Perdue v. Estate of Jackson
| Decision Date | 12 June 2013 |
| Docket Number | No. W2012-02710-COA-R3-CV,W2012-02710-COA-R3-CV |
| Court | Court of Appeals of Tennessee |
| Parties | DONNA PERDUE v. ESTATE OF DANIEL JACKSON, ET AL. |
DONNA PERDUE
v.
ESTATE OF DANIEL JACKSON, ET AL.
No. W2012-02710-COA-R3-CV
COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE AT JACKSON
May 22, 2013 Session
Filed June 12, 2013
The trial court granted summary judgment in this declaratory judgment action, finding that the will at issue was unambiguous. Having determined that the will at issue contains a latent ambiguity that must be resolved through the use of extrinsic evidence, we reverse the grant of summary judgment and remand for further proceedings. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
J. STEVEN STAFFORD, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ALAN E. HIGHERS, P.J., W.S., and DAVID R. FARMER, J., joined.
Terry Abernathy, Selmer, Tennessee, for the appellant, Donna Perdue.
Randy C. Camp, Jackson, Tennessee, for the appellees, Estate of Daniel Jackson, Deceased, by and through its Administratrix, C.T.A. Connie Higgs and Connie Higgs, Individually.
Testator Daniel Jackson died in 2011 leaving a holographic will, which stated: "All property and houses to be left to Connie Higgs - Phyllis daughter1 - Daniel Stepdaughter to be divided as she sees fit among kids . . . ." The will further provided that all contents of the house, with certain exceptions, were to go to Ms. Higgs. The will also provided that: "Nothing is to be sold off or auction[ed;] what [Ms. Higgs and] Frankie [and] Boys don't
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want to be given to Sue [and] Debra.2 Finally, the will stated that "[t]his was Phyllis['] wishes." The holographic will was admitted to probate on March 23, 2011.
On June 30, 2011, Appellant Donna Perdue filed a claim against Mr. Jackson's Estate in the Hardeman County Chancery Court alleging that she was the biological child of Mr. Jackson and asserting that she was entitled to unpaid child support. On July 15, 2011, Ms. Perdue filed a separate complaint for a Declaratory Judgment against the Estate of Mr. Jackson, and Connie Higgs, as Administratrix of Mr. Jackson's estate and individually (collectively, "Appellees"),3 seeking to have the will declared "too uncertain, too ambiguous, and too vague to constitute a valid testamentary disposition and to therefore adjudicate Daniel Jackson died intestate." The Declaratory Judgment complaint is the action at issue in this appeal. In Ms. Perdue's Declaratory Judgment complaint, she asserted that the phrase "among kids" is too vague to constitute an enforceable testamentary disposition because it is patently unclear which kids Mr. Jackson is referring to. On January 9, 2012, the trial court entered an order denying Ms. Perdue's separate claim for child support and refusing to name Mr. Jackson as Mr. Perdue's legal father on the basis of the expiration of the statute of limitations. Ms. Perdue filed a timely motion to alter or amend asserting that she was not seeking to have Mr. Jackson named her legal father, but merely sought an adjudication that Mr. Jackson was her biological father, based on DNA testing performed by Ms. Perdue, in order to pursue her Declaratory Judgment claim. Subsequently on April 4, 2012, the trial court entered an order in which the parties stipulated that Ms. Perdue was the biological daughter of Mr. Jackson. The trial court, however, did not amend its ruling dismissing Ms. Perdue's claim for unpaid child support. The claim for unpaid child support is not at issue on appeal.
On September 17, 2012, Appellees filed a Motion for Summary Judgment in the Declaratory Judgment action, arguing that Ms. Perdue had no standing to seek declaratory relief in this action and that the will was clear and unambiguous in that the term "kids" referred to the children of Ms. Higgs. The trial court heard oral argument on the Motion for Summary Judgment on October 3, 2012. The trial court made an oral ruling at the conclusion of the argument. The trial court ruled that in order to find a patent ambiguity, the court could not consider any parole evidence. According to the trial court, considering only the four
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corners of the will, Mr. Jackson clearly and unambiguously intended the word "kids" to refer to Connie Higgs' children, not Mr. Jackson's own children. Thus, the trial court concluded that the portion of the holographic will at issue contained neither a patent, nor a latent ambiguity and could be enforced without the need for extrinsic evidence. Specifically, the trial court stated:
You look at the will and you know he meant someone. There was a group of people he called kids. It's plural. It's not singular . . . .* * * When you look at this will, there's several things that come out to you. Connie Higgs is Phyllis' daughter and Mr. Jackson's stepdaughter. She is mentioned on several occasions. We know that she in the first paragraph is Connie.
She sees fit among kids. The only person that he mentions in that paragraph is Connie Higgs. He defines who she is. He says exactly who she is.
It's her kids. . . . . He wants what Phyllis wishes, he wants it to go to Connie, she does as she sees fit among kids. They're her kids unless they're not—unless she doesn't have kids plural, then we have a problem, but otherwise kids are Connie's children and that's what I am going to rule.
I find I can look at the four corners of this will and tell what he's talking about because . . . he's doing this for himself and Phyllis. He says again he wants it to be Phyllis, he says who Connie is, and the only person that paragraph that he's talking about is Connie. [H]e means Connie's children. Connie's kids.
Accordingly, the trial court granted Appellees' Motion for Summary Judgment. The trial court entered an order granting summary judgment in favor of Appellee on February 4, 2013. The trial court entered additional orders on January 31, 2013 and February 4, 2013, disposing of the remaining issues in the case. Ms. Perdue timely appealed.
The sole issue presented in this case is whether the trial court erred in granting Appellees' Motion for Summary Judgment on the issue of the construction of Mr. Jackson's will. A trial court's decision to grant a Motion for Summary Judgment presents a question
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of law. Our review is therefore de novo with no presumption of correctness afforded to the trial court's determination. Bain v. Wells, 936 S.W.2d 618, 622 (Tenn. 1997). This Court must make a fresh determination that the requirements of Rule 56 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure have been satisfied. Abshure v. Methodist Healthcare-Memphis Hosps., 325 S.W.3d 98, 103 (Tenn. 2010).
When a Motion for Summary Judgment is made, the moving party has the burden of showing that "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Tenn. R. Civ. P. 56.04. The Summary Judgment Motion filed by Appellees is governed by the summary judgment standard contained in Tennessee Code Annotated 20-16-101.4 Based on this statute, when the moving party is not the party that has the burden at trial, the moving party may accomplish summary judgment by either: (1) submitting "affirmative evidence that negates an essential element of the nonmoving party's claim"; or (2) demonstrating " to the court that the nonmoving party's evidence is insufficient to establish an essential element of the nonmoving party's claim." Tenn. Code. Ann. 20-16-101.
The trial court in this case granted summary judgment after concluding that no patent or latent ambiguity existed and that the holographic will unambiguously provided that Ms. Higgs' was to divide the property at issue among her own children. "The construction of a will is a question of law for the court." Briggs v. Briggs, 950 S.W.2d 710, 712 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997) (citing Presley v. Hanks, 782 S.W.2d 482, 487 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1989)). "The purpose of a suit to construe a will is to ascertain and give effect to the testator's intention." In re Estate of Eden, 99 S.W.3d 82, 87 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995) (citations omitted). According to this Court:
"It is the absolute right of the testator to direct the disposition of his property and the Court's [sic] are limited to the ascertainment and enforcement of his directions." Daugherty v. Daugherty, 784 S.W.2d 650, 653 (Tenn.1990) (citing Nat'l Bank of Commerce v. Greenberg, 195 Tenn. 217, 258 S.W.2d 765 (1953); Third Nat'l Bank in Nashville v. Stevens, 755 S.W.2d 459, 462 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1988)). "The cardinal rule in construction of all wills is that the court shall seek to discover the intention of the testator and give effect to it unless it contravenes some rule of law or public policy." Fisher v. Malmo, 650 S.W.2d 43, 46 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1983); see also
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Briggs v. Briggs, 950 S.W.2d 710, 712 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997); Presley v. Hanks, 782 S.W.2d 482, 487 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1989). In seeking out the testator's intent, we have several rules of construction to aid us in that effort. However, all rules of construction are merely aids in ascertaining the intent of the testator. Sands v. Fly, 200 Tenn. 414, 292 S.W.2d 706, 710 (1956)....
In gleaning the testator's intent, we look to the entire will,
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