Peoples v. CCA Detention Center, Civil Action No. 03-3129-KHV (D. Kan. 1/15/2004)
| Decision Date | 15 January 2004 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 03-3129-KHV. |
| Parties | CORNELIUS E. PEOPLES, Plaintiff, v. CCA DETENTION CENTER, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Kansas |
Cornelius E. Peoples, a prison inmate, brings suit against Corrections Corporation of America ("CCA") and its officials under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S.388 (1971). Plaintiff alleges that defendants violated his constitutional right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment while he was a federal pretrial detainee in a CCA facility in Leavenworth, Kansas. The matter is before the Court on Defendants' Motion To Dismiss (Doc. #15) filed August 19, 2003. For reasons set forth below, the Court sustains defendants' motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
CCA is a private Maryland corporation which houses federal pretrial detainees and prisoners under a contract with the United States Marshal's Service. The individual defendants Fred Lawrence, warden, Roger Moore, assistant warden, James Perry, chief of security and Jay Foskett, security captain, work at the CCA facility in Leavenworth, Kansas.
In late July 2001, the Marshal's Service transferred plaintiff from the United States Penitentiary at Lompac, California to the CCA detention center in Leavenworth to await a new trial in the United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri. CCA officials placed plaintiff in segregation for one day until the Marshal's Service approved his move to general population. CCA officials then placed plaintiff in an eight-man cell in H-pod, a medium security unit.1 That day, plaintiff asked the pod officer to speak with the captain. Plaintiff told the pod officer that there were "several Mexican gang members (Mexican Mafia), that he was going to have problems with." Doc. #1 at 5. The officer told plaintiff to let someone know if he had a problem, but that "the captain is not going to move you right now." Id. That evening plaintiff completed a grievance form stating that he had problems with certain members of the Mexican Mafia who had clashed with the "Moorish Science Temple" members, a religious group to which plaintiff belonged. Plaintiff marked the envelope "Emergency Grievance" and placed it in the grievance box that same night. Plaintiff never received a response. During the next several days, plaintiff told several CCA personnel about the situation between him and the Mexican Mafia members.2 The officials told plaintiff that they had spoken with Chief of Security Perry and that Perry refused to move him. Plaintiff wrote about his concern to Fred Lawrence, the CCA warden. Plaintiff again received no response.
On August 1, 2001, at about 6:00 a.m., an altercation broke out between plaintiff and approximately seven Mexican Mafia members. Officer Miller witnessed the altercation. Captain Foskett called an emergency lock-down of the unit. Captain Foskett called plaintiff out and interviewed him. Plaintiff told Foskett about his grievance and requests to be moved. Foskett told plaintiff that he would "talk to Perry and let him know what the deal is." Id. at 7. Foskett later told plaintiff that Perry was aware of his grievance and the letter to Lawrence, and that he would move him to a two-man cell but would not move him out of the pod. CCA officials then moved plaintiff to a two-person cell and took the pod off lock-down status.
Several hours later, at about 11:00 a.m., a fight over the television broke out between a member of the Mexican Mafia and inmate Greg Burns. Approximately ten Mexican Mafia members then attacked plaintiff with padlocks tied to socks and full cans of pop. Plaintiff suffered cuts and bruises on his head, back and ribs, and a significant cut on his wrist. Plaintiff filed another grievance about his safety, and was moved to A-pod for 14 days until defendants transferred him to another facility. CCA later terminated Perry because of his actions concerning plaintiffs safety.
Plaintiff asserts that defendants violated his constitutional right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment by failing to protect him from the assault by other inmates.
Defendants argue that they are entitled to dismissal both on jurisdictional grounds and because plaintiff has failed to state a claim on which relief can be granted. First, defendants argue that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over plaintiffs claim because he has not alleged that defendants acted under color of federal law, as required by Bivens. On the merits, defendants argue that plaintiff has not stated a claim that defendants failed to protect him from other inmates because plaintiff has not alleged that (1) he was incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm or (2) defendants were deliberately indifferent to plaintiffs health or safety. See Farmer v. Brennan 511 U.S. 825 (1994).
The Court may only exercise jurisdiction when specifically authorized to do so, See Castaneda v. INS. 23 F.3d 1576, 1580 (10th Cir. 1994), and must "dismiss the cause at any stage of the proceeding in which it becomes apparent that jurisdiction is lacking." Scheideman v. Shawnee County Bd. of County Comm'rs. 895 F. Supp. 279, 280 (D. Kan. 1995) (citing Basso v. Utah Power & Light Co., 495 F.2d 906, 909 (10th Cir. 1974)); Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(h)(3). Because federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, the law imposes a presumption against their jurisdiction. Marcus v. Kan. Dep't of Revenue, 170 F.3d 1305, 1309 (10th Cir. 1999). If defendants challenge federal jurisdiction, plaintiff bears the burden of showing that jurisdiction is proper and he must demonstrate that the case should not be dismissed. See Jensen v. Johnson County Youth Baseball League, 838 F. Supp. 1437, 1439-40 (D. Kan. 1993).
Federal courts have original jurisdiction over civil actions "arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 1331. A plaintiff creates federal question jurisdiction by means of a well-pleaded complaint which establishes either that federal law creates the cause of action or that plaintiff's right to relief depends on resolution of a substantial question of federal law. Sac & Fox Nation of Okla. v. Cuomo, 193 F.3d 1162, 1165-66 (10th Cir. 1999) (citing Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust for S. Cal. 463 U.S. 1, 27-28, (1983)). Federal courts also have original jurisdiction over civil actions "between . . . citizens of different States" when the amount in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000. 28 U.S.C. § 1332.
Rule 12(b)(1) motions to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction generally take two forms: facial attacks on the complaint or factual attacks on the accuracy of the allegations in the complaint. See Holt v. United States. 46 F.3d 1000, 1002-03 (10th Cir. 1995). Defendants' motion relies only upon the complaint and is therefore a facial attack. A facial attack on subject matter jurisdiction questions the sufficiency of the complaint. See Holt. 46 F.3d at 1003. In its review, the Court must therefore accept the allegations in the complaint as true.
The Court affords a pro se plaintiff some leniency and must liberally construe the complaint. See Oltremari v. Kan. Soc. & Rehab. Serv., 871 F. Supp. 1331, 1333 (D. Kan. 1994). While pro se complaints are held to less stringent standards than pleadings drafted by lawyers, pro se litigants must follow the same procedural rules as other litigants. See Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 9 (1980); Green v. Dorrell, 969 F.2d 915, 917 (10th Cir. 1992). The Court may not assume the role of advocate for a pro se litigant. See Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106. 1110 (10th Cir. 1991).
Plaintiff asserts jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and 1343 and Bivens. Section 1343 provides jurisdiction over claims for constitutional violations, provided that the action is "authorized by law." Section 1331 provides jurisdiction over civil action "arising under the Constitution, laws or treaties of the United States." Thus, the jurisdictional question turns on whether federal law, i.e. Bivens, provides a cause of action.
In Bivens, the United States Supreme Court recognized an implied private remedy for damages for violation of the Fourth Amendment by "a federal agent acting under color of his authority." 403 U.S. at 389. The Supreme Court later extended Bivens to provide a damages remedy for violation of the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause, see Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228 (1979), and violation of the guarantee against cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment, see Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 18 (1980). In Carlson, the Supreme Court stated that "Bivens established that victims of a constitutional violation by a federal agent have a right to recover damages against the official in federal court despite the absence of any statute conferring such a right." 446 U.S. at 18.
Defendants point out that CCA is a private corporation performing under contract with the United States Marshal's Service. Defendants contend that this relationship does not make CCA and its employees federal agents for purposes of Bivens. In a very similar case, Judge Rogers of this Court stated as follows:
The difficult question presented by this complaint is whether or not jurisdiction lies under Bivens to sue a private corporation and employees of that corporation who operate a prison pursuant to a contract with the United States. See 18 U.S.C. § 4013, 4002. Jurisdiction would clearly lie for claims involving unconstitutional actions taken by federal officials, persons actually employed by the United States or agents of the United States. Cf. Logue v. United States. 412 U.S. 521, 524, 93 S.Ct. 2215, 2218, 37 L.Ed.2d 121 (1973). Plaintiffs jurisdictional assertions are based upon an unfounded assumption that the CCA...
To continue reading
Request your trial