State v. Caulfield, No. A04-1484.

• Decision Date: 05 October 2006
• Docket Number: No. A04-1484.
• Citation: 722 N.W.2d 304
• Parties: STATE of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Scott CAULFIELD, Appellant.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

722 N.W.2d 304

STATE of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Scott CAULFIELD, Appellant.

No. A04-1484.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

October 5, 2006.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Mike Hatch, Attorney General, State of Minnesota, Saint Paul, MN, Raymond F. Schmitz, Olmsted County Attorney, Daniel Paul Haugrud Reiff, Olmsted County Attorney, David F. McLeod, Assistant Olmsted County Attorney, Rochester, MN, for Respondent.

Roy G. Spurbeck, Assistant State Public Defender, Office of the Minnesota State Public Defender, Minneapolis, MN, for Appellant.

Heard, considered, and decided by the court en banc.

OPINION

HANSON, Justice.

Appellant Scott Caulfield challenges his conviction of possession of a controlled substance with intent to sell. Caulfield argues that a Bureau of Criminal Apprehension (BCA) laboratory report identifying a substance seized from him as cocaine was testimonial evidence under Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004). He contends that his confrontation rights were violated because the report was admitted into evidence even though the BCA analyst who prepared the report did not testify at trial. He also argues that Minn.Stat. § 634.15 (2004) violated his confrontation rights under the United States Constitution because it required him to request the testimony of the analyst 10 days before trial.¹ We hold that the report is testimonial and that its admission, under the statute permitting its introduction without the testimony of the analyst, violated Caulfield's rights under the Confrontation Clause. We also determine that the error in admitting the report was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt and therefore reverse and remand for a new trial.

During the fall of 2001, employees at Kathy's Pub in Rochester, Minnesota noticed the unusual behavior of Scott Caulfield, a frequent customer. Caulfield would repeatedly go into a back hallway or alley with people who had approached him in the bar, then return after 10 to 15 minutes.

On October 24, 2001, Rochester Police Officer James Novak and another Rochester policeman responded to a call from the bar prompted by Caulfield's behavior and the suspicion that Caulfield was dealing drugs out of the bar. The officers approached Caulfield and asked him to step outside, where Novak asked Caulfield whether he was selling drugs. Caulfield said he did not have drugs in his possession and consented to a search, which produced a small bottle with six plastic bags containing a fine white powder substance. Novak testified that Caulfield identified the substance as "drugs," then specified "cocaine."

Novak arrested Caulfield and seized the substance. Novak conducted a field test of the substance in one of the six plastic baggies and the substance tested positive for cocaine or cocaine solvents. The next day, Rochester Police Officer Tom Pingel also field tested the substance and obtained a positive result for cocaine.² Pingel then sent the substance to the BCA lab in St. Paul to confirm the preliminary indication that the substance was cocaine. The BCA analyst produced a report stating that the substance contained cocaine.

Caulfield was initially charged with fifth-degree possession of a controlled substance, in violation of Minn.Stat. § 152.025, subd. 2(1) (2004). Later, the charge was upgraded to third-degree sale of a controlled substance in violation of Minn.Stat. § 152.023, subd. 1(1) (2004). Subsequently, the BCA report was issued, and the BCA analyst was added to the state's witness list for Caulfield's trial.

Caulfield waived his right to a jury trial. The state presented the testimony of Officer Pingel, who explained the results of his field test and opined that the drugs were packaged for sale; Officer Novak, who explained the results of his field test; and two bartenders from Kathy's Pub, who described their observations of Caulfield over a period of months. The state also offered the BCA report. Caulfield objected to the admission of the report based on the United States Supreme Court's ruling in Crawford. After a discussion of the applicability of Crawford, the district court admitted the report without explaining its reasoning. Caulfield did not testify.

The district court found Caulfield guilty of third-degree sale and the lesser-included offense of fifth-degree possession. The court convicted Caulfield of third-degree sale and sentenced him to an executed 27-month term.

The court of appeals recognized that the BCA report could be testimonial, but did not decide the issue. State v. Caulfield, No. A04-1484, 2005 WL 1804353, at *4 (Minn.App. Aug.2, 2005). Instead, the court found that even if the district court abused its discretion in admitting the report, its admission was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at *6.

I.

Generally, evidentiary rulings— including the admission of chemical or scientific test reports—are within the discretion of the district court and will not be reversed absent a clear abuse of discretion. State v. Fields, 679 N.W.2d 341, 345 (Minn.2004); Lindberg v. Comm'r of Pub. Safety, 498 N.W.2d 301, 303 (Minn.App. 1993) (citing State v. Sneva, 353 N.W.2d 134, 134 (Minn.1984)). But whether the admission of evidence violates a criminal defendant's rights under the Confrontation Clause is a question of law this court reviews de novo. State v. King, 622 N.W.2d 800, 806 (Minn.2001).

Because the state does not counter Caulfield's assertion that the BCA lab report is a hearsay statement, the first point of dispute is whether the BCA report is testimonial. In Crawford, the Supreme Court revised the test for admission of testimonial out-of-court statements from a witness who is not present at trial. 541 U.S. at 59-62, 124 S.Ct. 1354. The Court rejected the test it had prescribed in Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66, 100 S.Ct. 2531, 65 L.Ed.2d 597 (1980), which allowed the admission of out-of-court statements that were either within a firmly rooted hearsay exception or bore particularized guarantees of trustworthiness. 541 U.S. at 59-62, 124 S.Ct. 1354. Crawford mandated that all testimonial statements be excluded unless the declarant is unavailable to testify at trial and the defendant has had a prior opportunity to cross-examine the declarant. 541 U.S. at 68, 124 S.Ct. 1354. The state does not contend that the BCA analyst was not available or that Caulfield had a prior opportunity for cross-examination.

The state argues that the BCA report is not testimonial, suggesting that it is not analogous to the specific examples of testimonial statements provided by the Supreme Court in Crawford (prior testimony and police interrogation) and noting the difference between a fact witness and a BCA analyst who can only provide foundational testimony. Further, the state argues that the preparation of such reports is nonadversarial, and that the analysts who prepare them are not directly involved in police investigations.

The state has the burden to prove that the BCA report is not testimonial. State v. Burrell, 697 N.W.2d 579, 600 (Minn.2005) (citing State v. King, 622 N.W.2d 800, 807 (Minn.2001)). The Supreme Court in Crawford declined to offer a comprehensive definition of "testimonial," but it did outline three general categories of testimonial statements:

• ex parte in-court testimony or its functional equivalent—that is, material such as affidavits, custodial examinations, prior testimony that the defendant was unable to cross-examine, or similar pretrial statements that declarants would reasonably expect to be used prosecutorially.

• extrajudicial statements * * * contained in formalized testimonial materials, such as affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or confessions.

• statements that were made under circumstances which would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement would be available for use at a later trial.

541 U.S. at 51-52, 124 S.Ct. 1354 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted; bullet points added).

The BCA lab report bears characteristics of each of the three generic descriptions offered by the Supreme Court in Crawford. The lab analyst submitting the report attested to her findings. The report functioned as the equivalent of testimony on the identification of the substance seized from Caulfield. The report was prepared at the request of the Rochester police for the prosecution of Caulfield, and was offered at trial specifically to prove an element of the crimes with which he was charged. The report conforms to the types of statements about which the Court in Crawford expressed concern—affidavits and similar documents admitted in lieu of present testimony at trial. See 541 U.S. at 43, 51, 124 S.Ct. 1354.

We have said the critical determinative factor in assessing whether a statement is testimonial is whether it was prepared for litigation. See State v. Bobadilla, 709 N.W.2d 243, 250-51 (Minn.2006) (noting that this court and numerous others have "determined that the testimonial question turns on whether government questioners or declarants take or give a statement `with an eye toward trial'"); State v. Scacchetti, 711 N.W.2d 508, 513 (Minn.2006) (recognizing that the central consideration in assessing potentially testimonial evidence was "whether either a declarant or government questioner is acting, to a substantial degree, in order to produce a statement for trial").

The BCA report was clearly prepared for litigation. The substance to be tested was seized from Caulfield by Rochester police as part of an investigation into his suspected drug dealing. It was sent to the BCA lab after the police had preliminarily determined that it was cocaine and Caulfield had been arrested. The BCA report was introduced by the state at trial for the purpose of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the substance was cocaine.

As to the state's argument that state crime lab analysts play a nonadversarial role and are removed from the prosecutorial process, we...