Peppers v. Coates

• Decision Date: 13 November 1989
• Docket Number: No. 88-8557,88-8557
• Citation: 887 F.2d 1493
• Parties: Cullen Reed PEPPERS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Bobby F. COATES, Jr., Defendant-Appellant, Buster Williams, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit

Page 1493

887 F.2d 1493

Cullen Reed PEPPERS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Bobby F. COATES, Jr., Defendant-Appellant Buster Williams, et al., Defendants.

No. 88-8557.

United States Court of Appeals Eleventh Circuit.

Nov. 13, 1989.

Nina Hickson Perry, Sharon D. Stokes, Asst. U.S. Attys., Atlanta, Ga., for defendant-appellant.

Frank J. Beltran, Beltran & Buckley, Atlanta, Ga., Simone R. Siex, Atlanta, Ga., for plaintiff-appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia.

Before FAY and HATCHETT, Circuit Judges, and ALLGOOD ^*, Senior District Judge.

FAY, Circuit Judge.

This action arose from a series of events which involved the Secret Service and plaintiff-appellee, Cullen Peppers, and eventually led to the arrest of several defendants allegedly involved in a counterfeiting scheme. Peppers filed a Bivens ¹ action alleging a plethora of violations of his rights against several Secret Service agents, including defendant-appellant, Bobby Coates. Coates ² challenges the district court's order denying defendants' motion for summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity, ³ asserting that Peppers has failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact with respect to Coates' involvement in any allegedly unlawful conduct in violation of Peppers' rights. Peppers argues that this court lacks jurisdiction because the district court's order denying Coates' motion for summary judgment turns on an issue of fact and therefore is not immediately appealable. Further, Peppers argues that he has raised questions of fact sufficient to withstand a motion for summary judgment. For the reasons set forth in this opinion we hold that this court has jurisdiction to review the district court's order denying Coates' motion for summary judgment, and we REVERSE and REMAND with instructions to grant summary judgment in favor of Coates.

I. BACKGROUND

In 1983, Peppers' brother, Anthony Peppers, became aware of a counterfeiting scheme and offered to assist the Secret Service in undercover operations to expose the scheme. When Anthony Peppers was unable to obtain samples of the counterfeit currency, he solicited assistance from his brother, plaintiff, Cullen Peppers. Plaintiff alleges that George Sexton, a Secret Service agent, knew of his involvement in the undercover operations, and actually authorized him to obtain samples of the counterfeit currency. Defendants deny this allegation. In any event, on April 23, 1983 Peppers obtained the samples and relinquished them to the Secret Service.

At a meeting on April 25, 1983, defendant Hal Ewing and another agent inquired as to how Peppers obtained the counterfeit currency. Peppers alleges that these agents threatened, coerced, and intimidated him at this meeting so that he would monitor the counterfeiters' activity. The agents assert that all they told Peppers at the April 25th meeting was that he violated the law, and that they would turn the information they had over to the United States Attorney's office.

On April 27, 1983, defendant Guy Hinton and another Secret Service agent met with Peppers. Peppers alleges that at this meeting Hinton failed to advise Peppers of his Miranda rights and threatened to arrest him if he refused to sign a statement. Furthermore, Peppers alleges that Hinton denied Peppers' request to confer with counsel and intimidated, coerced, and threatened Peppers so that he would assist the Secret Service in a "buy bust" with the counterfeiters. Defendants deny any threats, coercion, or intimidation.

On April 28, 1983, defendant Bob Francis installed electronic surveillance equipment in Peppers' van in preparation for the "buy bust." Furthermore, it is uncontroverted that on April 28, 1983, defendant Bobby Coates authorized the agents to use the office television set to purchase the counterfeit currency in the "buy bust." The only other involvement of Coates in these events was that the agents conducting the investigation briefed him on the developments in the case. Later that day, the "buy bust" occurred and Secret Service agents simulated the arrest of Peppers in order to protect his cover. Peppers alleges that the agents used excessive force in simulating his arrest.

On May 13, 1983, Assistant United States Attorney Mary Jane Stewart and Agent Ewing appeared before a federal grand jury to present evidence against Peppers and others involved in the counterfeiting scheme. Peppers was indicted for violations of law as a result of his April 23, 1983 actions in obtaining counterfeit currency samples. Charges against Peppers were dismissed voluntarily at his criminal trial.

On July 3, 1985, Peppers filed his complaint alleging that the actions of the agents, including Bobby Coates, during the interviews and simulated arrest violated his constitutional rights. Defendant Coates and other defendants filed a motion to dismiss and, in the alternative, for summary judgment, which was denied by the district court. Following discovery, defendants filed two motions for reconsideration of their motion for summary judgment. The district court requested clarification of the first motion for reconsideration and denied, on the merits, defendants' renewed motion for reconsideration. Coates now appeals to this court the district court's denial of his renewed motion for reconsideration of his motion for summary judgment.

II. JURISDICTION

Initially, we must determine whether this court has jurisdiction to hear Coates' appeal from the trial court's order denying him summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity. Except in certain instances, this court is without jurisdiction to hear appeals from interlocutory orders of the district courts. ⁴ The purpose of restricting interlocutory appeals is to prevent "the debilitating effect on judicial administration caused by piecemeal appellate disposition of what is, in practical consequence, but a single controversy." Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 170, 94 S.Ct. 2140, 2149, 40 L.Ed.2d 732 (1974). However, the Supreme Court has created an exception to the finality requirement. The Court realized the existence of a small class of decisions which "finally determine claims of right separable from, and collateral to, rights asserted in the action, too important to be denied review and too independent of the cause itself to require that appellate consideration be deferred until the whole case is adjudicated." Cohen v. Beneficial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546, 69 S.Ct. 1221, 93 L.Ed. 1528 (1949). The Court has since clarified the so-called "collateral order doctrine," setting forth three criteria for review of interlocutory orders. "[T]he order must conclusively determine the disputed question, resolve an important issue completely separate from the merits of the action, and be effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment." Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 468, 98 S.Ct. 2454, 2458, 57 L.Ed.2d 351 (1978).

Having established the requirements for invoking the collateral order doctrine, the Supreme Court has approved of its use specifically in cases where a trial court has denied a defendant's motion to dismiss or for summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987); Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 105 S.Ct. 2806, 86 L.Ed.2d 411 (1985). In Mitchell, the Court painstakingly applied the criteria promulgated in Cohen to such a case. The Court reasoned that because the essence of qualified immunity is to relieve a public official of having to answer for his conduct in a civil damages action, later review of an order denying summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity would prove futile. Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 526-27, 105 S.Ct. at 2815-16. ⁵ Furthermore, the Court held that the "court's denial of summary judgment finally and conclusively determines the defendant's claim of right not to stand trial on the plaintiff's allegations...." Id. at 527, 105 S.Ct. at 2816 (emphasis in original). ⁶ Lastly, the Court stated, "a question of immunity is separate from the merits of the underlying action for purposes of the Cohen test even though a reviewing court must consider the plaintiff's factual allegations in resolving the immunity issue." Id. at 528-29, 105 S.Ct. at 2816-17. Thus, Mitchell has approved the application of the collateral order doctrine to appeals from a district court's denial of a claim of qualified immunity, to the extent that it turns on a question of law. Id. at 530, 105 S.Ct. at 2817.

In adhering to the standards explicated in Mitchell, we hold that in order to invoke the appellate jurisdiction of this court immediately after denial of defendant's motion for summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity, defendant must establish that plaintiff has failed to raise a genuine issue of fact material to the qualified immunity defense. ⁷ In Mitchell the Court stated that in resolving a claim for qualified immunity, the district court may grant a motion to dismiss "[u]nless the plaintiff's allegations state a claim of violation of clearly established law," and even if plaintiff survives a motion to dismiss, "defendant is entitled to summary judgment if discovery fails to uncover evidence sufficient to create a genuine issue as to whether the defendant in fact committed those acts." Id. at 526, 105 S.Ct. at 2815. In the context of the Mitchell opinion these standards go only to one element of the Cohen collateral order doctrine, namely that the order be effectively unreviewable after final adjudication of the case. Id. We believe that a decision denying summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity is effectively unreviewable only if defendant has a "right" not to stand trial. See Id. at 525, 527, 105 S.Ct. at 2815, 2816. And defendant may legitimately claim this "right" only if plaintiff fails to raise sufficient questions of fact regarding defendant's qualified...