People v. Young, No. 99SC426.
| Decision Date | 16 January 2001 |
| Docket Number | No. 99SC426. |
| Citation | 16 P.3d 821 |
| Parties | The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Petitioner, v. Christopher M. YOUNG, Respondent. |
| Court | Colorado Supreme Court |
Ken Salazar, Attorney General, John J. Krause, First Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Justice Section Appellate Division, Denver, CO, Attorneys for Petitioner.
David S. Kaplan, Colorado State Public Defender, Thomas M. Van Cleave, III, Deputy State Public Defender, Denver, CO, Attorneys for Respondent.
We granted certiorari to review an unpublished court of appeals' opinion in People v. Young, No. 96CA2249 , which interpreted our recent decision in Carrillo v. People, 974 P.2d 478 (Colo. 1999). After a jury trial, Christopher Young was convicted of three counts of criminal attempt to commit reckless manslaughter, two counts of first degree assault, and one count of second degree assault. Young appealed the judgment to the court of appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in denying a challenge for cause as to one of the potential jurors. The court of appeals reversed the judgment of the trial court, finding that the trial court's ruling constituted reversible error.
The People now argue that the court of appeals failed to apply the appropriate standard of appellate review and failed to give proper deference to the trial court's ruling on a challenge for cause. We agree and hold that the court of appeals erred in reversing the trial court's ruling on the challenge for cause. Therefore, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
The Respondent, Christopher Young, was tried and convicted of assaulting three men with a knife in an altercation that occurred outside the Mirage Bar in Jefferson County. Young's jury trial began on October 8, 1996, and jury selection commenced on that same day. One of the prospective jurors, John Cox, provided responses during voir dire that formed the basis for this appeal.
Cox's voir dire began with the court questioning Cox as to whether he could be fair and impartial to both sides in the case. Cox responded by referring to an unrelated case in Fort Collins where a defendant confessed to sexually assaulting an elderly woman:
MR. COX: I have two points. The rape, alleged rapist in Ft. Collins there, I think I have a problem if he has admitted his guilt, and we're going to put him on trial and try him and everything. I think that's kind of a waste. And if a person weren't guilty, he wouldn't be here. If he's going to be charged with a crime, why be here. Why is he being here if he's not being charged with a crime, if he weren't guilty, therefore. And I have a hard time kind of differentiating guilty from not guilty. I assume everybody is not guilty, but if a person is charged with a crime, I jump to the conclusion that therefore he is guilty.1
In response to this, the court asked Cox whether he would assume that a defendant was guilty based on the fact that a district attorney's office charged the defendant with a crime. Cox responded in the affirmative. The court concluded this discussion by asking Cox:
Later on in the voir dire, defense counsel broached the concept of the presumption of innocence with Cox:
Defense counsel again asked Cox whether he felt that Young must be guilty, since the district attorney had charged Young with the crimes at issue. Cox explained:
Defense counsel concluded his questioning of Cox by asking Cox whether it would be appropriate for someone with his frame of mind to sit on a jury:
At the close of the voir dire, defense counsel requested that Cox be excused for cause. The court summarized defense counsel's position:
THE COURT: The defense challenged Mr. Cox for cause. It was essentially their view that while he may have given the right answers at the end that he expressed an attitude of basically rushing to judgment feeling that anybody who was accused of crime must necessarily be guilty of it and that in the view of the defense he could not set that aside and be a fair juror. I think that was the essence of the defendant's position, but I'm sure it was stated more eloquently by defense. Mr. Garner [Defense counsel], do you want to expand on that at all?
Defense counsel replied that Cox unquestionably revealed distinct bias towards Young, and provided three reasons as evidence of this alleged bias. First, counsel asserted that Cox's philosophy is that a person charged by the district attorney is guilty. Second, counsel argued that Cox would not follow the court's instructions with respect to the presumption of innocence. Third, counsel claimed that Cox was "openly hostile" toward defense counsel.
The trial court disagreed and denied defense counsel's challenge for cause as to Cox:
THE COURT: Obviously, I didn't see it that way. Mr. Cox was certainly an opinionated fellow and had a great deal of faith, I guess, in his own opinions ... [b]ut it appeared to me that ultimately Mr. Cox indicated that he would judge this case based solely on the facts of it and would apply the presumption of innocence.
Subsequently defense counsel exhausted all of his available peremptory challenges, including one used to remove Cox from the panel.
Young was tried and found guilty under sections 18-2-101, 6 C.R.S. (2000)(Criminal Attempt); 18-3-104, 8B C.R.S. (1984 & Supp.1995)(Reckless Manslaughter); 18-3-202, 8B C.R.S. (1984 & Supp.1996)(First Degree Assault); and 18-3-203, 8B C.R.S. (1984 & Supp.1996)(Second Degree Assault). Young appealed the judgment to the court of appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in denying his challenge for cause.
The court of appeals reversed the trial court's ruling on the challenge for cause. People v. Young, No. 96CA2249 (Colo.App. Oct. 8, 1998)(Young I). The court found that there was no support in the record for the trial judge's finding that Cox would judge the case based solely on the facts and would apply the presumption of innocence. It concluded that the trial court had abused its discretion in denying Young's challenge for cause.
In 1999 this court reviewed the court of appeals' decision, vacated it, and remanded it to the court of appeals for reconsideration in light of Carrillo v. People, 974 P.2d 478 (Colo.1999). People v. Young, No. 98SC847 (Colo. Mar. 8, 1999)(order). On remand, the court of appeals reaffirmed its first decision, again finding that the trial court abused its discretion in denying Young's challenge for cause. People v. Young, No. 96CA2249 (Young II).
We granted certiorari to consider whether the court of appeals correctly applied the appropriate standard of review and whether it gave appropriate deference to the trial court's ruling on the challenge for cause.2 We now hold that the court of appeals erred in concluding that the trial court should have granted the challenge for cause. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
To ensure a defendant's right to a fair trial with an impartial jury, a trial court must excuse biased or prejudiced persons from the jury. Nailor v. People, 200 Colo. 30, 32, 612 P.2d 79, 80 (1980). This requirement is codified in section 16-10-103, 6 C.R.S. (2000), which states that courts must sustain challenges for cause where "[t]he existence of a state of mind in the juror evinc[es] enmity or bias toward the defendant or the state." § 16-10-103(1)(j), 6 C.R.S. (2000). The statute further provides, however, that:
No person summoned as a juror shall be disqualified by reason of a previously formed or expressed opinion with reference to the guilt or innocence of the accused, if the court is satisfied, from the examination of the juror or from other evidence, that he will render an...
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