Perez v. Perez
Citation | 1966 NMSC 10,409 P.2d 804,75 N.M. 656 |
Decision Date | 10 January 1966 |
Docket Number | No. 7666,7666 |
Parties | Enedina Lucero PEREZ, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Eddie PEREZ, Jr., Defendant-Appellant. |
Court | Supreme Court of New Mexico |
J. Benson Newell, Las Cruces, for appellant.
T. K. Campbell, Las Cruces, for appellee.
This appeal arises from the trial court's disposition of a divorce action filed by appellee of a divorce action filed by appellee Enedina Lucero Perez. The complaint was filed May 16, 1963, and defendant Eddie Perez, Jr. signed an acknowledgment and waiver on the same date. The complaint stated that no children were born to the parties during the marriage, sought only an absolute divorce, asked for defendant's payment of attorney's fees, and restoration of appellee's maiden name. On June 5, 1963, the final decree of the court was entered, granting the divorce, finding in accordance with the allegations of the complaint, and ordered defendant to pay one-half of plaintiff's attorney's fees and one-half of the costs of suit.
On November 15, 1963, the trial court granted a motion for order to show cause filed by plaintiff-appellee, directing defendant-appellant to appear and show cause why the final decree of divorce should not be modified to require appellant to pay the necessary expenses of the birth of his child, and for the support and maintenance of said child. The motion recited: (1) That in appellee's original complaint she failed to allege that she was then pregnant, whereas in fact she was pregnant; (2) that appellee gave birth to a daughter on October 20, 1963; (3) that although the final decree entered June 5, 1963, recited the parties' separation one month after their marriage, they continued to have sexual intercourse until shortly before the complaint herein was filed; (4) that although appellant admitted the child to be his, he had failed to pay the necessary expenses of the birth and to contribute to the support and maintenance of said child.
On November 27, 1963, poursuant to Sec. 21-1-1(59)(e), N.M.S.A., 1953 Comp., appellant moved to strike the order to show cause. The trial court, on December 6, 1963, overruled the motion to strike and ordered appellant to contribute to appellee $25 per month for the support of the child, and $25 per month toward hospital and doctors' expenses incidental to the birth of the child.
Also, on December 6, 1963, appellant filed an answer to the order to show cause alleging: (1) That the final decree shows the parties were married on November 29, 1959, separated one month later, and did not live together after the separation; (2) that appellee failed to advise her attorney that she was pregnant when the complaint was filed; (3) that the child was born October 20, 1963, and conception would have had to have occurred in January or February, 1963, assuming appellee carried the baby nine months; (4) that appellant denies intercourse with appellee during this period and that, therefore, he could not be the father of the child; and (5) that appellant, upon information and belief, stated that appellee was in California when conception occurred.
On January 10, 1964, the trial court found appellant in contempt of court for failing to pay the December 6, 1963, contribution to appellee, and allowed appellant until January 10, 1964, to make the December contribution, or serve 10 days in jail. The court expressly modified the final decree entered June 5, 1963, and found: (1) That appellee committed perjury when she signed the divorce complaint, and in her testimony in court; (2) that appellant is the father of the minor child in question; and (3) that appellant is well able to contribute the $50 a month so decreed.
On January 22, 1964, appellant filed notice of appeal.
Appellant's primary contention is the same as he made in the trial court in his motion to strike the order to show cause, i. e., that Sec. 21-1-1(59)(e), supra, should have been applied to the motion to strike instead of Sec. 21-1-1(60)(b), N.M.S.A., 1953 Comp.
Both our Rules 59(e) and 60(b) are taken from their corresponding counter-parts in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 59(e) states:
'A motion to alter or amend the judgment shall be served not later than [ten] 10 days after entry of the judgment.'
Rule 60(b) provides:
The Notes of Advisory Committee on Rules, 28 U.S.C.A., Rule 59, p. 15, state:
* * *'
In the Boaz case the court, at the close of plaintiff's evidence, dismissed her suit without prejudice and excused the jury. Two days later the court set aside the first order and entered an order of dismissal with prejudice. On appeal, plaintiff argued that under Rule 50(b), when a motion for directed verdict is made at the close of all the evidence, the power is reserved to the court to reconsider and change its ruling after the jury has been discharged, but no such reservation is expressed in the rules where defendant moves to direct a verdict under ...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Jemez Properties, Inc. v. Lucero
...to do justice in a given case, but it is limited to instances where there is a showing of exceptional circumstances. Perez v. Perez, 75 N.M. 656, 409 P.2d 804 (1966); Battersby v. Bell Aircraft Corporation, 65 N.M. 114, 332 P.2d 1028 This is certainly a case where we cannot say that "except......
-
Albuquerque Redi-Mix v. Scottsdale Ins. Co.
...stated that Rule 1-059(E) and Rule 1-060(B) NMRA "are taken from their corresponding [federal] counterparts." Perez v. Perez, 75 N.M. 656, 658, 409 P.2d 804, 805 (1966). When our state court rules closely track the language of their federal counterparts, we have determined that federal cons......
-
Koppenhaver v. Koppenhaver, 7406
...held to vest power in the trial court to modify judgments whenever such action is appropriate to effectuate justice. Perez v. Perez, 75 N.M. 656, 409 P.2d 804 (1966); Klapprott. Rule 60(b)(6), should be liberally applied to situations not covered in the preceding five clauses. Foundation Re......
-
State ex rel. Human Services Dept. in Matter of Kira M.
...interests of natural parents in exceptional cases. See SCRA 1986, Rule 1-060(B)(6) (relief from judgment or order); Perez v. Perez, 75 N.M. 656, 660, 409 P.2d 804, 807 (1966). Thus, while we recognize that the legislature has not authorized revocation on grounds other than fraud, we also re......