Peoria Unified Sch. Dist. v. McClennen
| Decision Date | 11 September 2014 |
| Docket Number | No. 1 CA-SA 13-0263,1 CA-SA 13-0263 |
| Parties | PEORIA UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT, a political subdivision of the state, Petitioner, v. THE HONORABLE CRANE MCCLENNEN, Judge of the SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF ARIZONA, in and for the County of MARICOPA, Respondent Judge, TIMOTHY MCKEE, a single man, Real Party in Interest. |
| Court | Arizona Court of Appeals |
NOTICE: NOT FOR PUBLICATION. UNDER ARIZ. R. SUP. CT. 111(c), THIS DECISION DOES NOT CREATE LEGAL PRECEDENT AND MAY NOT BE CITED EXCEPT AS AUTHORIZED.
Petition for Special Action from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
The Honorable Crane McClennen, Judge
JURISDICTION ACCEPTED; RELIEF GRANTED
Lewis Roca Rothgerber, LLP, Phoenix
By Mary Ellen Simonson, Kimberly A. Demarchi
DeConcini McDonald Yetwin & Lacy, PC, Tucson
By Denise M. Bainton
Co-Counsel for Petitioner
Law Offices of William R. Hobson, Chandler
By William R. Hobson
Law Offices of Kevin Koelbel, PC, Chandler
By Kevin Koelbel, Kyle J. Shelton
Co-Counsel for Real Party in Interest
By Christopher P. Thomas, Phoenix
Counsel for Arizona School Boards Association
Judge Kent E. Cattani delivered the decision of the Court, in which Presiding Judge Maurice Portley and Judge John C. Gemmill joined.
¶1 Peoria Unified School District seeks special action review of the superior court's decision that the District's Governing Board improperly terminated Timothy McKee's employment after a student in McKee's physical education ("P.E.") class drowned. The Board acted after finding that McKee failed to exercise appropriate professional judgment when he allowed a student with limited swimming skills to be in a crowded pool during a free-swim period in which the student was not constantly observed. The District argues that the superior court failed to give the Board's decision the deference owed under Arizona Revised Statutes ("A.R.S.") §§ 41-783(F) and 15-543(B). The District further argues that the court erred by holding that the Board's findings were not supported by substantial evidence and that the Board incorrectly and arbitrarily applied the law. For reasons that follow, we accept special action jurisdiction and grant relief by reversing the superior court's decision and remanding withinstructions that the superior court enter judgment affirming McKee's dismissal.
¶2 McKee taught an Advanced P.E. class at Ironwood High School during the 2009-10 school year. The class included a swimming unit at the high school pool, with formal instruction, along with "free swim" time. Students who were not proficient swimmers or who preferred a different activity were not required to participate in the swimming unit.
¶3 On May 12, 2010, a student with limited swimming skills told McKee that he wanted to participate in the swimming class even though he was not a good swimmer. After the structured instruction concluded, McKee permitted the student to stay for the free swim portion of the class, but directed him to remain in the shallow end of the pool. The student went in the pool, and while standing in the shallow end, asked McKee for a kickboard. McKee left the pool area to look for a kickboard in a nearby storage room, briefly leaving the pool unsupervised.
¶4 While McKee was looking for a kickboard, a second teacher arrived at the pool area with his P.E. class. McKee told the other teacher he was looking for a kickboard, but he did not mention there was a student in the pool with limited swimming skills.
¶5 After returning and telling the student he could not find a kickboard, McKee walked to a ramada area 11 to 13 feet from the edge of the pool and sat down in a chair next to the other teacher. They talked while watching the pool area, but McKee did not tell the other teacher about the student with limited swimming abilities. From his seated position, McKee was not able to see the bottom of the deep end of the pool or the bottom of the lane closest to him in the shallow end.
¶6 While McKee was seated, another student in the class noticed the student with limited swimming skills at the bottom of the pool in the deep end and called for help. McKee and the other teacher provided medical attention, as did paramedics who were called to the scene. The student was taken to the hospital, but died shortly thereafter.
¶7 The District's human resources director conducted an investigation of the drowning incident and determined that the District had cause to terminate McKee's employment, and District administrators thereafter prepared a Statement of Charges to initiate the statutory termination process under A.R.S. § 15-501 et seq. McKee requested ahearing, and a hearing officer appointed by the Board conducted a three-day evidentiary hearing beginning on October 4, 2010.
¶8 After considering the evidence presented, the hearing officer found that the student had drowned during a less-than two minute period after McKee told him he could not find a kickboard, walked from the shallow end and sat down next to the other teacher near the deep end of the pool. The hearing officer recommended that the Board dismiss the Statement of Charges, concluding that the District had not sustained its burden of showing that McKee engaged in unprofessional conduct or that there was cause to support his dismissal.
¶9 The Board reviewed the hearing officer's recommendation and held a lengthy public meeting at which it heard argument from both the District Administration and McKee regarding whether to adopt, reject, or modify the hearing officer's recommendation. Following the hearing, the Board concluded that McKee had failed to exercise appropriate professional judgment by allowing a student with limited swimming skills to be in a crowded pool outside McKee's view. The Board thus rejected the hearing officer's recommendation and terminated McKee's employment.
¶10 McKee appealed the Board's ruling to the Maricopa County Superior Court, which reversed, finding that "the Board's actions were contrary to law, arbitrary and capricious, and an abuse of discretion." The District seeks special action relief from that ruling.
¶11 Special action jurisdiction is discretionary and is generally appropriate only when no equally plain, speedy and adequate remedy is available by appeal. Ariz. R.P. Sec. Act. 1(a). In Anderson v. Valley Union High School, 229 Ariz. 52, 59, ¶ 21, 270 P.3d 879, 886 (App. 2012), this Court held that, under A.R.S. § 15-543, there is no right to appeal beyond the superior court in a Teacher Tenure Act disciplinary action. The District thus lacks any remedy by appeal, and in the exercise of our discretion, we accept special action jurisdiction.
¶12 The District argues that (1) the superior court acted in excess of its jurisdiction because McKee's appeal from the Board's decision was filed after the 30-day jurisdictional deadline, (2) the superior court erred by vacating a decision by the Board that was supported by substantial evidence, and (3) the superior court erred by finding that the Board violatedMcKee's right to due process and otherwise treated him unfairly. We address each issue in turn.
¶13 The District asserts that McKee's appeal to the superior court was untimely and thus jurisdictionally barred, because it was filed 31 days after the Board's decision, rather than within 30 days, as required by A.R.S. § 15-543. But McKee filed his appeal within 30 days, albeit with an incorrect cover sheet. Although a court clerk rejected the filing, we conclude that the wrong cover sheet was a technical defect at most, and that the otherwise compliant complaint was thus constructively filed when initially delivered to the Clerk. See Whittaker Corp. v. Estate of King, 25 Ariz. App. 356, 357, 543 P.2d 477, 478 (1975) (); Rowland v. Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc., 210 Ariz. 530, 532-34, ¶¶ 4, 10, 16, 115 P.3d 124, 126-28 (App. 2005) ().1
¶14 Pursuant to A.R.S. § 15-539(D), a governing board may terminate a teacher's employment based on unprofessional conduct. Unprofessional conduct can include violations of statutes, rules, or objectives of the governing board. Id. It can also include teacher conduct that breaches the duties owed to students under the teacher's care. See Roberts v. Santa Cruz Valley Unified Sch. Dist. No. 35, 161 Ariz. 398, 778 P.2d 1294 (App. 1989); see generally Rouse v. Scottsdale Unified Sch. Dist. No. 48, 156 Ariz. 369, 752 P.2d 22 (App. 1987). Good cause for dismissal includes "a cause which bears a reasonable relationship to a teacher's unfitness to discharge the duties assigned or is in a reasonable sense detrimental to the students." Bd. of Educ. of Tempe Union High Sch. Dist. v. Lammle, 122 Ariz. 522, 526, 596 P.2d 48, 52 (App. 1979).
¶15 A.R.S. § 15-541(A) provides that a governing board may designate a hearing officer agreed to by the parties to conduct a hearing regarding proposed actions to dismiss or suspend a teacher. Afterconducting a hearing, the hearing officer must make a written recommendation to the governing board that includes findings of fact and conclusions. Id. Parties to the hearing have the right to object to the findings of the hearing officer and present oral and written arguments to the governing board, which is ultimately responsible for accepting or rejecting the hearing officer's recommendation. Id.; A.R.S. § 15-541(B).
¶16 Under A.R.S. § 15-543(B) and A.R.S. § 41-783(F), the superior court may review a governing board's decision to determine whether the decision was: (1) founded on or contained an error of law, including error of...
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