Perez v. Cleveland, No. 92-947
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of Ohio |
| Writing for the Court | A. WILLIAM SWEENEY; MOYER |
| Citation | 66 Ohio St.3d 397,613 N.E.2d 199 |
| Decision Date | 16 June 1993 |
| Docket Number | No. 92-947 |
| Parties | PEREZ et al., Appellants, v. CLEVELAND, Coroner, Appellee. |
Page 397
v.
CLEVELAND, Coroner, Appellee.
Decided June 16, 1993.
James N. Perry, Cincinnati, for appellants.
Joseph T. Deters, Hamilton County Pros. Atty., Scott C. Kirschman and Robert E. Taylor, Asst. Pros. Attys., for appellee.
A. WILLIAM SWEENEY, Justice.
The determinative issue posed in this appeal is whether appellants' complaint for declaratory relief brought pursuant to R.C. 2721.02 for relief pursuant to 313.19 presents a justiciable claim for relief. For the reasons that follow, we hold that appellants have stated a cause of action under R.C. 313.19, and, therefore, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and remand this action for further proceedings.
R.C. 313.19 provides as follows:
"The cause of death and the manner and mode in which the death occurred, as delivered by the coroner and incorporated in the coroner's verdict and in the death certificate filed with the division of vital statistics, shall be the legally accepted manner and mode in which such death occurred, and the legally accepted cause of death, unless the court of common pleas of the county in which the death occurred, after a hearing, directs the coroner to change his decision as to such cause and manner and mode of death." (Emphasis added.)
While at least three courts of appeals have held the above-emphasized language to be void for vagueness, see State ex rel. Dana v. Gerber (1946), 79 Ohio App. 1, 34 O.O. 48, 70 N.E.2d 111; Goldsby v. Gerber (1987), 31 Ohio App.3d 268, 31 OBR 553, 511 N.E.2d 417; and Roark v. Lyle (App.1952), 68 Ohio Law Abs. 180, 121 N.E.2d 837, the constitutionality of R.C. 313.19 is not before the court in this action.
Page 399
In reviewing a complaint upon a motion to dismiss pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(6), this court has held that a court must presume that all factual allegations of the complaint are true and that all reasonable inferences must be made in favor of the nonmoving party. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Lawson Milk Co. (1988), 40 Ohio St.3d 190, 192, 532 N.E.2d 753, 756. In addition, in order to grant a Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion to dismiss, it must appear beyond doubt that plaintiffs can prove no set of facts warranting relief. O'Brien v. Univ. Community Tenants Union, Inc. (1975), 42 Ohio St.2d 242, 71 O.O.2d 223, 327 N.E.2d 753, syllabus.
Appellants contend that their complaint alleged sufficient facts...
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Alexander Local Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Vill. of Albany, No. 16CA19
...E.g., State ex rel. Talwar v. State Med. Bd. of Ohio, 104 Ohio St.3d 290, 2004-Ohio-6410, 819 N.E.2d 654, ¶ 5 ; Perez v. Cleveland, 66 Ohio St.3d 397, 399, 613 N.E.2d 199 (1993). "This standard is consistent with Civ.R. 8(A), which provides for notice pleading and requires only (1) ‘a short......
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Dunning v. Varnau, Case No. 1:14cv932
...pleas has jurisdiction to both hear and determine the type of factual questions raised in an R.C. 313.19 action." Perez v. Cleveland, 66 Ohio St. 3d 397, 399, 613Page 18N.E.2d 199, 201 (1993); see also State ex rel. Blair v. Balraj, 69 Ohio St.3d 310, 631 N.E.2d 1044, 1048 (Ohio 1994) ("an ......
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Doe v. Adkins, 20CA08
...E.g., State ex rel. Talwar v. State Med. Bd. of Ohio, 104 Ohio St.3d 290, 2004-Ohio-6410, 819 N.E.2d 654, ¶ 5 ; Perez v. Cleveland, 66 Ohio St.3d 397, 399, 613 N.E.2d 199 (1993). A trial court may grant a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim only if it appears "beyond doubt from t......
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State ex rel. Edwards v. Toledo City School Dist. Bd. of Edn., No. 94-2104
...must be presumed to be true and all reasonable inferences must be made in favor of the nonmoving party. Perez v. Cleveland (1993), 66 Ohio St.3d 397, 399, 613 N.E.2d 199, 200. Additionally, in order to dismiss a complaint under Civ.R. 12(B)(6), it must appear beyond doubt that relator can p......
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Alexander Local Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Vill. of Albany, No. 16CA19
...E.g., State ex rel. Talwar v. State Med. Bd. of Ohio, 104 Ohio St.3d 290, 2004-Ohio-6410, 819 N.E.2d 654, ¶ 5 ; Perez v. Cleveland, 66 Ohio St.3d 397, 399, 613 N.E.2d 199 (1993). "This standard is consistent with Civ.R. 8(A), which provides for notice pleading and requires only (1) ‘a short......
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Dunning v. Varnau, Case No. 1:14cv932
...pleas has jurisdiction to both hear and determine the type of factual questions raised in an R.C. 313.19 action." Perez v. Cleveland, 66 Ohio St. 3d 397, 399, 613Page 18N.E.2d 199, 201 (1993); see also State ex rel. Blair v. Balraj, 69 Ohio St.3d 310, 631 N.E.2d 1044, 1048 (Ohio 1994) ("an ......
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Doe v. Adkins, 20CA08
...E.g., State ex rel. Talwar v. State Med. Bd. of Ohio, 104 Ohio St.3d 290, 2004-Ohio-6410, 819 N.E.2d 654, ¶ 5 ; Perez v. Cleveland, 66 Ohio St.3d 397, 399, 613 N.E.2d 199 (1993). A trial court may grant a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim only if it appears "beyond doubt from t......
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State ex rel. Edwards v. Toledo City School Dist. Bd. of Edn., No. 94-2104
...must be presumed to be true and all reasonable inferences must be made in favor of the nonmoving party. Perez v. Cleveland (1993), 66 Ohio St.3d 397, 399, 613 N.E.2d 199, 200. Additionally, in order to dismiss a complaint under Civ.R. 12(B)(6), it must appear beyond doubt that relator can p......