Jenkins v. Patel
| Decision Date | 26 July 2004 |
| Docket Number | Docket No. 123957. Calendar No. 9. |
| Citation | 684 N.W.2d 346,471 Mich. 158 |
| Parties | Margaret JENKINS, as Personal Representative of the Estate of Mattie Howard, Deceased, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Jayesh Kumar PATEL, M.D., and Comprehensive Health Services, Inc., a Michigan Corporation, doing business as The Wellness Plan, Jointly and Severally, Defendants-Appellants. |
| Court | Michigan Supreme Court |
Ira B. Saperstein, P.C. (by Ira B. Saperstein), Southfield, MI, for the plaintiff.
Grier & Copeland, P.C. (by Wilson Copeland), and Kitch Drutchas Wagner DeNardis & Valitutti (by Susan Healty Zitterman), Detroit, MI, for the defendants.
Michael A. Cox, Attorney General, Thomas L. Casey, Solicitor General, and Michael J. Fraleigh, Assistant Attorney General, for the Commissioner of the Office of Insurance and Financial Services and Rehabilitator of the Wellness Plan.
Fraser Trebilcock Davis & Dunlap, P.C. (by Graham K. Crabtree), Lansing, MI, for ProNational Insurance Company and Michigan Health and Hospital Association. Kerr, Russell and Weber, P.L.C. (by Richard D. Weber and Joanne Geha Swanson), Detroit, MI, for Michigan State Medical Society.
We granted leave to appeal to consider whether the medical malpractice noneconomic damages cap, M.C.L. § 600.1483(1), applies to a wrongful death action where the underlying claim is medical malpractice. The jury awarded plaintiff $10 million in noneconomic damages. The trial court denied defendants' motion for remittitur or a new trial, concluding that the medical malpractice noneconomic damages cap does not apply to wrongful death actions. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Because we conclude that the medical malpractice noneconomic damages cap does apply to wrongful death actions where the underlying claim is medical malpractice, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand this case to the Court of Appeals for consideration of the constitutional issues raised by plaintiff that were not resolved by the Court of Appeals in light of its analysis of the statutory issue.
Plaintiff brought this wrongful death action against defendants, seeking to recover damages for the death of her mother that allegedly resulted from defendants' medical malpractice. Plaintiff's decedent began treating with defendant Dr. Jayesh Patel shortly after being hospitalized for a stroke. Plaintiff contends that Dr. Patel negligently managed the decedent's renal disease and hypertension, which ultimately led to her death. Plaintiff sought damages for the loss of society and companionship sustained by the decedent's seven children and seven siblings. The jury awarded plaintiff $10 million in noneconomic damages.
Defendants filed a motion for remittitur or for a new trial, arguing that the medical malpractice noneconomic damages cap, M.C.L. § 600.1483(1), requires a reduction in the damage award, and, in the alternative, that the award is excessive. The trial court held that the medical malpractice noneconomic damages cap does not apply to wrongful death actions. The trial judge further held that, although the award is excessive, he could not determine an appropriate amount of damages because he was not personally present at the trial to hear the testimony of the witnesses and judge their credibility.1 Therefore, he let the jury's $10 million verdict stand. In a published decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision that the medical malpractice noneconomic damages cap does not apply to wrongful death actions.2 The Court of Appeals, however, remanded the case to the trial court, holding that the trial court, having found the award to be excessive, must either set a remittitur amount or grant a new trial on damages only.3 One of the judges on the panel wrote a concurring opinion to emphasize her belief that the language of the wrongful death act precludes application of the medical malpractice noneconomic damages cap. We granted defendants' application for leave to appeal.4
Whether the medical malpractice noneconomic damages cap, M.C.L. § 600.1483(1), applies to a wrongful death action where the underlying claim is medical malpractice is an issue of statutory interpretation, which is a question of law that this Court reviews de novo. Morales v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., (After Remand), 469 Mich. 487, 490, 672 N.W.2d 849 (2003).
M.C.L. § 600.1483, also referred to as the medical malpractice noneconomic damages cap, provides, in pertinent part:
The wrongful death act, M.C.L. § 600.2922, provides, in pertinent part:
There is no common-law right to recover damages for a wrongfully caused death. Instead, the wrongful death act provides the exclusive remedy under which a plaintiff may seek damages for a wrongfully caused death. Courtney v. Apple, 345 Mich. 223, 228, 76 N.W.2d 80 (1956). That does not mean, however, that the wrongful death act is the only act that is applicable in a wrongful death action. For instance, the medical malpractice statute of limitations, M.C.L. § 600.5838a, applies to wrongful death actions where the underlying claim is medical malpractice because "in all actions brought under the wrongful death statute, the limitations period will be governed by the provision applicable to the liability theory of the underlying wrongful act." Hawkins v. Regional Medical Laboratories, PC, 415 Mich. 420, 436, 329 N.W.2d 729 (1982); Waltz v. Wyse, 469 Mich. 642, 677 N.W.2d 813 (2004). Additionally, actions brought under the wrongful death act "accrue as provided by the statutory provisions governing the underlying liability theory...." Hawkins, supra at 437, 329 N.W.2d 729. Accordingly, when the underlying claim is medical malpractice, the medical malpractice accrual statute, M.C.L. § 600.5838a, applies to a wrongful death action. Further, this Court has recently applied the medical malpractice notice of intent requirement of M.C.L. § 600.2912b, the medical malpractice tolling provision of M.C.L. § 600.5856(d), the medical malpractice affidavit of merit requirement of M.C.L. § 600.2912d, and the medical malpractice expert witness qualification requirements of M.C.L. § 600.2169(1)(a) to wrongful death actions. Waltz, supra; Grossman v. Brown, 470 Mich. 593, 685 N.W.2d 198, 2004 WL 1616418 (2004); Halloran v. Bhan, 470 Mich. 572, 683 N.W.2d 129 (2004).5
Clearly, the wrongful death act is not the only act that is pertinent in a wrongful death action. "The mere fact that our legislative scheme requires that suits for tortious conduct resulting in death be filtered through the so-called `death act', M.C.L. § 600.2922; M.S.A. § 27A.2922, does not change the character of such actions except to expand the elements of damage available." Hawkins, supra at 436, 329 N.W.2d 729. That is, a wrongful death action grounded in medical malpractice is a medical malpractice action in which the plaintiff is allowed to collect damages related to the death of the decedent.
The statute at issue here, M.C.L. § 600.1483, specifically provides that it applies to "an action for damages alleging medical malpractice...."6 Plaintiff's action is clearly an "action for damages alleging medical malpractice...." Section 1483(1). This fact is undisputed. Although the Court of...
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