Perkins v. Bronx Lebanon Hosp. Ctr., 14 Civ. 1681 (JCF)
| Decision Date | 31 October 2016 |
| Docket Number | 14 Civ. 1681 (JCF) |
| Parties | CRAIG PERKINS, Plaintiff, v. BRONX LEBANON HOSPITAL CENTER, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York |
The plaintiff, Craig Perkins, filed this action against his employer, Bronx Lebanon Hospital Center (the "Hospital"), for violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq. ("FLSA") and New York Labor Law ("NYLL").1 Mr. Perkins' sole remaining claim in this action is that the Hospital violated the FLSA and NYLL by failing to pay him overtime compensation for his meal breaks. The Hospital has moved for summary judgment on this issue. The motion is granted.2
The following facts are taken from the defendant's statement of undisputed facts filed pursuant to Local Civil Rule 56.1 (Defendant's Statement of Undisputed Facts Pursuant to Local CivilRule 56.1 dated July 15, 2016 ("Def. 56.1 Statement")), which relies heavily on the stipulation the parties previously submitted in order to narrow the issues in the case (The Parties' Stipulation Concerning Remaining Claims and Uncontested Facts filed July 1, 2016). I have also relied on certain facts contained in the affidavit the plaintiff submitted in opposition to the motion. (Affidavit of Craig Perkins dated Aug. 16, 2016 ("Perkins Aff.")).3
The Hospital assigns one Safety Officer to its Grand Concourse building for each of three eight-hour shifts. (Def. 56.1 Statement, ¶¶ 9-10). In accordance with its interpretation of New York City law, the Hospital requires that at least one personcertified as a Fire Safety Director by the New York City Fire Department ("Fire Department") "remain on or about the premises of Grand Concourse at all times to monitor and provide assistance in the event of an alarm activation or other emergency." (Def. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 11).
Mr. Perkins, a certified Fire Safety Director, is employed in the Hospital's Safety Department as a Safety Officer. (Def. 56.1 Statement, ¶¶ 1-2, 12). When he is assigned to work at the Grand Concourse building, his primary work location is the Fire Command Station, which houses the fire alarm control panel, an instrument that both shows the location of any fire alarm activations in the building and displays non-emergency alerts related to the fire suppression systems within or around the building. (Def. 56.1 Statement, ¶¶ 15-16). While at the Fire Command Station, he has a number of different duties, including monitoring the control panel. (Def. 56.1 Statement, ¶¶ 16, 18). His work also routinely requires him to leave the Fire Command Station to perform duties in other areas, including around the exterior premises of the Hospital. (Def. 56.1 Statement, ¶¶ 19-20; Perkins Aff., ¶¶ 6-7). If an emergency were to occur while he was away from the Fire Command Station, he would receive notice of emergency alarm activations in one of two ways: "through the overhead alarms and speaker-strobes located throughout the building, which may be audible and visible outside the building around the perimeter" or through a communication to his cell phone, radio, or pager. (Def. 56.1 Statement, ¶¶ 25-26). When the alarm system is triggered, the FireDepartment is automatically notified. (Perkins Aff., ¶ 14; Deposition of Fifi Dubois dated March 3, 2016 ("Dubois Dep.") at 59). However, when the system is "off-line" it is "removed from active notification to the [F]ire [D]epartment." (Dubois Dep. at 59).
One half-hour of each Safety Officer's eight-hour shift "is automatically deducted . . . for [a] meal break[]."4 (Def. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 14). Meal breaks maybe taken at any time other than the first or last half-hour of a shift. (Def. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 35). Although Safety Officers must clock in before and clock out after their shifts using the Hospital's fingerprint-scanning time clocks, they need not do so before or after their meal breaks. (Def. 56.1 Statement, ¶¶ 13-14). Instead, prior to taking a meal break, a Safety Officer must inform the Hospital's Security Department, Telecommunications Department, and Engineering Department. (Def. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 24). He must stay on the Grand Concourse premises during the meal break and carry his "radio, cell phone and/or Fire Command pager" so that he can be contacted by Hospital personnel in an emergency, which wouldrequire his return to the Fire Command Center. (Def. 56.1 Statement, ¶¶ 23, 27-28). During meal breaks Security Officers have access to Hospital facilities and may eat and drink, read, and use their cell phones for personal business, among other activities. (Def. 56.1 Statement, ¶¶ 32-34). If a meal break is interrupted by an emergency, Hospital policy requires the Safety Officer to "take a subsequent, uninterrupted meal break . . . or to note the interruption in the [Fire Command Logbook] and notify his supervisor so that he may be paid for the time." (Def. 56.1 Statement, ¶¶ 14, 36).5
According to the plaintiff, he is rarely contacted via radio during a shift at Grand Concourse, and he "could not recall any specific instance in which he contacted Safety Department administration about an interruption to his break time." (Def. 56.1 Statement, ¶¶ 31, 40). Nevertheless, since approximately 2007, Mr. Perkins "has routinely recorded the phrase[s] 'no lunch or break,' 'no relief for lunch,' 'no lunch,' or other similar notations in the Fire Command Logbooks" due to "his position that his meal breaks are not 'bona fide'" because of the aforementioned restrictions on his break-time movement and, consequently, his break-time activities. (Def. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 41). There are no records indicating that he has ever provided notice of an interrupted or missed meal break "in accordance with departmentalrequirements" during the period relevant to this case. (Def. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 39).
Pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment is appropriate where "there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law," Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Utica Mutual Insurance Co. v. Munich Reinsurance America, Inc., 594 F. App'x 700, 701-02 (2d Cir. 2014). The moving party bears the initial burden of identifying "the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). A fact is "material" if it "might affect the outcome of the suit under [] governing law," and is genuinely in dispute "if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). The movant may discharge this burden by showing that the nonmoving party has "fail[ed] to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322.
If the movant meets this initial burden, the opposing party then must come forward with "specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Id. at 324 (quoting former Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)). In assessing the record to determine whether thereis a genuine issue of material fact, the court must resolve all ambiguities and draw all factual inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255; Vann v. City of New York, 72 F.3d 1040, 1048-49 (2d Cir. 1995). But the court must inquire whether "there is sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a jury to return a verdict for that party" and grant summary judgment where the nonmovant's evidence is conclusory, speculative, or not significantly probative. Anderson, 477 U.S at 249-50. "The litigant opposing summary judgment 'may not rest upon mere conclusory allegations or denials,' but must bring forth 'some affirmative indication that his version of relevant events is not fanciful.'" Podell v. Citicorp Diners Club, Inc., 112 F.3d 98, 101 (2d Cir. 1997) (quoting Quinn v. Syracuse Model Neighborhood Corp., 613 F.2d 438, 445 (2d Cir.1980)); see also Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986) (); Goenaga v. March of Dimes Birth Defects Foundation, 51 F.3d 14, 18 (2d Cir. 1995) (). "Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is no 'genuine issue for trial.'" Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (quoting First National Bank of Arizona v. Cities Service Co., 391 U.S. 253, 288 (1968)).
"The central issue in mealtime cases is whether employees are required to 'work' as that term is understood under the [relevant statutes]."6 SNET, 121 F.3d at 64. In this Circuit, whether an employee's activities "could potentially constitute 'work'" is a question of law for the court, and therefore susceptible to decision on a motion for summary judgment. Singh v. City of New York, 418 F. Supp. 2d 390, 397 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (quoting Holzapfel v. Town of Newburgh, 145 F.3d 516, 521 (2d Cir. 1998)), aff'd, 524 F.3d 361 (2d Cir. 2008).
After the court defines "work" as a matter of law, the fact finder determines "not only how much of plaintiff's time . . . [falls] within the court's definition of 'work' and would be compensable, but also how much of that time was spent with the employers actual or constructive knowledge." If a court determines that the activity at issue constitutes "work," an employee . . . is [] entitled to compensation for those hours of work performed of which the employer had actual or constructive knowledge.
Id. () (internal citation omitted) (quoting Holzapfel, 145 F.3d at 521, 524); see also Gibbs v....
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