Perez v. Commonwealth

Docket Number0835-21-2
Decision Date19 July 2022
PartiesFRANCISCO BELTRAN PEREZ v. COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
CourtVirginia Court of Appeals

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF CHESTERFIELD COUNTY David E. Johnson Judge

Todd M. Ritter (Hill & Rainey, on brief), for appellant.

Mason D. Williams, Assistant Attorney General (Jason S. Miyares Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.

Present: Judges AtLee, Causey and Senior Judge Haley Argued at Richmond, Virginia

MEMORANDUM OPINION [*]

JAMES W. HALEY, JR. JUDGE

The trial court convicted appellant of aggravated involuntary manslaughter and sentenced him to twenty years of incarceration.[1] On appeal, appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain his conviction. He also argues that the trial court abused its discretion by sentencing him to "more than double the high-end recommendation of the sentencing guidelines." For the following reasons, we affirm the trial court's judgment.

BACKGROUND

"In accordance with familiar principles of appellate review, the facts will be stated in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the prevailing party at trial." Poole v. Commonwealth, 73 Va.App. 357, 360 (2021) (quoting Gerald v. Commonwealth, 295 Va. 469,472 (2018)).

In doing so, we discard any of appellant's conflicting evidence, and regard as true all credible evidence favorable to the Commonwealth and all inferences that may reasonably be drawn from that evidence. Gerald, 295 Va. at 473.

On the evening of August 15, 2020, appellant was at a nightclub in Chesterfield County, where he consumed seven beers. He left in his car around 2:00 a.m. the next morning. As appellant approached an intersection, the light changed from green to yellow, and he accelerated to "get through the light." When appellant entered the intersection, he realized that a white Toyota Scion "was coming from the opposite direction" and turning through the intersection. Appellant "realized it was too late to stop" as his car collided with the Scion.

Omni Rodriguez saw the collision as he waited at the stoplight. Rodriguez testified[2] that appellant's car "did not respect the light" and entered the intersection at a "very high" speed. Rodriguez did not know how fast appellant was travelling but testified that it was "not a correct speed" for the street. The force of the collision launched the Scion off the road and up an embankment, where it struck a light pole before coming to rest on bushes that separated a parking lot from the road. Rodriguez exited his car to check on the Scion's driver later identified as Justus Taylor, but he did not respond to Rodriguez. An autopsy revealed that Taylor died from blunt force trauma to his head during the accident; he was twenty years old.

Officer Stevens arrived at the intersection at 2:14 a.m. and saw two severely damaged vehicles. The Scion was off the road and had "heavy damage" to the driver's side and "front end." The front left tire and wheel assembly had been "ripped off." Appellant's car was "partially on the road[]" and had severe damage to the front end and "both driver and passenger side quarter panels." Vehicle debris was "in the middle of the intersection" and "several gouge marks" led from the intersection to the where the cars had come to rest. There were no signs that appellant took any maneuvers to avoid the collision.

An ambulance transported appellant to the hospital, where he consented to a blood draw at 3:47 a.m. Forensic analysis of his blood revealed a blood alcohol concentration of 0.145. When officers informed appellant that Taylor had died, he cried for "several minutes" and stated that he was "afraid of being deported."

Cailin Delaney, a forensic scientist at the Virginia Department of Forensic Science, testified that alcohol is a "central nervous system . . . depressant" that affects "vision" and "motor coordination" and can "increase reaction times." She explained that someone with a 0.145 blood alcohol concentration would have an impaired ability to respond to unexpected events and divide their attention between multiple tasks.

At the close of the Commonwealth's evidence, appellant did not move to strike and presented no evidence. The Commonwealth waived its initial closing argument, choosing to respond. Appellant then "submit[ted]" the case to the court without closing argument. After further inquiry from the court, appellant confirmed that he did not intend to present closing argument. The court found appellant guilty of aggravated involuntary manslaughter and continued the case for sentencing.

At the sentencing hearing, the trial court received a written victim impact statement from Taylor's mother. She expressed her joy and sense of "purpose" in being Taylor's mother; she felt that she had "lost part of [herself]" when he died. She was unable to drive for six months following the collision and was "still riddled with fear when riding in a car." Taylor's stepfather had suffered from depression and anxiety since Taylor's death. He and Taylor's mother both took medication for anxiety and insomnia. Taylor's mother expressed her anguish over the loss of her son and dismay over appellant's actions. She asserted that driving while intoxicated was a "choice made sober" and the consequence of those choices was not an accident. Accordingly, she asked the court for "the justice" Taylor "deserved for his life being stolen."

In argument, the Commonwealth cited the victim impact statement as "a perfect and succinct statement to the Court" and asked for "a sentence that could bring justice for [Taylor]." In response, appellant expressed "sympathy and regret for his actions." He proffered that he had fled from El Salvador five years earlier because of gang violence. He argued that his actions were involuntary and emphasized that he cried for several minutes when he learned of Taylor's death in the hospital. Appellant asked the court to consider the discretionary sentencing guidelines,[3] which reflected his lack of criminal history. In allocution, appellant apologized to Taylor's family and asked for their forgiveness. He stated that he made a "mistake" and was "not a bad person."

The court "reviewed and considered the presentence report, the sentencing guidelines, the victim impact statement, evidence presented, the argument by counsel, and [appellant's] statement." It found that this case was a "tragedy" that was "aggravated by the senselessness and needlessness" of Taylor's death. Quoting the victim impact statement, the court found that appellant chose to "drive without a license to a bar," "to sit at that bar and drink alcohol at the age of 20," and "to drive a vehicle while intoxicated." The court credited appellant's remorse but found that his decisions evinced reckless disregard for human life and the consequence of those decisions was not an accident. Accordingly, the court sentenced appellant to twenty years of incarceration. This appeal follows.

ANALYSIS
A. Sufficiency of the Evidence

Appellant argues that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction for aggravated involuntary manslaughter because it failed to demonstrate that his conduct "was so gross, wanton, and culpable as to show a reckless disregard for human life." He argues that not all "drunk-driving" related homicides are punishable as aggravated involuntary manslaughter and emphasizes that appellant's blood alcohol concentration was not high enough to "elevate[] punishment for a first offense DUI." Appellant, however, did not preserve his sufficiency argument for appeal.

"No ruling of the trial court . . . will be considered as a basis for reversal unless an objection was stated with reasonable certainty at the time of the ruling, except for good cause shown or to enable this Court to attain the ends of justice." Rule 5A:18. "Rule 5A:18 requires a litigant to make timely and specific objections, so that the trial court has 'an opportunity to rule intelligently on the issues presented, thus avoiding unnecessary appeals and reversals.'" Brown v. Commonwealth, 279 Va. 210, 217 (2010) (quoting West v. Commonwealth, 43 Va.App. 327, 337 (2004)). "Specificity and timeliness undergird the contemporaneous-objection rule [and] animate its highly practical purpose." Bethea v. Commonwealth, 297 Va. 730, 743 (2019). "Not just any objection will do. It must be both specific and timely-so that the trial judge would know the particular point being made in time to do something about it." Id. (quoting Dickerson v. Commonwealth, 58 Va.App. 351, 356 (2011)).

"To preserve an argument concerning the sufficiency of the evidence in a bench trial, a defendant 'must make a motion to strike at the conclusion of all the evidence, present an appropriate argument in summation, or make a motion to set aside the verdict.'" Taylor v. Commonwealth, 58 Va.App. 185, 189 (2011) (quoting Howard v. Commonwealth, 21 Va.App. 473, 478 (1995)). "[T]he failure to object to the sufficiency of all the evidence is a waiver of that issue just as if the defendant 'failed to object to any other matter at trial.'" Murillo-Rodriguez v. Commonwealth, 279 Va. 64, 80 (2010) (quoting White v. Commonwealth, 3 Va.App. 231, 233 (1986)). Appellant neither moved to strike the Commonwealth's evidence nor presented any closing argument to the trial court. He also did not move to set aside the verdict or ask the court to reconsider its ruling. Accordingly, he failed to preserve the sufficiency challenge he now raises on appeal. See Taylor, 58 Va.App. at 189 ("Sufficiency arguments not properly preserved are waived on appeal.").

Nevertheless appellant maintains that he preserved his sufficiency argument in his "opening statement," where he explained that the "gist" of his defense was "in term[s] of the...

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