Peretz v. United States
Decision Date | 27 June 1991 |
Docket Number | No. 90-615,90-615 |
Parties | Rafael PERETZ, Petitioner v. UNITED STATES |
Court | U.S. Supreme Court |
Gomez v. United States, 490 U.S. 858, 109 S.Ct. 2237, 104 L.Ed.2d 923, held that the selection of a jury in a felony trial without a defendant's consent is not one of the "additional duties" that magistrates may be assigned under the Federal Magistrates Act. That decision rested on the lack of both an express statutory provision for de novo review and an explicit congressional intent to permit magistrates to conduct voir dire absent the parties' consent. And it was compelled by concerns that a defendant might have a constitutional right to demand that an Article III judge preside at every critical stage of a felony trial and that the procedure deprived an individual of an important privilege, if not a right. In this case, petitioner Peretz consented to the assignment of a Magistrate to conduct the voir dire and supervise the jury selection for his felony trial, never asked the District Court to review the Magistrate's rulings, and raised no objection regarding jury selection at trial. However, on appeal from his conviction, he contended that it was error to assign the jury selection to the Magistrate. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction on the ground that Gomez requires reversal only in cases in which the magistrate has acted without the defendant's consent.
Held:
1. The Act's "additional duties" clause permits a magistrate to supervise jury selection in a felony trial provided that the parties consent. The fact that there is only ambiguous evidence of Congress' intent to include jury selection among magistrates' additional duties is far less important here than it was in Gomez, for Peretz' consent eliminates the concerns about a constitutional issue and the deprivation of an important right. Absent these concerns, the Act's structure and purpose evince a congressional belief that magistrates are well qualified to handle matters of similar importance to jury selection. This reading of the additional duties clause strikes the balance Congress intended between a criminal defendant's interests and the policies undergirding the Act. It allows courts, with the litigants' consent, to continue innovative experiments in the use of magistrates to improve the efficient administration of the courts' dockets, thus relieving the courts of certain subordinate duties that often distract them from more important matters. At the same time, the consent requirement protects a criminal defendant's interest in requesting the presence of a trial judge at all critical stages of his felony trial. Pp. 932-936.
2. There is no constitutional infirmity in the delegation of felony trial jury selection to a magistrate when the litigants consent. A defendant has no constitutional right to have an Article III judge preside at jury selection if he has raised no objection to the judge's absence. Cf. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 848, 106 S.Ct. 3245, 3255, 92 L.Ed.2d 675. Cf. also, e.g., United States v. Gagnon, 470 U.S. 522, 528, 105 S.Ct. 1482, 1485, 84 L.Ed.2d 486. In addition, none of Article III's structural protections are implicated by this procedure. The entire process takes place under the total control and jurisdiction of the district court, which decides, subject to veto by the parties, whether to invoke a magistrate's assistance and whether to actually empanel the jury selected. See United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 100 S.Ct. 2406, 65 L.Ed.2d 424. That the Act does not provide for a de novo review of magistrates' decisions during jury selection does not alter this result, for, if a defendant requests review, nothing in the statute precludes a court from providing the review required by the Constitution. See id., at 681, n. 7, 100 S.Ct., at 2415, n. 7. Pp. 936-939.
904 F.2d 34 (CA2 1990), affirmed.
Joel B. Rudin, New York City, for petitioner.
William C. Bryson, Washington, D.C., for respondent.
The Federal Magistrates Act grants district courts authority to assign magistrates certain described functions as well as "such additional duties as are not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States." 1 In Gomez v. United States, 490 U.S. 858, 109 S.Ct. 2237, 104 L.Ed.2d 923 (1989), we held that those "additional duties" do not encompass the selection of a jury in a felony trial without the defendant's consent. In this case, we consider whether the defendant's consent warrants a different result.
Petitioner and a codefendant were charged with importing four kilograms of heroin. At a pretrial conference attended by both petitioner and his counsel, the District Judge asked if there was "[a]ny objection to picking the jury before a magistrate?" App. 2. Petitioner's counsel responded: "I would love the opportunity." Ibid. Immediately before the jury selection commenced, the Magistrate asked for, and received, assurances from counsel for petitioner and from counsel for his codefendant that she had their clients' consent to proceed with the jury selection.2 She then proceeded to conduct the voir dire and to supervise the selection of the jury. Neither defendant asked the District Court to review any ruling made by the Magistrate.
The District Judge presided at the jury trial which resulted in the conviction of petitioner and the acquittal of his codefendant. In the District Court, petitioner raised no objection to the fact that the Magistrate had conducted the voir dire. On appeal, however, he contended that it was error to assign the jury selection to the Magistrate and that our decision in Gomez required reversal. The Court of Appeals disagreed. Relying on its earlier decision in United States v. Musacchia, 900 F.2d 493 (CA2 1990), it held "that explicit consent by a defendant to magistrate-supervised voir dire waives any subsequent challenge on those grounds," and affirmed petitioner's conviction. App. to Pet. for Cert. 2a; 904 F.2d 34 (1990) (affirmance order).
In Musacchia, the Second Circuit had affirmed a conviction in a case in which the defendant had not objected to jury selection by the Magistrate. The Court of Appeals concluded that our holding in Gomez applied only to cases in which the magistrate had acted without the defendant's consent. The court explained:
The conflict among the Circuits described by the Court of Appeals prompted us to grant the Government's petition for certiorari in the France case, see 495 U.S. ----, 110 S.Ct. 1921, 109 L.Ed.2d 285 (1990). Earlier this term, we affirmed that judgment by an equally-divided Court, 498 U.S. ----, 111 S.Ct. 805, 112 L.Ed.2d 836 (1991). Thereafter, we granted certiorari in this case and directed the parties to address the following three questions:
See 493 U.S. ----, 111 S.Ct. 781, 112 L.Ed.2d 844 (1991).
Resolution of these questions must begin with a review of our decision in Gomez.
Our holding in Gomez was narrow. We framed the question presented as "whether presiding at the selection of a jury in a felony trial without the defendant's consent is among those 'additional duties' " that district courts may assign to magistrates. 490 U.S., at 860, 109 S.Ct., at 2239 (emphasis added). We held that a magistrate "exceeds his jurisdiction" by selecting a jury "de...
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