Perkey v. Department of Motor Vehicles

Citation42 Cal.3d 185,721 P.2d 50,228 Cal.Rptr. 169
Decision Date24 July 1986
Docket NumberS.F. 24708
CourtCalifornia Supreme Court
Parties, 721 P.2d 50 Christopher Ann PERKEY, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. DEPARTMENT OF MOTOR VEHICLES et al., Defendants and Respondents.

Brent A. Barnhart, Sacramento, for plaintiff and appellant.

Fred OKrand and Robert Burns as amici curiae on behalf of plaintiff and appellant.

John K. Van de Kamp, Atty. Gen., N. Eugene Hill, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Faith J. Geoghegan, Deputy Atty. Gen., Sacramento, for defendants and respondents.

BIRD, Chief Justice.

May the state compel an individual to provide a fingerprint as a condition for obtaining a driver's license, where the fingerprint is to be disseminated to third parties for purposes unrelated to motor vehicle safety?

I.

Vehicle Code section 12800, subdivision (c) requires each applicant for a driver's license to submit a fingerprint to the Department of Motor Vehicles (hereafter DMV or department). 1 In enacting this provision, the Legislature stressed the importance of such a requirement to maintaining a reliable licensing system: "The state has adopted a policy that the driver's license and identification card issued by the Department of Motor Vehicles are the basic identification documents in this state and that the state has a compelling interest in insuring the accuracy and integrity of this identification system. It is the purpose and intent of this act to further secure the accuracy and integrity of this system by requiring the application for a license or card to include a legible thumb or fingerprint of the applicant, effective July 1, 1982." (Stats. 1981, ch. 1102, § 3, pp. 4311-4312.)

The declarations 2 reveal that the DMV indiscriminately discloses the fingerprints obtained from license applicants to the general public. There are numerous admissions in the record of instances in which the DMV has sold its computerized fingerprint file--or access to it--to anyone who can afford to pay the fee. 3

In August of 1982, plaintiff (hereafter petitioner) Christopher Ann Perkey applied for a renewal of her driver's license. She filled out the renewal form, paid the application fee, passed the eye test and the written examination, but refused to be fingerprinted. The DMV denied her application for renewal.

The denial was based solely on petitioner's refusal to be fingerprinted. The department concedes that petitioner has otherwise satisfied all requirements for renewal. While the department has the discretion to issue a license to an applicant who has not complied with Vehicle Code section 12800, subdivision (c) (Veh. Code, § 12809, subd. (b)), the declarations establish that it is the department's policy to deny a license to any applicant who refuses to be fingerprinted.

Petitioner has never been fingerprinted by a government agency. She was first licensed to drive in New Jersey in 1959. She later obtained driver's licenses in Indiana and Wisconsin. She has also held licenses to teach public school in each of those states. However, none of the agencies involved conditioned the issuance of a license on her submission of a fingerprint.

Petitioner was first licensed to drive in California in 1975. At that time, the submission of a fingerprint on the driver's license application was optional, and petitioner elected not to be fingerprinted.

Petitioner concedes that the DMV could properly collect fingerprints solely for its own use in detecting and preventing fraudulent license applications. However, she contends that the collection and retention of fingerprints for unrestricted use in a statewide identification system violates the right of personal privacy guaranteed by the California Constitution. (Cal.Const., art. I, § 1.) Specifically, she argues that Vehicle Code section 12800, subdivision (c), by requiring the submission of a fingerprint for use in such a system impermissibly conditions access to a public benefit on the waiver of a constitutional right.

Petitioner sought a writ of mandate to compel the DMV to renew her driver's license without requiring a fingerprint. In the alternative, she requested a declaration that the fingerprint requirement is unconstitutional. The trial court denied the requested relief. It is from that judgment that petitioner appeals.

II.

Petitioner urges this court to strike down the mandatory fingerprint requirement as a violation of substantive due process. Although petitioner acknowledges that the state has the power to regulate the right to drive, she maintains that Vehicle Code section 12800, subdivision (c) is unconstitutional because a proper nexus has not been established between the fingerprint requirement and the state's interest in promoting highway safety.

When called upon to evaluate a substantive due process challenge to a legislative police power measure that does not impinge upon fundamental rights, constitutional principles require the reviewing court to apply the rational basis test. (See People v. Glaze (1980) 27 Cal.3d 841, 845-846, 166 Cal.Rptr. 859, 614 P.2d 291.) The right to drive is not a fundamental right under the California Constitution. (Hernandez v. Dept'ment of Motor Vehicles (1981) 30 Cal.3d 70, 80, 177 Cal.Rptr. 566, 634 P.2d 917.) Accordingly, the standard to be applied in determining whether the challenged provision comports with the requirements of due process is that enunciated in Hale v. Morgan (1978) 22 Cal.3d 388, 398, 149 Cal.Rptr. 375, 584 P.2d 512: "In the exercise of its police power a Legislature does not violate due process so long as an enactment is procedurally fair and reasonably related to a proper legislative goal." 4

The Legislature adopted Vehicle Code section 12800, subdivision (c) to ensure the accuracy of the department's drivers' license records. (See Stats.1981, ch. 1102, § 3, pp. 4311-4312.) As the declarations in this case demonstrate, the department faces many difficulties in its efforts to verify the personal identification information contained in the licensing system. In past years, the incidence of fraud and duplicate licensing has been steadily increasing, while the successful detection of such illegality has been declining. From September of 1981 to September of 1982, the last year that fingerprints were still optional, 1,858 incidents of suspected fraud were encountered by the department. Furthermore, a department study conducted in 1980 indicated that approximately 186,000 more driver's licenses had been issued to males between the ages of 20 and 44 than there were eligible persons in this category.

The significance of these fraudulently obtained licenses becomes evident when one considers the multitude of cases in which the department denies, suspends, or terminates the driving privileges of persons who are dangerous drivers. (Veh.Code, § 13352.) It is not uncommon for a person whose license has been revoked pursuant to a conviction for reckless driving or driving under the influence of drugs or alcohol to apply for a new license using false identification. To the extent that the fingerprint requirement will deter this type of fraud there can be little doubt that it will operate to promote highway safety.

Thus, the interception of applications from those who pose a serious danger to public safety clearly constitutes a proper legislative objective. The question remaining is whether the statutory provision requiring fingerprints is reasonably related to that objective.

The department asserts that the utilization of fingerprint technology is the only reliable means of ensuring the integrity of its records. The handwriting specimen furnished by the applicant is too small and too easily simulated to provide a verifiable exemplar. Similarly, the photograph appearing on the license does not provide an accurate means of detecting fraudulent applications since an applicant can easily alter his or her appearance with wigs, makeup, or a change in facial hair. The only assuredly accurate source of identification which remains immutable throughout an individual's lifetime is his or her fingerprints. Thus, the statutory provision requiring the submission of a fingerprint as a part of the license application process bears a reasonable and rational relationship to the goal of promoting the safe and lawful use of California highways.

Petitioner's next contention is that the mandatory fingerprint requirement violates her right to privacy. Preliminarily, this court must examine the procedure itself to determine whether it involves the kind of intrusive invasion of bodily integrity that has been found either to violate "due process" rights guaranteed by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments (Rochin v. California (1952) 342 U.S. 165, 172-174, 72 S.Ct. 205, 209-210, 96 L.Ed. 183) or to contravene the Fourth Amendment's proscription against "unreasonable" searches (Schmerber v. California (1966) 384 U.S. 757, 766-772, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 1833-1836, 16 L.Ed.2d 908).

The decisional authority in this area demonstrates that fingerprinting alone does not improperly infringe upon an individual's right of privacy. (See United States v. Sechrist (7th Cir.1981) 640 F.2d 81, 86.) In Davis v. Mississippi (1969) 394 U.S. 721, 89 S.Ct. 1394, 22 L.Ed.2d 676, the United States Supreme Court indicated that fingerprinting may not implicate the Fourth Amendment since it "involves none of the probing into an individual's private life and thoughts that marks an interrogation or search." (Id., 394 U.S. at p. 727, 89 S.Ct. at 1398; United States v. Dionisio (1973) 410 U.S. 1, 15, 93 S.Ct. 764, 772, 35 L.Ed.2d 67.) Unlike forcible stomach pumping (see Rochin v. California, supra, 342 U.S. 165, 72 S.Ct. 205) or the involuntary obtaining of a semen sample (People v. Scott (1978) 21 Cal.3d 284, 145 Cal.Rptr. 876, 578 P.2d 123), the physical process by which fingerprints are taken does not require "penetration[] beyond the body's surface." Therefore, it does not readily offend those...

To continue reading

Request your trial
24 cases
  • Alfaro v. Terhune
    • United States
    • California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
    • May 16, 2002
    ...purpose, and restricts disclosure of such information. (Civ.Code, §§ 1798.14, 1798.24; see Perkey v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1986) 42 Cal.3d 185, 192-193, 228 Cal.Rptr. 169, 721 P.2d 50.) These provisions are relevant in determining the extent of an intrusion upon privacy interests an......
  • Sheyko v. Saenz
    • United States
    • California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
    • October 9, 2003
    ...the use of fingerprinting for driver's licenses, again, because of the need to deter fraud. (Perkey v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1986) 42 Cal.3d 185, 190-191, 228 Cal.Rptr. 169, 721 P.2d 50.) The New York courts have rejected the claim that a relief applicant may refuse to give fingerim......
  • Bd. of Registered Nursing v. Superior Court of Orange Cnty.
    • United States
    • California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
    • January 15, 2021
    ...seq. ), which limits the collection and disclosure of such information by state agencies. (See Perkey v. Dept. of Motor Vehicles (1986) 42 Cal.3d 185, 191-193, 228 Cal.Rptr. 169, 721 P.2d 50 ; Bates v. Franchise Tax Bd. (2004) 124 Cal.App.4th 367, 373, 21 Cal.Rptr.3d 285.) Under the IPA, "[......
  • People v. Jeha
    • United States
    • California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
    • August 24, 2010
    ...as an enactment is procedurally fair and reasonably related to a proper legislative goal." ( Perkey v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1986) 42 Cal.3d 185, 189, 228 Cal.Rptr. 169, 721 P.2d 50.)C Defendant and amicus curiae, Prison Law Office, survey the negative consequences of the sex offend......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT