Perez v. State
| Decision Date | 25 January 2002 |
| Docket Number | No. 5D00-3511.,5D00-3511. |
| Citation | 804 So.2d 1265 |
| Parties | George PEREZ, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee. |
| Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
James Dickson Crock of James Dickson Crock, P.A., Daytona Beach, for Appellant.
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Alfred Washington, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Appellee.
Perez was charged by information with one count of conspiracy to traffic in heroin; five counts of sale and delivery of heroin; five counts of possession of heroin; two counts of trafficking in heroin; and two counts of sale of a substance in lieu of a controlled substance. Perez entered into a plea agreement with the State whereby he agreed to plead guilty to one count of conspiracy to traffic in heroin and two counts of trafficking in heroin. The plea agreement specifically provided that Perez would be sentenced pursuant to another agreement (the referenced agreement). The State nol prossed the remaining counts.
Both agreements are dated February 25, 1998. The referenced agreement, consisting of six pages divided into three sections, contains numerous conditions Perez was to comply with and provided for various periods of incarceration. The period of incarceration that was to be imposed depended on Perez's level of compliance with the conditions contained in the agreement.
The record reveals that Perez entered his plea on the same day the agreements are dated. The trial court approved the agreements, accepted Perez's plea, and set sentencing for another day. When Perez subsequently appeared for sentencing, he received a sentence of 84 months' incarceration.
Over eighteen months after the sentence was imposed, Perez filed a motion pursuant to rule 3.800, Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, arguing that he was entitled to resentencing under Heggs v. State, 759 So.2d 620 (Fla.2000). Specifically, Perez alleged that he was sentenced pursuant to the 1995 guidelines which required a range of between 67.3 and 185.875 months' incarceration and that in imposing his sentence, the trial court did not apply the discretionary 1.5 drug trafficking multiplier provided in section 921.0014(1)(b), Florida Statutes (1997). See Fla. R.Crim. P. 3 .702(d)(14) (providing that application of the multiplier is discretionary with the trial court). He further alleged that his sentence of 84 months exceeded that which would be permissible under a corrected 1994 sentencing guidelines scoresheet.
The trial court granted Perez's 3.800 motion and scheduled resentencing. Prior thereto, however, the State filed a motion to reinstate Perez's original sentence. In the motion and at the resentencing hearing, the State argued that Perez was not entitled to resentencing because he could be sentenced to the same period of incarceration under a 1994 guidelines scoresheet provided the multiplier was utilized. With the multiplier, the 1994 scoresheet calculated a range between 27.45 and 86.125 months; without the multiplier, the range fell between 26.6 and 44.3 months.
Perez, on the other hand, argued that ...
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Carrigan v. State
...of the drug multiplier is entirely discretionary with the sentencing court. See Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.702(d)(14). See also Perez v. State, 804 So.2d 1265 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002). The instant case thus does not involve correction of an erroneous scoresheet. Rather, the precise question presented is ......