rob someone. Martin had no gun. Defendant then spoke on the telephone to Martin's brother-in-law, Lawrence. Martin did not hear their conversation. Martin then drove defendant to Lawrence's house. After they arrived, defendant and Lawrence spoke in a back room away from Martin, who again could not hear their conversation.

Lawrence testified that during this conversation, defendant asked him for a gun because some men had threatened him. Defendant did not mention to Lawrence any plan to rob a drug house. Lawrence did furnish a gun to defendant. Martin and defendant then drove back to Martin's home. Martin went inside his home while defendant walked off in the direction of a nearby drug house.

Defendant later telephoned Martin, stating that he was planning to rob a drug house. Martin hung up. Later that day, defendant visited Martin's home and admitted that he had shot the two victims in the head. After defendant left, Martin contacted Lawrence. Martin and Lawrence then went to defendant's home. Defendant told them that he was angry because he had killed the victims for only six rocks of crack cocaine. Defendant called an unknown person and directed him to tell Martin where to find the gun. Defendant eventually directed Martin and Lawrence to a field near Martin's home where Martin found the gun.

The police questioned Martin twice. During the second interview, he disclosed what had happened. The police then retrieved the murder weapon. Martin and Lawrence were never charged with a crime in connection with the murders.

In addition to the testimony of Martin and Lawrence, the prosecution presented other evidence of defendant's guilt. One witness testified that defendant had also asked him for a gun. Another witness, Ronald Mathis, had seen defendant in the drug house just before the murders occurred. At that time, defendant offered to sell Mathis a gun. Mathis then left the premises. Upon his return approximately fifteen minutes later, Mathis discovered the victims' bodies and noted that defendant was gone. Finally, a cigarette butt recovered at the murder scene contained deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) material that matched defendant's DNA.

Defendant was charged with several offenses, including first-degree murder, MCL 750.316. The jury convicted defendant of two counts of second-degree murder, MCL 750.317; one count of assault with intent to commit armed robbery, MCL 750.89; one count of possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, MCL 750.227b; and one count of possession of a firearm by a person convicted of a felony, MCL 750.224f. Defendant was sentenced to concurrent terms of forty-five to seventy years' imprisonment for the second-degree murder convictions, forty to sixty years' imprisonment for the assault conviction, and two to five years' imprisonment for the felon in possession of a firearm conviction. Those sentences are to be served consecutively to the two-year term of imprisonment for the felony-firearm conviction.

The Court of Appeals affirmed defendant's convictions.¹ It rejected defendant's contention that the trial court had erred under McCoy in failing to sua sponte provide a cautionary instruction on accomplice testimony, concluding that: (1) this case did not present a closely drawn credibility contest, and (2) it was not clear that Martin and Lawrence were accomplices.

We granted defendant's application for leave to appeal. 470 Mich. 869, 470 Mich. 869 (2004), mod 471 Mich. 862, 683 N.W.2d 669 (2004).

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Whether the McCoy rule has a basis in Michigan law and whether it is consistent with MCL 768.29 and MCR 2.516(C) are questions of law that we review de novo. Jenkins v. Patel, 471 Mich. 158, 162, 684 N.W.2d 346 (2004). Moreover, as discussed later in this opinion, the decision whether to give a cautionary accomplice instruction falls within the trial court's sound discretion. MCL 768.29; People v. Dumas, 161 Mich. 45, 48-49, 125 N.W. 766 (1910); People v. Wallin, 55 Mich. 497, 505, 22 N.W. 15 (1885). We therefore review that decision for an abuse of discretion. Finally, where, as here, the defendant failed to preserve his claim, our review is confined to the plain-error framework set forth in Grant and Carines.

III. ANALYSIS

A. Legal Background

In McCoy, this Court discussed dangers that inhere in accomplice testimony, including "`the effect of fear, threats, hostility, motives, or hope of leniency.'" McCoy, supra at 236, 220 N.W.2d 456, quoting 30 Am. Jur. 2d, Evidence, § 1148, p. 323. The McCoy Court stated that in People v. Jenness, 5 Mich. 305, 330 (1858), this Court referred to a judge's duty to comment, where warranted, on the nature of accomplice testimony. The McCoy Court acknowledged, however, that subsequent case law reflected that the trial court had discretion in deciding whether to provide a cautionary accomplice instruction. See Dumas, supra.

The McCoy Court also acknowledged that federal courts have not articulated a definitive rule regarding cautionary instructions on accomplice testimony. Indeed, the United States Supreme Court refused to reverse a conviction on the basis of a failure to give such an instruction in Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 495, 37 S.Ct. 192, 61 L.Ed. 442 (1917). The Caminetti Court stated that "there is no absolute rule of law preventing convictions on the testimony of accomplices if juries believe them." Id.

Despite these authorities, the McCoy Court invented a novel rule: "For cases tried after the publication of this opinion, it will be deemed reversible error ... to fail upon request to give a cautionary instruction concerning accomplice testimony and, if the issue is closely drawn, it may be reversible error to fail to give such a cautionary instruction even in the absence of a request to charge." McCoy, supra at 240, 220 N.W.2d 456.

Justice Coleman dissented in McCoy. She cited MCL 768.29, which provides: "The failure of the court to instruct on any point of law shall not be ground for setting aside the verdict of the jury unless such instruction is requested by the accused." She also quoted the predecessor to MCR 2.516(C), GCR 1963, 516.2: "No party may assign as error the giving or the failure to give an instruction unless he objects thereto before the jury retires to consider the verdict, stating specifically the matter to which he objects and the grounds of his objection."

Justice Coleman noted that the articulation in Jenness of a duty to comment on accomplice testimony predated both the statute and the court rule. Moreover, Jenness "was not a rigorously applied precedent." McCoy, supra at 248, 220 N.W.2d 456. For example, in Dumas, this Court stated:

It is the long settled rule in this State that the credibility of an accomplice, like that of any other witness, is a question exclusively for the jury. And while there have been intimations, rather than rulings, to the effect that it is proper, or is not improper, especially in cases where an accomplice is the sole witness upon a material point, for the trial court to direct the attention of the jury to the circumstance and invite the exercise of caution upon the part of the jury, we know of no decision of this court in which it is held or intimated that the failure of the court to indulge in voluntary comment is ground for reversal. [Dumas, supra at 48, 125 N.W. 766.]

The Dumas Court had also quoted from Wal...