People v. Youngs

• Decision Date: 15 December 1896
• Citation: 45 N.E. 460,151 N.Y. 210
• Parties: PEOPLE v. YOUNGS.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

151 N.Y. 210

45 N.E. 460

PEOPLE

v.YOUNGS.

Court of Appeals of New York.

Dec. 15, 1896.

Appeal from supreme court, trial term.

William Youngs was convicted of murder, and appeals. Affirmed.

Louis H. Reynolds, for appellant.

Z. S. Westbrook and L. F. Fish, for the People.

O'BRIEN, J.

The defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree, and appeals to this court for a new trial. There is no dispute whatever with respect to the fact that on the 14th day of December, 1895, at the place charged in the indictment, the defendant shot and killed his wife with a revolver, having deliberately fired two shots at her, both of which took effect, and one of them inflicting a mortal wound producing death. The facts and circumstances attending the commission of the act are fully disclosed by the record, but it is not necessary to repeat them here at much length. The defense was insanity, or at least the existence, at the time of the commission of the act by the defendant, of such mental disturbance or defect of reason as to render him irresponsible for his act. Some proof was given by the defendant tending to support this defense, which was answered by the people by proof of his acts and declarations before and after the shooting, and by the testimony of medical experts to the effect that the defendant was sane at the time he committed the act charged. It cannot be and is not seriously claimed by the learned counsel for the defendant, that the verdict of the jury in finding that the defendant was responsible is against the weight of evidence, or that there is any just ground for complaint in that respect. It is proper to say that, after a careful examination of all the testimony in regard to the mental condition of the defendant at the time of the homicide, it does not fairly permit any other conclusion than that the shooting was the willful, deliberate, and premeditated act of a person who understood perfectly well the nature, quality, and consequences of his act. Indeed, but for the atrocious circumstances attending and preceding the act, and the absence of all cause, provocation, or apparent motive for the commission of the crime, the defendant's responsibility, in the legal sense, could scarcely be doubted. It appears that the defendant and the deceased had been married something over six years, and had two children. They lived together until the month of October, 1895, when the deceased left the defendant, and entered the hospital for treatment of a private disease which she claimed had been communicated to her by the defendant. This disease seriously affected her health, and destroyed the sight of one of her eyes. Whatever may be the truth as to the responsibility of the defendant for his wife's condition, it is quite clear that she believed that he was the author of the wrong, and refused to live with him any longer, and finally threatened to apply for a divorce. The proof would seem to indicate that the wife looked upon the defendant with feelings of hatred and disgust, but that he was anxious to have her return, and resume her marital relations with him. He attempted to bring this result about through the intervention of friends and neighbors and otherwise, but failed. When he became convinced that his wife intended to separate from him, he sold his household effect, with the intention, apparently, or leaving the place. The deceased returned from the hospital about a week before the homicide, and with her children went to the house of a neighbor, where she had been invited by his wife and grown-up daughter, who evidently sympathized with her misfortunes. The defendant was, or pretended to be, jealous of the relations that existed between his wife and this neighbor, in whose house she had, for the time at least, taken up her abode; and this is the only motive suggested for the commission of the crime. Whatever may have been the real state of the defendant's feelings on this subject, there is no proof in the record to indicate that he had the slightest cause to suspect that anything improper had taken place between them, or was likely to. The deceased wife seems to have sought the shelter of this neighbor's house, for the time at least, for herself and children, and he and his wife and daughter extended it to her as an act of kindness. On the 14th day of December, 1895, the defendant went to this house, armed with a revolver, entered through the kitchen door without any warning or invitation, then passed into another room, where his wife was, and there fired the shot which caused her death. It appears that for some days prior to the homicide the defendant had the revolver in his possession, and practiced with it, and that he made various statements to different persons in the neighborhood with respect to his wife, and his intentions towards her, which the jury was warranted in interpreting as threats on his part to take her life.

Looking at the case upon the merits, it is impossible to find any ground for the interference of this court. The questions in the case were for the jury, and the verdict is well supported by the evidence. While this court has the power, in a capital case, to review the facts, and to grant a new trial when satisfied that the accused has not had a fair trial, or when it appears that injustice has been done, yet it must observe the rules and principles which apply to all tribunals exercising appellate jurisdiction. It is the province of the jury to determine questions of fact depending upon conflicting evidence, and to declare by their verdict what the truth is; and when the issue of fact is once determined upon evidence which is sufficient, even though it may be capable of diverse and opposing inferences, this court has no more right than the trial court to substitute its own judgment in the place of that of the jury, or to usurp its legitimate functions. People v. Kerrigan, 147 N. Y. 210, 41 N. E. 494. There cannot be any serious ground for the claim, and, indeed, it is not claimed that this is a case which would justify this court in interfering with the facts as determined by the jury.

We can only consider, upon this appeal, certain exceptions taken at the trial, and which have been urged upon the argument as grounds for the reversal of the judgment. The defendant was indicted at a term of the court held on January 20, 1896, which was appointed by the justices of the appellate division in the Third department on December 3, 1895. On January 1, 1896, the same justices reconvened and made the appointments for terms of courts as before, thus ratifying what had been done at their first meeting. The justices were required to make these appointments by article 6, § 2, of the new constitution, and also by section 232 of the Code of Civil Procedure.¹ It is true that by the provisions of the Code they were required to make the appointments before the 1st day of December, 1895; but this, we think, was directory, and the fact that they did not make the designations until three days afterwards does not, we think, affect the validity of the act. The constitution conferred upon them this power in explicit language, and their jurisdiction was not affected by the circumstance that the act was not performed on the precise day that the legislature had designated for that purpose. It is further said that, as the appellate division had no legal existence under the constitution until January 1, 1896, the designation of the terms of the court on December 3, 1895, was premature. It is true that the jurisdiction of the appellate division as a court was not complete until January 1, 1896, and exists from that day only. But we think that this fact would not exclude the power of the justices after their appointment, and before that day, to assemble and designate the terms of the court, and assign the justices who were to preside therein. The constitution required them to perform this duty without designating any time, and the legislature, under the constitution, had directed the performance of the act prior to the 1st of December. The designation of the particular day was, as we have already remarked, directory, and the observance of the date was not essential to the jurisdiction to perform the act.

But if it could be shown that there was any irrgularity in the designation made by the appellate division justices arising from the fact that they did not constitute a court until the 1st day of January, 1896, still we think that the irregularity, if any, was cured by the redesignation on that day, when the jurisdiction of the court became complete. We think, therefore, that there is no substantial ground upon which the legality or regularity of the court where the indictment was found can be questioned. People v. Herrmann, 149 N. Y. 190, 43 N. E. 546. But, even if this were otherwise, and it could be said that the designation of the terms of the court was not in strict compliance with the constitution or the statute, the objection ...