Perez v. Renfrow (In re Estate of Renfrow)

• Decision Date: 09 May 2013
• Docket Number: 1 CA-CV 12-0081
• Parties: In the Matter of the Estate of: WARREN E. RENFROW, Deceased. VALLERIE PEREZ, as Special Administrator of the Estate of Warren Renfrow, Petitioner/Appellee, v. LANCE RENFROW, Respondent/Appellant.
• Court: Arizona Court of Appeals

In the Matter of the Estate of: WARREN E. RENFROW, Deceased.

VALLERIE PEREZ, as Special Administrator of the Estate of Warren Renfrow, Petitioner/Appellee, v. LANCE RENFROW, Respondent/Appellant.

1 CA-CV 12-0081

COURT OF APPEALS STATE OF ARIZONA DIVISION ONE DEPARTMENT C

FILED: May 9, 2013

NOTICE: THIS DECISION DOES NOT CREATE LEGAL PRECEDENT AND MAY NOT BE CITED

EXCEPT AS AUTHORIZED BY APPLICABLE RULES.

See Ariz. R. Supreme Court 111(c); ARCAP 28(c);

Ariz. R. Crim. P. 31.24

MEMORANDUM DECISION

(Not for Publication -

(Rule 28, Arizona Rules of

Civil Appellate Procedure)

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

Cause No. PB2008-000210

The Honorable Andrew G. Klein

AFFIRMED

Fennemore Craig, P.C.

by Julio M. Zapata

Alexander R. Arpad

Phoenix

And

Dana Law Firm

by Matthew S. Dana

Mark E. Andersen

Attorneys for Petitioner/Appellee

Scottsdale

Sanders & Parks, P.C.

by G. Gregory Eagleburger

Attorneys for Respondent/Appellant

Phoenix

THUMMA, Judge

¶1 Lance Renfrow appeals from a judgment entered against him awarding the Estate of Warren Renfrow (Lance's father) $940,000 in restitution as well as attorneys' fees, costs and interest, and ordering that Lance forfeit all interest in the Estate. Finding no reversible error, the judgment is affirmed.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY ¹

¶2 Warren and Ruby Renfrow had two children: Lance, who is a party to this case, and Carol, who died in 2003. Warren and Ruby were married for 67 years until Ruby's death in April 2005, following a short illness that began on March 12, 2005. Warren and Ruby took pride in living debt free. At the time of Ruby's death, they had no debt of consequence. They had lived for years in their home on Edgemont Street in Scottsdale, owned by Warren and Ruby free of debt and valued at $440,000 just before Ruby's death.

¶3 Warren was 90 years old when Ruby died. Two months later, in July 2005, Lance placed Warren in an assisted living facility called Dream Catcher, where Warren lived until hisdeath in December 2007. In July 2005, Warren had assets generating sufficient income to pay for his living expenses, including Dream Catcher expenses, for the foreseeable future. When Warren died less than two years later at age 92, Lance held title to the Edgemont house. According to Lance, at the time of Warren's death, Warren's estate was worth just $3,500, consisting of a 1987 Porsche, furniture, clothing and personal effects. The reason and responsibility for this nearly complete transfer of Warren's assets are the keystone of this litigation.

¶4 In 2002, Warren signed a durable power of attorney naming Lance as his attorney in fact, and Lance filed Warren's income taxes thereafter. Although Warren had executed a Will years earlier, Warren signed a Codicil purporting to amend his Will in May 2005. At about that same time, Lance was involved with various documents transferring title to the Edgemont home, in the end making Lance owner of the property. Warren then signed various notes, deeds of trust and loan agreements to obtain loans on the Edgemont property.

¶5 In April 2005, Warren signed documents making Lance a signer and joint owner of a Bank of America checking account owned by Ruby and Warren. Almost immediately, Lance began writing checks on that joint account. From 2005 through 2007, Lance took funds from a line of credit on the Edgemont home and the Bank of America account for Lance's personal use and the useof his wife and his business. Although Lance's records noted these transactions were "loans," no promissory notes or similar documents were ever signed for the "loans."

¶6 In the years leading up to his death, Warren developed various medical issues, the precise nature and impact of which were hotly contested. The superior court found Warren suffered from senile dementia, Alzheimer's type, a condition that provided the basis for the court's conclusion that Warren had a mental impairment rendering him a statutory vulnerable adult.

¶7 In March 2008, Vallerie M. Perez² filed this action seeking to invalidate Lance's transfers and other relief. Vallerie was appointed Special Administrator of Warren's Estate and the parties participated in substantial discovery and motion practice. Among other things, Lance demanded a jury trial, which the superior court denied.

¶8 A six-day bench trial addressed the Estate's claims that (1) Lance exploited Warren, who was a vulnerable adult, in violation of Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) § 46-456(A) (2007);³ (2) Lance misused the power of attorney in violation of A.R.S. § 14-5506 and (3) Lance exercised undue influence overWarren.⁴ After considering conflicting evidence (including hundreds of exhibits and witness testimony), the superior court found in favor of the Estate on all three claims in a detailed 30-page minute entry issued August 25, 2011. On November 14, 2011, the court entered judgment against Lance awarding the Estate $940,000 in restitution as well as attorneys' and expert fees, costs and interest, and ordering that Lance forfeit all interest in the Estate. After post-judgment motions were resolved, Lance filed a timely appeal and this court has jurisdiction pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-2101(A)(1) (2013).

ANALYSIS

I. Right To A Jury Trial.

¶9 Lance argues the superior court erred by denying his demands for a jury trial. Whether a party is entitled to a jury trial is a question of law, meaning the review on appeal is de novo. Stoudamire v. Simon, 213 Ariz. 296, 297, ¶ 3, 141 P.3d 776, 777 (App. 2006).

¶10 Lance cites several cases, each relying directly or indirectly on Brown v. Greer, 16 Ariz. 215, 141 P. 841 (1914), for the boundless proposition that the Arizona Constitutionensures "either party to any litigation in the superior court is entitled to a jury trial as a matter of right." See Shaffer v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 113 Ariz. 21, 22, 545 P.2d 945, 946 (1976) (citing Stukey v. Stephens , 37 Ariz. 514, 516, 295 P. 973, 973 (1931)); see also Mounce v. Wightman, 30 Ariz. 45, 48, 243 P. 916, 917 (1926). Brown, however, construed a provision of the 1901 Arizona Territorial Code providing that "[i]n all cases, both at law and in equity, either party shall have the right to submit all issues of fact to a jury." 16 Ariz. at 218, 141 P. at 842 (quoting Ariz. Rev. Stat. ¶ 1389 (1901)). That code provision "was deleted from the 1928 Revised Code and was replaced by a provision that did not grant a substantive right to a jury trial in civil actions." Hoyle v. Superior Court , 161 Ariz. 224, 229, 778 P.2d 259, 264 (App. 1989).

¶11 Nearly 90 years ago, the Arizona Supreme Court rejected the argument that Brown did anything other than address a statutory jury trial right, which was then repealed in 1928. Donahue v. Babbitt , 26 Ariz. 542, 550, 227 P. 995, 997 (1924) (Brown's language "concerning the extent of trial by jury was gratuitous and entirely aside from the issue. Brown v. Greer does not announce the law in this respect in the face of at least four prior decisions to the contrary.").

¶12 Brown's dicta, moreover, is contrary to broad directives that simply could not exist if Lance's argument wascorrect. See, e.g. , A.R.S. Title 8 (providing for non-jury trials in juvenile matters in superior court); Title 25 (providing for non-jury trials in family court cases in superior court). Stated simply, Brown and its progeny cited by Lance "do not provide an independent statutory or constitutional basis for requiring a jury for equitable claims." In re Estate of Newman, 219 Ariz. 260, 274, ¶ 56, 196 P.3d 863, 877 (App. 2008).

¶13 To determine whether there is a right to a jury trial, the proper analysis focuses on the nature of the claim raised, not the division of the court in which it was filed. "'[T]here is no probate court apart from the superior court.' Thus, 'if a party to a probate proceeding is otherwise . . . entitled to trial by jury, it gets one.'" Id. at 272, ¶ 44, 196 P.3d at 875 (quoting Marvin Johnson, P.C. v. Myers , 184 Ariz. 98, 100, 102, 907 P.2d 67, 69, 71 (1995)). A jury trial right may be based on a statutory or constitutional provision or case law. Id. at 272, ¶ 45, 196 P.3d at 875. There are three claims for which Lance argues he had a jury trial right: (1) exploitation of Warren as a vulnerable adult in violation of A.R.S. § 46-456(A); (2) misuse of a power of attorney in violation of A.R.S. § 14-5506 and (3) undue influence by Lance over Warren. None of these claims provides Lance a jury trial right.

¶14 For all three claims, Lance cites to A.R.S. § 14-1306(A) and (B) for a jury trial right. Subsection A does notcreate a jury trial right but, rather, preserves the right if a constitutional jury trial right exists and a proper demand is made. A.R.S. § 14-1306(A) ("If duly demanded, a party is entitled to trial by jury in any proceeding in which any controverted question of fact arises as to which any party has a constitutional right to trial by jury."); see also Newman, 219 Ariz. at 272, ¶ 44, 196 P.3d at 875 (noting, by statute, "there is no mandatory right to a jury trial in probate proceedings unless one is constitutionally required. Thus, [the appellate court's] inquiry becomes whether any of the individual causes of action at issue here created a constitutional right to a jury trial."); Ariz. R. Civ. P. 38(a) ("The right of trial by jury shall be preserved inviolate to the parties."). A.R.S. § 14-1306(B) does not create a jury trial right but, rather, affords the superior court the discretion to use an advisory jury "[i]f there is no right to trial by jury . . . or the right is waived." Accordingly, neither subsection of A.R.S. § 14-1306 supports Lance's argument.

¶15 Lance next argues A.R.S. § 46-455(H)(4), expressly incorporated into § 46-456(F), establishes a jury trial right for the vulnerable adult claim. A.R.S. § 46-455(H)(4) provides that, following a liability determination, "[t]he court or jury may order the payment of punitive damages under common law principles that are generally applicable to the award of...