Perez v. Se. Freight Lines, Inc.

• Decision Date: 20 March 2015
• Docket Number: No. 1D14–3821.,1D14–3821.
• Citation: 159 So.3d 412
• Parties: Carlos PEREZ, Appellant, v. SOUTHEASTERN FREIGHT LINES, INC. and Gallagher Bassett Services, Inc., Appellees.
• Court: Florida District Court of Appeals

159 So.3d 412

Carlos PEREZ, Appellant

v.SOUTHEASTERN FREIGHT LINES, INC. and Gallagher Bassett Services, Inc., Appellees.

No. 1D14–3821.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

March 20, 2015.

Bram J. Gechtman of the Law Offices of Bran J. Gechtman, P.A., for Appellant.

Aaron S. Bass of Silver, Bass & Brams, P.A., for Appellees.

Opinion

PER CURIAM.

In this workers' compensation case, Claimant appeals the portion of an order of the Judge of Compensation Claims (JCC) that denies temporary total disability (TTD) benefits on the finding that Claimant had not produced evidence of “objective relevant medical findings” as required by section 440.09(1), Florida Statutes (2013). The JCC employed this test at the insistence of the Employer/Servicing Agent (E/SA), based on the wording of section 440.09(1) : “[t]he injury, its occupational cause, and any resulting manifestations or disability must be established to a reasonable degree of medical certainty, based on objective relevant medical findings.” But Claimant argues the JCC used the wrong legal standard, because section 440.09 governs compensability and here the E/SA had stipulated to compensability of the injury. On de novo review, we agree with Claimant, for the reasons that follow.

Although a claimant has the burden to prove his entitlement to workers' compensation benefits, see Fitzgerald v. Osceola County School Board, 974 So.2d 1161, 1164 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008), once a claimant has established compensability of an injury, for example by a prior ruling or a stipulation, an employer/carrier cannot challenge the causal connection between the work accident and the injury, but only the causal connection between the injury and the requested benefit, see Engler v. Am. Friends of Hebrew University, 18 So.3d 613, 614 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009), and further, the burden of proof regarding that causal connection is on the employer/carrier “to demonstrate a break in the causation chain, such as the occurrence of a new accident or that the requested treatment was due to a condition unrelated to the injury which the E/C had accepted as compensable.”

Jackson v. Merit Electric, 37 So.3d 381, 383 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010). Although Jackson addresses the law as it stood before imposition of the “major contributing cause” standard of causation in 1994, see chapter 93–415, section 5, at 76, Laws of Florida (amending section 440.09(1) ), its holding translates to the current causation standard if a “break” is understood to occur when the work-related cause drops to 50% or less of the total cause of the need for the requested benefit. Cf. Cespedes v. Yellow Transp., Inc./Gallagher Bassett Servs., Inc., 130 So.3d 243, 248–50 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013) (citing Jackson and remanding for JCC to consider whether preexisting condition was major contributing cause of need for requested benefit). Here, the E/SA did not assert that there has been any break in the chain of causation from the compensable injury to the need for the requested TTD benefits, or indeed any major contributing cause defense at all.

By the stipulation of compensability, Claimant was absolved of the need to reestablish objective relevant medical findings, defined as “those objective findings that correlate to the subjective complaints of the injured employee...