Perdue v. C. Hager & Sons Hinge Mfg., Co., Inc.
| Decision Date | 01 November 2005 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 2:04CV799-M [WO]. |
| Citation | 412 F.Supp.2d 1227 |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Alabama |
| Parties | John L. PERDUE, Plaintiff, v. C. HAGER & SONS HINGE MFG., COMPANY, INC., Defendant. |
Jere L. Beasley; Larry Apaul Golston, Jr.; and Wilson Daniel Miles, III, Beasley Allen Crown Methvin Portis & Miles PC, Montgomery, AL, for Plaintiff.
Antonio D. Robinson, Lawrence Dale Owens, Jackson Lewis LLP, Atlanta, GA, Joseph Terrace Carpenter, Carpenter, Prater, Ingram & Mosholder LLP, Montgomery, AL, for Defendants.
The defendants ["Hager"] filed a Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. # 53) of plaintiff's ["Perdue"] claim of religious discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq. (2000), and state law torts, including "defamation," "negligence and wantonness," and "negligent hiring, training, supervision, and retention" (Doc. # 25). Perdue responded, and the parties submitted legal briefs and evidentiary materials supporting their positions (Docs.# 54-61, 63, 69). After thoroughly reviewing the parties' submissions, the court finds that the motion should be granted with respect to Perdue's discrimination claim, and Perdue's state law claims should be dismissed without prejudice.
After 23 years of virtually untarnished employment with Hager, Perdue, while working and using one of the company's telephones, inadvertently dialed the wrong number when attempting to contact the local power company to report a problem (Perdue Dep., 80-81; 212).1 A recorded voice that Perdue recognized answered the call, and Perdue left the following message:
Well, hello there, Bert Loeb. I am glad to see that you got into another line of business, but—and I'm surprised it's you, but since I have you listening—and you're probably wondering who this is— and I know of your background, your heritage, that you're Jewish. Jesus loves you. Jesus is the Messiah. He has come, and he is coming again. I hope you come to the saving knowledge of Jesus.
Bert Loeb ["Loeb"] owns a concrete design company called ConCreations, Inc., which is based in Montgomery, Alabama (Loeb Aff., ¶ 2). The number Perdue dialed belonged to Loeb's company, and after listening to the message and determining, using his caller identification system, that it had originated with Hager, Loeb recorded the message on tape and sent a copy along with a letter to Hager's human resources manager, David Ward ["Ward"] (Ward Aff., ¶ 2).3 The letter, which was dated 14 June 2004, stated as follows in its entirety:
Please find enclosed a cassette tape with a recording which may interest you. This message was received on my business phone on Friday, May 28, 2004, at 1:48 p.m. This time is during my office hours, and it is my assumption that it is also within your business hours.
Mr. Ward, is prophesizing [sic]4 indicative of your company's policy? The demeanor and anonymity of this phone call greatly concern me, as I'm sure would [sic] concern a large number of contractors, developers, suppliers, and architects in this area that are also Jewish. It is my understanding that the voice on this recording belongs to Mr. Sonny Beck. I respect Mr. Beck's religious beliefs but do not understand the necessity of his actions, especially emanating from your company. The phone number associated with this message was (334) 288-8873, which when I called, belongs [sic] to Hager Hinge in Hope Hull. I do not know Mr. Beck, [sic] and cannot help but wonder what instigated this call, and if I was the only person subjected to this behavior. [sic]
It is my feeling that if you are not aware of what is being practiced at your company, that it may benefit you to know. As a business owner, I would certainly appreciate someone letting me know if one of my employees' actions were such as these.
Thank you for your time in reading this correspondence and would [sic] appreciate your letting me know what measures, if any, are taken.
After receiving the letter and listening to the message, Ward conferred with Blake Earnest ["Earnest"], Hager's "Group Vice President Domestic [sic] Supply Chain Operations and Corporate Human Resources" (Ward Aff., ¶¶ 2, 4; Earnest Aff., ¶ 2). Earnest identified the voice—the same voice that had been recorded on Hager's electronic telephone greeting as Perdue's. (Earnest Aff., ¶ 7; Perdue Dep., 48-49). They agreed that Ward should meet with Perdue and his supervisors, Michael Perry ["Perry"] and Bob Dansavage ["Dansavage"] (Earnest Aff. ¶ 8; Ward Aff. ¶ 4).
At the meeting on 25 June 2004, Perdue confirmed that the voice on the tape was his and that he had left the message (Doc. # 63-1, p. 4; Ward Aff., ¶ 4; Perry Aff., ¶ 4; Dansavage Aff., ¶ 4).5 Ward suspended Perdue and conferred again with Earnest (Earnest Aff., ¶ 9; Ward Aff., ¶ 6). In a certified letter dated 29 June 2004, Hager terminated Perdue's employment. In relevant part, the letter stated,
We recently were contacted by Mr. Burt [sic] Loeb of Concreations. He was concerned about an anonymous voice mail message that was left for him on Friday, May 28, 2004 at 1:48 p.m. His caller ID showed that the call came from (334) 288-8873, the Hager Hinge Distribution facility where you work. He sent us a cassette tape with a recording of the voice mail message. We have reviewed the message carefully, and we have determined that the voice on the message is yours. Your conduct in leaving this message from a Hager Hinge facility telephone was completely unacceptable. The message sounded ominous and offensive, and the fact that it was left anonymously only supports that conclusion. Your references to Mr. Loeb's religious faith and personal background in this manner obviously caused concern for Mr. Loeb. Reasonable people would find these statements insulting, offensive and harassing. The fact that you made these statements from a Hager Hinge facility telephone, during working hours, put the company at substantial risk that its reputation would be harmed and that its customers and prospective customers would be justifiably offended. We are terminating your employment effective immediately, June 29, 2004, because of the anonymous, insulting and harassing telephone message you left for Mr. Loeb from a Hager Hinge facility telephone.
(Pl's.Ex.S, Doc. # 63-11).
Summary judgment can be entered on a claim only if it is shown "that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." FED.R.CIV.P. 56(c). A dispute is genuine if the "evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Green v. Pittsburgh Plate & Glass Co., 224 F.Supp.2d 1348, 1352 (N.D.Ala.2002) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986)). "A judge's guide is the same standard necessary to direct a verdict: `whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.'" Id. at 259, 106 S.Ct. 2505. "Credibility determinations, the weighing of evidence, and the drawing of inferences from the facts are the function of the jury, and therefore, the evidence of the nonmovant is to be believed and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor." Id. at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505.
On a motion for summary judgment, the court is to construe the evidence and factual inferences arising therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.6 Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144 158, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970); Mize v. Jefferson City Bd. of Educ., 93 F.3d 739, 742 (11th Cir.1996). Notwithstanding this advantage, a nonmoving plaintiff bears the burden of coming forth with sufficient evidence on each element that must be proved.7 Earley v. Champion Int'l Corp., 907 F.2d 1077, 1080 (11th Cir.1990); see Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548. When faced with a properly supported motion for summary judgment, a plaintiff must "go beyond the pleadings and ... designate `specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'" Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548. Although the evidence need not be in a form necessary for admission at trial, id., unsupported, self-serving allegations are insufficient to oppose a motion for summary judgment. Harris v. Ostrout, 65 F.3d 912 (11th Cir.1995); Fullman v. Graddick, 739 F.2d 553, 556-57 (11th Cir.1984).
Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer to "discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's . . . religion." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2000). A discriminatory act may be demonstrated upon showing that "religion ... was a motivating factor for any employment practice, even though other factors also motivated the practice." Id. at § 2000e-2(m). "All forms and aspects of religion, however eccentric, are protected except those that cannot be, in practice and with honest effort, reconciled with a business like operation." Cooper v. Gen. Dynamics, Convair Aerospace Div., Ft. Worth Operation, et al., 533 F.2d 163, 168-69 (5th Cir.1976) ().8
To survive summary judgment, a plaintiff alleging employment discrimination under Title VII must present evidence, either direct or circumstantial, sufficient to allow a reasonable fact finder to conclude that the defendant intentionally and unlawfully discriminated against the plaintiff, i.e., in a religious discrimination case, that the employment decision at issue was made "on...
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...that the employment decision at issue was made 'on account of [the plaintiff's] religious beliefs.''' Perdue v. C. Hager & Sons Hinge Mfg. Co., Inc., 412 F. Supp. 2d 1227 (M.D. Ala. 2005), quoting Young v. Southwestern Sav. & Loan, 509 F.2d 140, 143 (5th Cir.1975) (emphasis added). It is no......