People v. Zayas
| Decision Date | 25 January 1916 |
| Citation | 217 N.Y. 78,111 N.E. 465 |
| Parties | PEOPLE v. ZAYAS et al. |
| Court | New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Appeal from Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department.
Hector A. Zayas and others were charged with grand larceny in the first degree. From a judgment of the Appellate Division of the First Department (153 N. Y. Supp. 1135), affirming a judgment of the trial court sustaining demurrers to the first count of the indictment, the people appeal. Reversed, and demurrers disallowed.
Charles Albert Perkins, Dist. Atty., of New York City (Robert S. Johnstone, of New York City, of counsel), for the People.
John F. McIntyre, of New York City, for respondent Zayas.
O'Gorman, Battle & Vandiver, of New York City (Almuth C. Vandiver and John M. Quinn, both of New York City, of counsel), for respondent McGee.
Nathan Vidaver, of New York City, for respondent Pommery.
Deiches & Goldwater, of New York City (Maurice Deiches, of New York City, of counsel), for respondent Hughes.
The demurrers were interposed to the first count of the indictment. This count charges grand larceny in its first degree. It charges the form of larceny known as false pretenses. It alleges that the false pretenses were made in the county of New York, state of New York, and that by reason thereof the complaining witness delivered money or property to the defendants in the city of Philadelphia, in the state of Pennsylvania. It is not necessary to set forth in detail these allegations, as the demurrers raise only the question whether the fact that the false pretenses were made in New York, and the money or property obtained in another state, renders this count of the indictment insufficient in law. This question must be determined under the statutes of this state. Section 1930 of the Penal Law of the state provides, in part, as follows:
“The following persons are liable to punishment within the state: (1) A person who commits within the state any crime, in whole or in part.”
The word “crime” as used in this statute should be construed solely with reference to the Penal Law of the state of New York. In People v. Arnstein, 211 N. Y. 585, 592, 105 N. E. 814, 816, Chief Judge Bartlett said:
The reasons leading to this conclusion were set forth in the opinion of the Chief Judge in the Arnstein Case, and need not here be repeated. For the reasons so cogently stated in that opinion, I think the judgment in this case should be reversed. The respondents urge that we are not free to adopt this course because of the decision reached in the Arnstein Case, supra. In that case divergent views as to the meaning of the statute now under consideration were expressed. Six of the seven judges who heard the appeal in that case held that the statute declared that offenses committed partly within this state and partly in another state constitute a crime punishable under the law of this state. Only one judge expressed an opinion to the contrary, and he did not doubt the power of the Legislature to declare that such acts should constitute a crime under the law of this state, but was of the opinion that the Legislature did not in this statute so provide. Of the six judges who held that this statute gave this state jurisdiction of an offense commenced within the state and consummated beyond its borders, three held that it was necessary that the transaction should also constitute a crime under the law of the foreign state, and three held that it was not necessary that the transaction should constitute a crime under the law of the foreign state. The only question of law actually decided in the Arnstein Case was that this statute gave the state jurisdiction of an offense committed partly within the state and partly within the borders of a foreign state. To that determination I think that we should adhere in this case. Whether it is necessary under this statute that the transaction should also constitute a crime under the law of the foreign state was not decided in the Arnstein Case. I think that w...
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...reversing order, 142 N.Y.S. 842, 157 A.D. 766, 30 N.Y. Cr. 162, which reversed 138 N.Y.S. 806, 78 Misc. 18, 28 N.Y. Cr. 165; and People v. Zayas, 217 N.Y. 78, Ann. 1917E, 309, 111 N.E. 465, reversing judgment in 153 N.Y.S. 1135, 168 A.D. 949. In the latter case the New York court said: "The......
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