Pepsico, Inc. v. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. of Asbury Park

• Decision Date: 17 December 1969
• Docket Number: PEPSI-COLA
• Citation: 261 A.2d 520
• Parties: PEPSICO, INC., a corporation of the State of Delaware, formerly known as Pepsi-Cola Company, Defendant Below, Appellant, v.BOTTLING COMPANY OF ASBURY PARK, a corporation of the State of New Jersey, and Pepsi-Cola Newburgh bottling Co., Inc., a corporation of the State of New York, Plaintiffs Below, Appellees.
• Court: Supreme Court of Delaware

Page 520

261 A.2d 520

PEPSICO, INC., a corporation of the State of Delaware, formerly known as Pepsi-Cola Company, Defendant Below, Appellant, v. PEPSI-COLA BOTTLING COMPANY OF ASBURY PARK, a corporation of

the State of New Jersey, and Pepsi-Cola Newburgh

bottling Co., Inc., a corporation of the

State of New York, Plaintiffs

Below, Appellees.

Supreme Court of Delaware.

Dec. 17, 1969.

Upon motion to dismiss appeal from Chancery Court. Appeal dismissed.

William S. Potter and Charles S. Crompton, Jr., of Potter, Anderson & Corroon, Wilmington, for defendant below, appellant.

E. Norman Veasey and Richard F. Balotti, of Richards, Layton & Finger, Wilmington, for plaintiffs below, appellees.

WOLCOTT, C.J., and CAREY and HERRMANN, JJ., sitting.

HERRMANN, Justice:

This is an appeal by the defendant from an order of the Court of Chancery requiring it to produce certain documents, to answer certain questions on oral deposition and written interrogatories, and to respond to certain requests for admission. The plaintiffs move to dismiss the appeal on the ground that such interlocutory order on discovery matters is not an appealable order.

In this action, the plaintiffs seek a declaratory judgment establishing that certain increases in the price of Pepsi-Cola concentrate or finished syrup, supplied to the plaintiffs by the defendant in 1963 and 1968, were made in violation of agreements entered into by the parties in 1945 and 1948. The Trial Court's order requires the defendant to produce documents and information relating to its operations, expenses and profits over a period of 25 years, commencing in 1945. The order preserved to the defendant, however, the right to apply to the Court for a protective order to prevent burdensome duplication of discovery and to prevent disclosure of any trade secret. The defendant contends that an intolerable burden of expense and trouble will be cast upon it if it is required to produce documents and information covering such long period of time, much of which it contends to be irrelevant to the issues of the case.

Thus, undue burden is the gravamen of the appeal before us. The Trial Court's determination of that issue against the defendant, in our opinion, did not decide a legal right and substantial issue. It follows that the appeal must be dismissed. The rule is settled that in the absence of a determination of legal right and substantial issue, an interlocutory order is unappealable. American Insurance Company v. Synvar Corporation, Del.Supr., 199 A.2d 755 (1964); Lummus Company v. Air Products and Chemicals, Inc., Del.Supr., 243 A.2d 718 (1968); Nadler v. Bohen, Del.Supr., 238 A.2d 836 (1968).

In Lummus we stated that, generally speaking, rulings on discovery fall within the class of interlocutory orders considered to be unappealable under the above rule. This is not to say, however, that all discovery rulings are unappealable. It is conceivable that a discovery order involving matters such as privilege, self-incrimination, privacy, or trade secrets, would determine such rights and issues as to become appealable under our rule. But that is not the situation here. It is conceivable, too, that discovery granted in a given case could be so burdensome as to be ruinous to the party, and so disproportionate to the amount in controversy as to amount to deprivation of due process,...