People v. Zetterlund
| Decision Date | 23 March 2018 |
| Docket Number | Appeal No. 3–15–0435 |
| Citation | 430 Ill.Dec. 785,127 N.E.3d 21,2018 IL App (3d) 150435 |
| Parties | The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. Aaron ZETTERLUND, Defendant–Appellant. |
| Court | United States Appellate Court of Illinois |
¶ 1 Defendant, Aaron Zetterlund, appeals his conviction contending that the Sex Offender Registration Act ( 730 ILCS 150/3(b) (West 2012) ) and other related statutes applicable to sex offenders (collectively, the SORA statutory scheme) are unconstitutional. We affirm.
¶ 3 The State charged defendant with criminal sexual assault ( 720 ILCS 5/11–1.20(a)(2) (West 2012) ). The evidence at trial established that on March 9, 2013, defendant was present at a party with the victim and several other individuals. During the course of the night, the victim became severely intoxicated and lost consciousness. While the victim was unconscious, defendant removed the victim's clothing and performed vaginal intercourse on the victim. Defendant's friend, Ethan Deyo, was present and recorded the assault on his phone. The victim did not recall any of these events. The next day, other individuals that were present at the party told the victim what happened, and the victim went to the hospital for a sexual assault examination. The victim stated that she never consented to having sexual intercourse with defendant.
¶ 4 Ultimately, the jury found defendant guilty of criminal sexual assault. The court sentenced defendant to six years' imprisonment and an indeterminate term of three years to life of mandatory supervised release (MSR). Because of defendant's conviction, he is subject to the restrictions and obligations set forth in the SORA statutory scheme for the remainder of his life.
¶ 6 On appeal, defendant challenges the constitutionality of the SORA statutory scheme, which he is now subject to because of his present conviction. We review de novo a challenge to the constitutionality of a statute on appeal. People v. Mosley , 2015 IL 115872, ¶ 22, 392 Ill.Dec. 588, 33 N.E.3d 137. Statutes are presumed to be constitutional, and in order to overcome this strong presumption, defendant must "clearly establish its invalidity." Id. "A court will affirm the constitutionality of a statute or ordinance if it is ‘reasonably capable of such a determination’ and ‘will resolve any doubt as to the statute's construction in favor of its validity.’ " Jackson v. City of Chicago , 2012 IL App (1st) 111044, ¶ 20, 363 Ill.Dec. 351, 975 N.E.2d 153 (quoting People v. One 1998 GMC , 2011 IL 110236, ¶ 20, 355 Ill.Dec. 900, 960 N.E.2d 1071 ).
¶ 7 Defendant makes two arguments to support his contention: (1) the SORA statutory scheme violates the due process clauses of the United States and Illinois Constitutions ( U.S. Const., amend. XIV, § 1 ; Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 2 ) and (2) the SORA statutory scheme violates the proportionate penalties guarantees of the United States and Illinois Constitutions ( U.S. Const., amend. VIII ; Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 11 ).
¶ 8 Before analyzing each constitutional argument, we note that our supreme court has upheld prior versions of the SORA statutory scheme against similar constitutional challenges. See People v. Cornelius , 213 Ill. 2d 178, 290 Ill.Dec. 237, 821 N.E.2d 288 (2004) ; People v. Malchow , 193 Ill. 2d 413, 250 Ill.Dec. 670, 739 N.E.2d 433 (2000). Nevertheless, defendant contends that the SORA statutory scheme is different than the prior versions determined to be constitutional because recent additions have made the SORA statutory scheme so onerous that it no longer satisfies constitutional protections.
¶ 9 In support of his argument, defendant points out that the current version of the SORA statutory scheme, which has not been addressed by the supreme court, contains the following additional restrictions and obligations: (1) specific restrictions on where sex offenders may be present or live (sections 11–9.3 and 11–9.4–1 of the Criminal Code of 2012 ( 720 ILCS 5/11–9.3, 11–9.4–1 (West 2012) ) ), (2) prohibitions against sex offenders working, at any time or any reason, within 500 feet of a school or public park or within 100 feet of a bus stop (id. ), (3) requirements of annual renewal of driver's licenses (section 5–3–3(o) of the Unified Code of Corrections ( 730 ILCS 5/5–5–3(o ) (West 2012) ) ), (4) prohibitions against petitions for name change (section 21–101 of the Code of Criminal Procedure ( 735 ILCS 5/21–101 (West 2012) ) ), (5) increases in the agencies with which a registrant must register in person (section 3(a) of the Sex Offender Registration Act ( 730 ILCS 150/3(a), (d) (West 2012) ) ), (6) expansion of the information a registrant must provide when reporting (id. § 3(a) ), (7) a shortening of the period in which a registrant must appear in person (id. § 7), and (8) an increase in initial and annual registration fees (id. § 3(c)(6) ). With this background in mind, we turn to defendant's constitutional claims.
¶ 11 First, defendant argues that the SORA statutory scheme violates the due process clauses of the United States and Illinois Constitutions. U.S. Const., amend. XIV, § 1 ; Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 2. Both the federal and state constitutions provide that no individual shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without the due process of law. U.S. Const., amend. XIV, § 1 ; Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 2. Upon review, we find the SORA statutory scheme satisfies substantive and procedural due process requirements. Therefore, we hold the SORA statutory scheme does not violate defendant's due process rights under the United States and Illinois Constitutions.
¶ 12 Due process analysis requires two distinct inquiries: substantive due process and procedural due process. See Doe v. City of Lafayette , 377 F.3d 757, 767–68 (7th Cir. 2004). The appropriate inquiry under substantive due process analysis is "whether the individual has been subjected to ‘the arbitrary exercise of the powers of government, unrestrained by the established principles of private rights and distributive justice.’ " Id. at 768 ). If the statute does not impact a fundamental right, then we apply the rational basis test. Cornelius , 213 Ill. 2d at 203, 290 Ill.Dec. 237, 821 N.E.2d 288. "Pursuant to this test, a statute will be upheld if it ‘bears a reasonable relationship to a public interest to be served, and the means adopted are a reasonable method of accomplishing the desired objective.’ " In re J.W. , 204 Ill. 2d 50, 67, 272 Ill.Dec. 561, 787 N.E.2d 747 (2003) (quoting People v. Adams , 144 Ill. 2d 381, 390, 163 Ill.Dec. 483, 581 N.E.2d 637 (1991) ). Under procedural due process, the government is only allowed to deprive a citizen of "life, liberty, or property" in accordance with certain procedural protections. City of Lafayette , 377 F.3d at 767–68.
¶ 13 At the outset, we note that two other districts in our appellate court have rejected the same argument defendant advances here. In both In re A.C. , 2016 IL App (1st) 153047, ¶¶ 35–79, 403 Ill.Dec. 811, 54 N.E.3d 952, and People v. Pollard , 2016 IL App (5th) 130514, ¶ 23, 403 Ill.Dec. 574, 54 N.E.3d 234, the court found that the current version of the SORA statutory scheme did not violate an individual's due process rights (substantive or procedural). We agree with the conclusions reached in A.C. and Pollard and adopt their reasoning.
¶ 14 In A.C. , a juvenile respondent, adjudicated as a delinquent of aggravated criminal sexual abuse, challenged the constitutionality of the SORA statutory scheme on due process grounds. The court rejected respondent's procedural due process claim on the basis that the SORA statutory scheme affords individuals sufficient procedural safeguards. A.C. , 2016 IL App (1st) 153047, ¶ 66, 403 Ill.Dec. 811, 54 N.E.3d 952. As to respondent's substantive due process claim, the court found that respondent's claim did not involve a fundamental liberty right and, therefore, considered his claim under the rational basis test. Id. ¶ 57. The court held that the SORA statutory scheme satisfied the rational basis test as it is "rationally related to the purpose of protection of the public from sexual offenders and constitute a reasonable means of accomplishing this goal." Id.
¶ 15 Similarly, in Pollard , the court found that the SORA statutory scheme did not impact an individual's fundamental rights. Therefore, the court applied the rational basis test in considering defendant's substantive due process claim. The court ruled that the statutes satisfied the rational basis test because Pollard , 2016 IL App (5th) 130514, ¶ 39, 403 Ill.Dec. 574, 54 N.E.3d 234. The court noted that "[a]lthough the SORA Statutory Scheme may be overinclusive, thereby imposing burdens on offenders who pose no threat to the public because they will not reoffend, there is a rational relationship between the registration, notification, and restrictions of sex offenders and the protection of the public from such offenders." Id. ¶ 42. As to defendant's procedural due process claim, the court rejected defendant's argument, finding that defendant enjoyed several procedural safeguards associated with his criminal proceedings and the restrictions and obligations created by the SORA statutory scheme were "not sufficiently burdensome to mandate the additional procedural protection of a mechanism to determine his risk of recidivism." Id. ¶ 48.
¶ 16 Based on the above decisions, which we believe are well reasoned and persuasively written, we reject defendant's contention that the restrictions and obligations included in the current version of the SORA statutory scheme violate his...
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