Peraza v. Helton
| Decision Date | 01 November 2016 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL NO.3:CV-12-1306 |
| Parties | PAUL PERAZA, Plaintiff v. N. HELTON, ET AL., Defendants |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Pennsylvania |
(Judge Conaboy)
Paul Peraza, an inmate presently confined at the United States Penitentiary, Beaumont, Texas initiated this pro se combined Bivens1-type civil rights and Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA)2 action while confined at the United States Penitentiary, Lewisburg, Pennsylvania (USP-Lewisburg). An Amended Complaint (Doc. 45) was subsequently filed.
Plaintiff raises multiple claims relating to the medical treatment which he has received while incarcerated at thefollowing federal correctional facilities: USP-Lewisburg; the United States Penitentiary, Big Sandy, Inez, Kentucky (USP-Big Sandy); the Canaan United States Penitentiary, Waymart, Pennsylvania (USP Canaan); the United States Penitentiary, Florence, Colorado (USP-Florence); and the Allenwood United States Penitentiary, White Deer, Pennsylvania (USP-Allenwood). Named as Defendants are the United States of America; and the following medical staff members of USP-Big Sandy; N. Helton, P. Cruz, S. Bhadra, Health Services Administrator P. Runyon, and D. Spradlin. Peraza is also proceeding against five USP-Allenwood staff members: J. Holtzapple, B. Buschman, K. Pigos, Ivan Navarro, and Francis Fasciana. Also named as Defendants are two USP-Cannaan staff: K. Kaiser and Holloway. The remaining Defendants are USP-Lewisburg Administrative Remedy Coordinator Nevill, and USP-Florence employees D. Allred and B. Cink.
Plaintiff states that he was stabbed 7 times on or about February 20, 2008 while confined at USP-Big Sandy. Following that incident, Peraza was taken to an outside hospital for treatment of his injuries which included a fractured scapula and a punctured left lung. See Doc. 45, p. 8. The Amended Complaint initially contends that although follow up treatment3 was recommended andPlaintiff made numerous complaints of pain, follow up care was not provided prior to his July 14, 2008 transfer to USP-Lewisburg.
Upon his arrival at USP-Lewisburg, Plaintiff's complaints about his scapula injury resulted in the prisoner being given Ibuprofen for pain and the taking of an x-ray. However, he was not seen by a specialist or provided with the follow up care which had been previously recommended during his stay at USP-Big Sandy. On March 24, 2009, Plaintiff was transferred to USP-Allenwood. While at that facility, Peraza continued to raise complaints regarding his alleged need for further treatment for his scapula which were allegedly ignored.
On or about April 28, 2011, Plaintiff was transferred to USP-Canaan where he again purportedly voiced medical complaints. While at USP-Canaan, Peraza was admittedly prescribed Naproxin for pain. However, he was purportedly refused other needed treatment. Plaintiff was sent back to USP-Lewisburg on August 11, 2011. Following a September 23, 2011 x-ray, Peraza was scheduled to see an orthopedic specialist. See id. at p. 14. However, he was told to rely on over the counter pain medication from the commissary which he purportedly could not always afford.
The Original Complaint was filed in this matter on July 5, 2012. According to the Amended Complaint, Plaintiff was transferred to USP-Florence during August, 2012. Although Defendant Allred initially prescribed Peraza pain medication andordered an x-ray, Plaintiff's subsequent requests for care were allegedly denied by Defendants Cink and Allred. Plaintiff's only non-medical claim is an allegation that Defendant Nevill obstructed his right to pursue administrative grievances at USP-Lewisburg.
Defendants responded to the Amended Complaint by filing a motion to dismiss, or in the alternative, for summary judgment. See Doc. 62. By Order dated September 3, 2014, Plaintiff's motion requesting that disposition of the request for summary judgment be stayed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(d) was granted. The Order provided the parties opportunity to respond to any outstanding discovery requests; submit any additional evidence regarding the pending dispositive motion; and/or file any motions to compel discovery.
Thereafter, Plaintiff filed three (3) motions to compel discovery. In addition to filing responses to the aforementioned motions to compel, Defendants submitted a motion seeking the issuance of a protective order. This Court subsequently granted the motion and directed that discovery be stayed pending disposition of the pending dispositive motion and the motions to compel were dismissed without prejudice.
Defendants' motion argues that entry of dismissal or summary judgment is appropriate because: (1) the claims againstthem in their official capacities are barred by the Eleventh amendment; (2) Peraza's claims are time barred; (3) a proper certificate of merit was not filed; (4) Plaintiff failed to exhaust his available administrative remedies regarding any of the deliberate indifference claims; (5) Plaintiff's claim of staff interference with his institutional grievances is not actionable; (6) a viable claim of deliberate indifference has not been alleged; (7) a medical negligence claim has not been established; and (8) Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.
Defendants' pending dispositive motion is supported by evidentiary materials outside the pleadings. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(d) provides in part as follows:
If, on a motion under Rule 12(b)(6) or 12(c), matters outside the pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion must be treated as one for summary judgment under Rule 56. All parties must be given reasonable opportunity to present all the material that is pertinent to the motion.
This Court will not exclude the evidentiary materials accompanying the Defendants' motion. Thus, their motion will be treated as solely seeking summary judgment.4 See Latham v. UnitedStates, 306 Fed. Appx. 716, 718 (3d Cir. 2009)(when a motion to dismiss has been framed alternatively as a motion for summary judgment such as in the present case, the alternative filing "is sufficient to place the parties on notice that summary judgment might be entered").
Summary judgment is proper if "the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); See also Saldana v. Kmart Corp., 260 F.3d 228, 231-32 (3d Cir. 2001). A factual dispute is "material" if it might affect the outcome of the suit under the applicable law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A factual dispute is "genuine" only if there is a sufficient evidentiary basis that would allow a reasonable fact-finder to return a verdict for the non-moving party. Id. at 248. The court must resolve all doubts as to the existence of a genuine issue of material fact in favor of the non-moving party. Saldana, 260 F.3d at 232; see also Reeder v. Sybron Transition Corp., 142 F.R.D. 607, 609 (M.D. Pa. 1992). Unsubstantiated arguments made in briefs are not considered evidence of asserted facts. Versarge v. Township of Clinton, 984 F.2d 1359, 1370 (3d Cir. 1993).
Once the moving party has shown that there is an absence of evidence to support the claims of the non-moving party, the non-moving party may not simply sit back and rest on the allegations in its complaint. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986). Instead, it must "go beyond the pleadings and by [its] own affidavits, or by the depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Id. (internal quotations omitted); see also Saldana, 260 F.3d at 232 (citations omitted). Summary judgment should be granted where a party "fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden at trial." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-23. "'Such affirmative evidence - regardless of whether it is direct or circumstantial - must amount to more than a scintilla, but may amount to less (in the evaluation of the court) than a preponderance.'" Saldana, 260 F.3d at 232 (quoting Williams v. Borough of West Chester, 891 F.2d 458, 460-61 (3d Cir. 1989)).
Defendants' initial argument contends that Plaintiff's action to the extent that it raises Bivens claims for monetary damages against them in their official capacities is barred by the Eleventh Amendment. See Doc. 65, p. 10.
The United States is generally immune from suit absent an explicit waiver of sovereign immunity, United States v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535, 538 (1980). This "immunity is jurisdictional in nature," FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 475 (1994), and extends to government agencies and employees sued in their official capacities. Antol v. Perry, 82 F.3d 1291, 1296 (3d Cir. 1996); Chinchello v. Fenton, 805 F. 2d 126, 130, n. 4 (3d Cir. 1986).
"Congress has not waived sovereign immunity for damages claims for constitutional violations." Germosen v. Reno, Civil No. 99-1268, slip op. at 13 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 20, 2000)(Vanaskie, C.J.). Therefore, entry of summary judgment in favor of the individual Defendants is appropriate to the extent that the Complaint asserts Bivens claims against them in their official capacities.
Defendants next argue that all of Plaintiff's pending FTCA and Bivens claims are time barred. Plaintiff counters that his claims should be deemed timely under the continuing violation doctrine.
With respect to the Bivens portion of Plaintiff's action, in reviewing the applicability of the statute of limitations to a civil rights action, a federal court must apply the appropriate state statute of limitations which governs personal injury...
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