Perdue v. State, 25511
| Decision Date | 04 December 1969 |
| Docket Number | No. 25511,25511 |
| Parties | William P. PERDUE v. The STATE. |
| Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court
1. Denial of the motion to excuse jurors because of prior knowledge of the crime was not erroneous.
2. The verdict of guilty is supported by the evidence.
3. There is no merit in the enumeration complaining of the trial court allowing the jury to determine whether a proper foundation was laid for testimony that the money was 'lawful United States currency.'
4. No error was committed in allowing a witness to testify after having remained in the courtroom while other testimony was given and after sequestration of witnesses had been ordered.
5. Permitting testimony as to identity of the appellant by photographs is not cause for reversal.
6. Refusal to permit introduction in evidence of a prior indictment against the appellant for the same offense was not error.
7. There is no merit in the complaint that the charge to the jury did not include the quantum of proof necessary to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
8. The trial court did not err in failing to instruct the jury that it could convict the appellant of robbery by use of an offensive weapon and that in such case it could recommend misdismeanor punishment.
9. The original verdict was not in accordance with law and was therefore properly rejected by the trial judge.
10. The enumerations relating to overruling the motion for directed verdict of acquittal and to the trial court's failure to define 'reasonable doubt' are waived.
Abner B. Dismukes, Sylvester, for appellant.
W. J. Forehand, Dist. Atty., Tifton, Arthur K. Bolton, Atty. Gen., Harold N. Hill, Jr., Executive Asst. Atty. Gen., Marion O. Gordon, William R. Childers, Jr., Asst. Attys. Gen., Atlanta, for appellee.
This appeal arises from the verdict finding William P. Perdue, also known as Willie Pride, guilty of robbery by force. He was indicted by the grand jury of Worth County, and was tried in the superior court of that county. The jury recommended him to the mercy of the court, and fixed his sentence at twenty years confinement. His enumerations of error complain of the refusal to excuse certain jurors, insufficiency of the evidence for conviction, rulings as to admission and rejection of evidence, allowing a witness to testify over a stated objection, failure to instruct the jury as to certain matters, and refusal to accept the original verdict of the jury.
1. One of the enumerations urges that the trial court erred in denying the appellant's motion to excuse jurors on the basis of their prior knowledge of the crime by having read newspaper accounts of it.
For support of this enumeration, appellant relies upon the qualification of only one prospective juror and that did not involve his having read newspaper accounts.
Rather, appellant's contention, as shown by his brief and its reference to the transcript, is that the prospective juror's answer to a question was a statement of his prior mental conviction as to the guilt of the appellant. In this connection the record shows, that the prospective juror stated that he did not know when the victim was robbed; that in answer to whether he had ever heard that the victim was robbed, he replied, 'I heard when he robbed him'; that the next time he saw the victim after having heard of the robbery it did not occur to him to ask anything about what happened; that he heard on the streets that the victim had been robbed, but that he had not discussed it on the streets with other people.
The objection made was that this prospective juror had discussed the case with other people outside the presence of the appellant, and that he should be stricken for cause.
What thus transpired did not amount to a statement of prior mental conviction as to the guilt of the appellant and did not require that the prospective juror be excused.
2. In three enumerations complaint is made that the verdict is contrary to the evidence and without evidence to support it, is decidedly and strongly against the weight of the evidence, and is contrary to the law and principles of justice and equity.
A study of the evidence convinces us that this complaint is not meritorious.
The testimony of the victim, 68-year-old William Henry Hurst, insofar as necessary to recite here, was the following.
In midmorning on the date in question he, with a passenger in his automobile, was driving along a highway in Worth Couty. He picked up the appellant, a young Negro man, who was hitch-hiking. When the passenger got out of the car at his destination, the appellant immediately moved from the back seat into the front seat. He then brandished a 12-inch long knife, put its blade to the victim's throat, threatened to cut his head off if he did not carry him farther, and slit the victim under his chin. Holding the knife to the victim's throat, he made him continue along the highway about two miles before ordering him to turn off onto a small road leading into a wooded area. The appellant forced the victim to proceed some distance aloug this road and then to stop the car.
There the appellant demanded that the victim hand over his money. The victim refused. Whereupon the appellant hit the victim across the nose with the back of the knife, reached into the victim's rear pocket, removed his billfold, took $76 therefrom, and put it in his own pocket. The appellant then beat the victim into unconsciousness.
When the victim regained consciousness he was locked in the trunk of his automobile. His money, watch and Masonic ring were gone.
About three hours later, while in a dazed and asphyxiated condition, he managed to maneuver so as to thrust his hand through the back seat deck area, wave a dirty red rag, and get the attention of a person who happened to be in the vicinity. That person summoned others to aid in extricating the victim from the trunk of his car. He was taken to a local hospital and later to one in another city. His condition was found to be critical, and approximately six weeks of hospitalization were required for his recovery.
While in the hospital he identified some pictures of the appellant. Several months later, he went to Syracuse, New York, and identified him in person. Upon the trial he positively identified him as the robber.
The person who found the victim gave testimony as to locating him locked in the trunk of his car, as to his condition and as to physical facts indicating a scuffle in the immediate area. Other persons who aided in his release gave similar testimony.
The appellant made an unsworn statement in which he admitted being in the victim's car with him on this occasion, but denied robbing him. He stated that the victim gave him the money and articles of personalty.
In view of the foregoing, we regard the verdict as being amply supported by the evidence.
3. Another enumeration urges that it was error to allow the jury to determine whether or not a foundation had been laid to enable the victim to testify that the money alleged to have been stolen was 'lawful United States currency.' Appellant argues that the court should have ruled on this question since it involved qualification of the witness...
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