Perez v. United States
Decision Date | 11 June 1963 |
Parties | Anna Maria PEREZ, Mirta Rivera, Nicholas Negron and Constautio Hermedas, Plaintiffs, v. UNITED STATES of America, Thomas Jones and Juan Torres, Defendants. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York |
Arthur D. Spatt, New York City, for plaintiffs.
Robert M. Morgenthau, U. S. Atty. for the Southern Dist. of New York, for defendant United States; Patricia A. Garfinkel, Asst. U. S. Atty., of counsel.
Defendant, United States Government, brings this motion to dismiss an action against Thomas Jones, a driver of a United States Post Office truck. Jones, while driving the Government truck, was involved in an accident with a motor vehicle owned and driven by defendant Juan Torres on November 3, 1962, in New York City. Plaintiffs, passengers in the Torres automobile, have brought an action in this Court against Jones, the United States, and Torres for damages sustained because of the alleged negligence of both drivers. Jurisdiction is based on the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b),1 since plaintiffs allege (and the Government concedes)2 that the Government truck was being driven by Jones in the course of his employment by the United States.
The Government moves to dismiss the action brought against Jones, relying on 28 U.S.C. § 2679. That section states:
The interpretation of this recently enacted statute (28 U.S.C. § 2679 (b-e)) appears to be a question of first impression. The Government contends that the express purpose of Congress in enacting this legislation is to bar suits against Government driver employees in their individual capacity when involved in an accident while in the scope of their employment. Plaintiffs contend that the purpose of the amendment is only to avoid duplication of actions in various jurisdictions, e. g., an action against the United States in the federal court and an action against the driver in the state court arising out of the same occurrence.
Careful examination of the statute and its legislative history indicates that the Government's position is correct, and that its motion to dismiss against the Government driver should be granted. Section 2679(b), quoted above, states that in the factual situation concededly present here, the remedy against the United States "shall * * * be exclusive of any other civil action * * *." The meaning of "exclusive" in this context is made clear by the legislative history of the statute. House Report No. 297, accompanying the bill ultimately enacted, states that the bill "would exclude suits against employees in their individual capacities on the same claims."3 The practical motivation behind passage of the bill was to insure that "suits against the employee-drivers will be tried as tort claims actions asserted against the United States."4 This method of insulating the federal employee-driver against possible liability was chosen after consideration of other proposed alternatives. For example, bills to provide government indemnification for the driver or liability insurance for the driver paid for by the Government5 were discarded in lieu of the statute eventually passed. Both of the discarded bills apparently assumed that prosecution of a suit against the driver in his individual capacity was permissible. It seems clear that the third alternative adopted was calculated to achieve a more effective result by precluding a suit against the driver in the first instance. Further reference to House Report No. 297 confirms this conclusion. That Report also stated (at pp. 2-5):
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